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THE  
PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKAM  
OF  
DHARMAKĪRTI

*An English Translation of the First Chapter with the  
Autocommentary and with Elaborate Comments*

[ KĀRIKĀS I-LI ]



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
*An English Translation of the First Chapter with the  
Autocommentary and with Elaborate Comments*

[ KĀRIKĀS I-LI ]

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


NAVA NĀLANDĀ MAHĀVIHĀRA  
NALANDA  
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The Government of Bihar established the Nalanda Institute of Research and Post-Graduate Studies in Buddhist learning and Pāli (The NAVA NĀLANDĀ MAHĀVIHĀRA) at Nalanda in 1951 with the object, *inter alia*, to promote advanced studies and research in Buddhist learning, and to publish works of permanent value to scholars. This Institute is one of the five others planned by this Government as a token of their homage to the tradition of learning and scholarship for which ancient Bihar was noted. Apart from the Nalanda Institute, four others have been established and have been doing useful work during the last twelve or thirteen years, Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning at Darbhanga, K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna, The Bihar Rashtra Bhasha Parishad for Research and Advanced Studies in Hindi at Patna, and the Vaisali Institute for Post-Graduate Studies in Prakrit and Jainology at Vaisali.

As part of this programme of rehabilitating and reorientating ancient learning and scholarship, the Research Volume IV has been accomplished by the Institute. The Government of Bihar hope to continue to sponsor such projects and trust that this humble service of the world of scholarship and learning would bear fruit in the fulness of time.







## PREFACE

Dharmakīrti is no longer a mere name nowadays, though it was so a few decades back. His *Nyāyabindu* with the commentary of Dharmottara has run into several editions, and the critical edition of Stcherbatsky is still the best. The *Pramāṇavārttika* was edited by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana with the commentary of Manorathanandin and also the chapter called *Svārthānumāna* with the autocommentary of the author himself with Karṇakagomin's commentary. The edition of the autocommentary was based upon an insufficient manuscript and the major part was restored by the editor, Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, from the Tibetan rendering. Latterly Dr. Raniero Gnoli of Istituto Italiano Per Il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente has brought out a critical edition of this text<sup>1</sup> which has removed a real desideratum. Another edition of the same text has been brought out by Pandit Malvaniya, published from Varanasi.<sup>2</sup> These editions have the real advantage of being based upon reliable manuscripts and as such free from conjectural reconstruction. Scholars are no longer in a quandary so far as the text is taken into account. Thus a hurdle of major magnitude has been removed and for this service to the cause of Buddhist scholarship, students of Buddhist logic must handsomely acknowledge their obligation to the editors.

Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* is an extremely difficult text both in respect of language and of content. His language is far too brief, which can be intelligible only after supplying the links which intervene between one argument and another. Karṇakagomin's commentary supplies these ellipses and makes the text and the argument understandable. But in spite of the elaborate comments of Karṇakagomin, the autocommentary remains unintelligible in several places. There are so many surds and snags which have caused us a veritable headache.

A few words may not be out of place regarding the genesis of our endeavour. H. Nagasaki, a research scholar from Japan, proposed to

1. Raniero Gnoli : The *Pramāṇavārttikam* of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, (Serie Orientale Roma XXIII), 1960.

2. *Pramāṇa-vārttika* [Svārthānumāna-pariccheda] by Dharmakīrti, ed. by Dalsukhbhai Malvaniya, (Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series, Vol. II).

make a comparative study of Jaina and Buddhist logic. He has read with me Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* word for word. After finishing this he commenced to study the *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti. He insisted on making an English rendering of the text—a really ambitious and arduous work which I would have fain left out in view of my multifarious engagements and my advanced age. But I could not help doing my part when he put his shoulder to the wheel. In this way the work proceeded. First, we made a free rendering, thinking that a faithful translation would be as abstruse as the original. But on the insistence of H. Nagasaki, we had to recast the whole and make the English rendering as faithful as possible in an alien idiom. Of course, we had to supply the ellipses within brackets in order to make the argument of Dharmakīrti intelligible. H. Nagasaki is a fastidious scholar and even smallest minutiae would not escape his vigil. We have finished the first 51 Kārikās with autocommentary and commit it to the press with the object of eliciting comments and suggestions from competent scholars.

We ought to mention in this connection that Dr. E. Frauwallner translated the Kārikās of the *Pramāṇavārttika* from 42 to 187 (= 40—185 in the edition of R. Gnoli) with his critical comments from the Tibetan version into German.<sup>1</sup> Dr. E. Kanakura of Japan also translated much of the same portion from Sanskrit into Japanese.<sup>2</sup> We have translated not only Kārikās, but also autocommentary which is a hard nut to crack. The curious reader may utilize these writings which will help greater and firmer comprehension of Dharmakīrti's text and argument.

It was suggested by some competent scholars that we should also additionally publish the original text in order to help ready comparison and sure appraisal. We also realized the necessity of the incorporation of the text. There has been a departure from Dr. R. Gnoli's edition and we had to distribute the text in more paragraphs than in his edition in order to make the text and translation correspond to one another. The credit for this arrangement must go to H. Nagasaki.

1. E. Frauwallner : Beiträge zur Apohalehre. I. Dharmakīrti. WZKM. 39 (1932), S. 247-285 ; 40 (1933), S. 51-94 ; 37 (1930), S. 259 sq. ; 42 (1935), S. 93-102.

2. E. Kanakura : Bukkyogaku no shomondai (1935), pp. 746-763. Indo seishinbunka no kenkyu (1944), pp. 355-396.

We have tried to make the text as accurate as far as the resources have permitted.

In spite of our meticulous labour there will be some passages which will not be free from doubt. The fact of the matter is that Dharmakīrti's work is a critical commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga which is lost in the original.<sup>1</sup> From the commentary of Kaṇvakagomin it appears that Dignāga was severely mauled by his adversaries, not only by the Brāhmaṇa logicians, but by the Buddhist logicians also. Īśvarasena, the reputed teacher of Dharmakīrti, probably wrote a work criticizing Dignāga as ruthlessly as the latter had animadverted on the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*. We find detailed criticism of Dignāga in the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara and also Kumārila's works. Dharmakīrti as a loyal expositor and commentator has given his reply to these critics. In the absence of the text of Dignāga in the original it is very difficult to determine how far the exposition of Dharmakīrti is justified by the text of Dignāga. It is pretty sure that Dharmakīrti has given his original views and a new orientation to those of Dignāga. As a sample we may advert to Dharmakīrti's defence of Dignāga against Kumārila's trenchant criticism regarding *Non-perception* as a logical probans. In this connection we may refer to the tangled historical problem as to the relative chronology of these two Masters. The commentators are categorical in their assertion that Dharmakīrti answers the criticism of Kumārila. Though there is hardly any foundation for the tradition that Kumārila and Dharmakīrti were close relations, it is undeniable that they were not far separated from one another in time. It is probable that Dharmakīrti was a younger contemporary of Kumārila.

Dharmakīrti is a name to conjure with. He introduced a new epoch in logic and epistemology. His towering genius has been unambiguously acknowledged not only by his admirers,<sup>2</sup> but also by his detractors and critics. He was nick-named Vipra Bhikṣu. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, while criticizing his definition of perception, pays an

1. It is reported that Dr. Hattori of Japan has translated the 1st chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* from the Tibetan version into English and Dr. Kitagawa has translated the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and the first half of the 6th chapters of the same text from the Tibetan rendering into Japanese.

2. *Hetubinduṭīka* of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa (Gaekward's Oriental Series No. CXIII) p.1.



unstinted tribute by calling him a prodigy who could turn the whole world upside down by dint of his super-ordinary intellect.<sup>1</sup> Śrīharṣa, the author of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, has paid compliment to Dharmakīrti without reservation.<sup>2</sup> Dharmakīrti has thus been fortunate in his admirers and detractors alike. Criticism is a form of appreciation. No writer on logic or philosophy who came after Dharmakīrti could afford to ignore him. In point of fact, the philosophical writings of India, irrespective of the difference of religious persuasion down to the twelfth century, are replete with quotations from Dharmakīrti's works and their approval or disapproval.

It is a pity that we have no reliable biography of this uncommon man. It is stated that he came from South India and wrote his works in the Nalanda Mahāvihāra. Suan Tsang has not mentioned him and this has given rise to speculation. It may be that Dharmakīrti was too young to invite notice, or Suan Tsang's interests were enlisted on the side of metaphysics. It is our misfortune that most of his works are lost. If scholars try to restore Dharmakīrti's works either in Sanskrit or in a modern language, that will go a long way in the scientific assessment of Dharmakīrti's contributions in all fields.

If circumstances permit, the remaining portion of this chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* with the commentary of the author may be completed in a year also. The ground has been broken and the present treatise will serve as an earnest of the future shape. We propose to give a summary of the problems discussed in a separate section when the work will be completed.

SATKARI MOOKERJEE

1. *Nyāyamañjarī* (The Vignānagram Sanskrit Series), Part 1, p. 100.

2. *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* (The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 81), p. 442.

## ABBREVIATIONS

- A Answer.
- C Translators' Comment.
- HVNRSS Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series Vol. II. *Pramāṇa-vārttika* [*Svārthānumāna-pariccheda*] by Dharmakīrti, edited by Dalsukhbhai Malvaniya.
- K *Pramāṇa-vārttikam* of Dharmakīrti, *Svārthānumāna-pariccheda*, with the author's *vṛtti* and subcommentary of Karṇakagomin, edited by Rāhula Sāṅkr̥tyāyana, Allahabad, 1943.
- M Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* with a commentary by Manorathanandin, edited by Rāhula Sāṅkr̥tyāyana, JBORS.
- NB *Nyāyabindu*.
- O Objection.
- PV *Pramāṇavārttikam*.
- Q Question.
- SOR The *Pramāṇavārttikam* of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, edited by Raniero Gnoli, Series Orientale Roma XXIII, 1960.





PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKAM

SVĀRTHĀNUMĀṆA

(KĀRIKĀ I to LI)

WITH AUTOCOMMENTARY



# PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKAM

## (SVĀRTHĀNUMĀṆA)

Om ! Salutation to the Buddha !

**“Salutation to Samantabhadra who has cast aside the net of conceptual construction (of egoity and possessive instincts) and manifests himself in the profound and majestic bodies, and who sheds light penetrating into every side.”**

[C] As literal translation does not give out the full meaning of this introductory verse, we propose to give the interpretation of two commentators, Kaṇṇakagomin and Manorathanandin. The latter follows the former and yet it is to be admitted that his treatment is more lucid and intelligible and compact than that of his predecessor. First of all, a question is raised, why should this salutation to the Buddha be embodied in the text ? This bespeaks the author's religious faith and his devotion to the Buddha. But the work, which he contemplates to compose, deals with the problems of logic, epistemology and philosophy. The author can succeed in his mission only by putting forward convincing arguments and not by appeal to authority. The salutation has no bearing upon the subject-matter and thus may be regarded as an irrelevancy. The answer to this charge may be given as follows. This has been the custom with Indian writers. They begin any serious literary work after making salutation to their respective deities. The salutation constitutes an act of merit and acquisition of merit serves to eliminate the obstructions and handicaps which are too frequent in this imperfect world to allow a good task being accomplished without a hitch. But one may be fastidious to raise the query. Well, let it be conceded that salutation of one's deity is effective in removing obstruction. But why should he not offer this worship in privacy of seclusion ? Worship is of three kinds, physical, vocal and mental. Let the pious author perform this worship and make his salutation without inserting a hymn in the body of the book. This also is not a serious objection. It is intended that not only the author should achieve his task with success,



but also that the reader should be exempted from obstacles in reading the text. This will be secured by the latter's recitation of the verse which will amount to his own salutation. Furthermore the author does not want to show his originality by breaking with the time-honoured tradition. This will rather suggest a recalcitrant spirit which is offensive to good taste.

The author offers his salutation to Samantabhadra, one of the significant names of the Buddha. He is called so, because the well-being in all respects occurs to those who make their supplication to him. The Buddha's whole mission consists in the promotion of welfare of others. This hymn also eulogizes his extraordinary excellences. The first half records his possession of the capacity for being the teacher of mankind and his own fulfilment of the highest aim of life. He has cast aside the net of illusion which hides the vision of the ultimate truth. The illusion of the subject and the object and self and not-self vitiates the knowledge of ordinary persons. They are enmeshed in the trammels of this ruling ignorance. The Buddha has rent assunder this net of ignorance by his knowledge of truth. He has cast aside the veil which obstructs the vision of the truth to be realized and also the veil of passions. His body, that is, his essence of being, which is manifest in triple form, is inaccessible to the ordinary run of Buddhist monks and ascetics who follow the lower vehicle and are concerned with their own salvation. These bodies are majestic, because they pervade all knowable and all beings and their welfare. In other words, he is omniscient and, as science means power, he is omnipotent. The first line, thus, speaks of the supreme equipment of the Lord. He is free from all shades of ignorance and possessed of infinite knowledge and power. The second line speaks of his equipment as the saviour and benefactor of all living beings. He is good to all and emits the light of knowledge in the form of sermons for the welfare of all. His sermons illumine the entire gamut of reality. This shows his universal compassion and also the capacity for enlightening the deluded creatures.

To sum up, (1) the Buddha is perfectly free from all imperfection and ignorance (*svārthasampatti*), (2) he is good to all and has infinite compassion (*parārthasampatti*) and (3) he knows

the means of procuring salvation to others (*parārthasampādūpāyajñāna*)—which is given in the second line—*samantaspharaṇatviṣe*.

**"The majority of people having attachment to ordinary pursuits and lacking in the requisite strength of intellect (understanding), not only have no interest in and fail to appreciate the holy discourses, but being covered with the dirt of malice, even hate them.**

**I do not therefore entertain the thought that this work (of mine) will be of benefit to others, but my mind having developed an obsession fostered by prolonged study of science and scripture is bent (intent) upon this task (I desire to compose)."**

[C] In this *śloka* Dharmakīrti is supposed to refer to four defects of a student, which disqualify him from undertaking a serious study of science and philosophy. The first is a bad intellectual habit (*kuprajñatva*). This induces him to read soft literature and also sophistical works of the heretical schools. The second is weak intellect which is unequal to the hardship involved in the study of *śāstras*. A person of weak intellect prefers to remain an ignoramus (*ajñatva*). These two defects are alluded to in the first two adjectives—(1) *prākṛtasakti* and (2) *apratibalaprajñā*. The third is lack of interest and passion for knowledge (*anarthitva*) given out by the third adjective, *nānarthin*. The fourth defect is *amādhyaṣṭhya*, lack of free unprejudiced mind without prepossession, alluded to in the fourth adjective, *īrṣyāmalaiḥ parigataḥ*. This induces a positive hatred for these intellectual pursuits.<sup>1</sup>

The student must keep an open mind free from attachment and aversion. In other words, students must have a critical intellect free from dogmatic bias and emotional imbalance caused by attachment and antipathy.

The interpretation of this has caused great trouble to commentators. It may refer to the Buddha's preaching or to Dignāga's work (the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* on which Dharmakīrti writes his free explanation, the *Pramāṇavārttika*). Dharmakīrti thinks that generally people are too dull to understand the intricacy of his philosophy. They are fond of soft subjects and shun dialectical subtleties for their incapacity to comprehend the philosophical

discourses. They have developed strong antipathy also. So his work will not be appreciated by his likely readers. He also does not cherish any illusion on this matter. But why should he engage in this wild-goose chase? He gives his answer : he has developed especial obsession for these intellectual pursuits and perhaps he cannot indulge in other diversions. So he writes this book for his own satisfaction.

Since the determination of good from evil (not-good) is necessarily grounded upon inference and (further) there is divergence of opinion regarding the same (inference), the author states for the sake of the determination (of the issue as follows) :

**“A probans is the property of the logical subject; is necessarily concomitant with an element (attribute) of it (subject), and is necessarily of three varieties, since the necessity of invariable universal concomitance is limited to these. What are other than these (three) are fallacies of reason.” [1]**

[A *pakṣa* which literally means thesis or the subject-matter to be proved consists of the subject and the predicate. It is the whole proposition of which the subject is only a part]. The word *pakṣa* (in the expression, *pakṣadharmā*) stands for the subject. It is the case of transference of epithet (*upacāra*). The whole stands for the part (that is, by way of secondary function, *upacāra*). (O)[An objection is raised by Īśvarasena, the putative teacher of Dharmakīrti]. There is no justification for resort to *upacāra*. It does not serve any purpose. (A) No, since it serves to exclude the possibility that it (probans) is an attribute of all possible subjects (i. e., the minor term and the subject of the example, the secondary usage is justified). [Why should *pakṣa* mean the minor term and not others? The answer is]: This secondary usage is relevant to the logical subject, because it is a part of it (the proposition) and as such is competent to be expressed by the whole. So (the attributes such as) visibility and the like (which do not belong to the subject, *sādhya dharmīn*) are eliminated (as the probans).

[C] The probans (*hetu*) must be an attribute of *pakṣa* and denotationally included under the attribute which is an element thereof. This is a literal rendering of the statement of Dignāga.

The term *pakṣa* means the proposition or thesis to be established. It is the same thing as *pratijñā* of Nyāya. For example :

1. The hill is possessed of fire. (*pratijñā* or *pakṣa*).
2. Because it is possessed of smoke. (*hetu*).
3. All that is possessed of smoke is possessed of fire, for instance, a kitchen. (*udāharana*).
4. It is possessed of smoke (which is a concomitant of fire). (*upanaya*).
5. Therefore it is possessed of fire. (*niḡamana*).

These are the five members of Nyāya syllogism. Dignāga, however, objected to the inclusion of the fourth and the fifth. He was an advocate of three-member syllogism, i.e., of the first three. Dharmakīrti did not deem it necessary that the conclusion should be stated, since it is understood by implication from the two members, major premise and minor premise.

However that may be, Dignāga defines a probans as an attribute of *pakṣa*. The *pakṣa*, as explained above, is the whole proposition called thesis which is to be proved. Being a proposition it consists of the subject (S) and the predicate (P), e. g., the hill (S) is possessed of fire (P). Smoke is the probans, but it cannot be an attribute (predicate) of the proposition. So, as it stands, the expression, *pakṣadharmā*, is unmeaning. It is proposed that the *pakṣa* here stands for the subject and not the whole proposition. Though it is a part of the proposition, it is called *pakṣa* as secondary meaning.

A word has admittedly two functions, primary and secondary. The primary meaning of *pakṣa* is the whole proposition and the secondary meaning is the logical subject, a part of it. The secondary meaning must be related to the primary and a resort to the former must be warranted by a purpose. In the present case, the word for the whole is used to mean the part and this satisfies the first condition, viz., that there must be relation



between the primary and the secondary meaning. If the definition of a probans had been *dharmidharma*, the attribute of a subject, instead of *pakṣadharmā*, it might extend also to the *dṛṣṭāntadharmīn*, the subject of an example. But because the word *pakṣa* here means the logical subject by way of metaphor, this cannot be applicable to the other subject which has no relation with it. So the use of the metaphor involved in the transference of epithet is justified. There is a necessary connection and also a purpose, and thus the two conditions of secondary function are fulfilled.<sup>1</sup>

[This defence also is not accepted by Īśvarasena]. The very word, '*dharma*' (property or attribute), implies that it must have a *dharmin*, i. e., a substratum. So the expression, *dharmidharma*, i. e., a property of substratum, (though redundant), by the logical necessity of being meaningful, must imply that the word, *dharmin*, stands for *sādhya-dharmin*, the logical subject, because it stands in close relation (to the probans. The probans, say smoke, is first seen in the subject, i. e., hill. It may be objected that if the definition were amended as *dharmidharma* instead of *pakṣadharmā*), it might also stand for *dṛṣṭāntadharmīn* (example). [For example, if the universal proposition states the necessary concomitance of the probans and the probandum], the example as subject (*dṛṣṭāntadharmīn*) stands near (to the probans). [So the argument of close association or proximity does not avail]. By the clause, *tadamiśa-vyāpti*, being necessarily concomitant with a property of it, it is meant that (the probans, i. e., *dharma*) is necessarily existent in *dṛṣṭāntadharmīn*, (because it is by means of the example that the concomitance of the probans with the probandum is understood and so the probans must be a property of the example and the statement of it will be redundant. So there is no need for stating that *dharma* is the property of the example). It follows that the expression, *dharmin* (in

1. Compare the definition of *lakṣaṇā*, secondary function, as given in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* (Ullāsa 2, 9) by Mammāṭa.

*Mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito'tha prayojanāt |*

*Anyo'rtho lakṣyate yat sā lakṣaṇā, ropitā kriyā ||*

*dharmidharma*), would necessarily stand for the logical subject. [It is therefore not warranted to have recourse to the secondary function (*lakṣaṇa*) which is involved in the expression, *pakṣa-dharma*. If, on the other hand, the word, *dharmin* in *dharmidharma*, was supposed to stand for *dṛṣṭāntadharmin* in which the existence of the probans is necessarily known to be an undoubted fact, the expression, *dharmidharma*, would be liable to be construed as a restrictive assertion. In other words, the expression would mean that the probans is what is exclusively a property of the example. In that case the attribute, visibility etc., which belong to the example, jar and the like, would be regarded as the probans. But this is absurd. But why should it be construed in restrictive sense? The answer is that] the statement of what is known is redundant, but it may be suspected that this (redundant) statement is meant to imply restriction.

[C] The point at issue may be made clear in this way. In the definition of the logical probans (*hetu*) Dignāga laid down the condition that it must belong to the logical subject (*pakṣa-dharma*) and that it must be necessarily concomitant with another property of it, that is, the probandum (*tadāṃśavyāpta*). But the expression, *pakṣadharmā*, has created difficulty. *Pakṣa* is the whole proposition which is stated as the thesis to be proved. The probans cannot be a property of a whole. It is, therefore, contended by Īśvarasena that instead of *pakṣadharmā*, it should be *dharmidharma* and this would preclude resort to *lakṣaṇa*. But this amendment would raise another difficulty. The word, *dharmidharma*, is ambiguous. It may mean *sādhya-dharmin* as well as *dṛṣṭāntadharmin*. But the property of the latter is not necessarily a valid probans. What belongs to the example does not necessarily belong to the logical subject. But Īśvarasena contends that the expression, *dharmidharma*, necessarily means that the probans is a *dharma* (property) of *sādhya-dharmin*, the logical subject, because it is redundant. *Dharma* must belong to *dharmin*, subject or substratum. So the statement of it as *dharmidharma* is redundant. The meaning will be the same,

if the word, *dharmin*, is omitted and it is merely stated as *dharma* (property). But this redundancy is purposive. *Dharmin*, therefore, would stand for *sādhya-dharmin*, the logical subject.

But Dharmakīrti defends the definition, *pakṣadharmaḥ hetuḥ*. He observes that the expression, *dharmidharma*, need not exclusively mean that the probans is the property of *sādhya-dharmin*. It is no doubt a fact that the probans is related to the logical subject. But it is also related to the subject of the example. The necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum is observed in the example. For example, in the argument, "The hill is possessed of fire, because it is possessed of smoke, as the kitchen is", the probans, smoke, is the property, not only of the hill, the logical subject, but also kitchen, the example. So the amendment of the definition as *dharmidharma* will not make it free from difficulties. But it has been contended by the opponent that this difficulty does not arise. The probans is already known to be a property of the example at the time when the necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum is observed in the example. So there is no point in the contention that the expression, *dharmidharma*, would mean that it is the property of the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta-dharmidharma*). This is quite obvious from the second clause, *tadamaśena vyāptaḥ*. The probans must be necessarily concomitant with another property, i.e., the probandum. As this concomitance is already known in the example, the statement of it will be redundant, if the expression, *dharmidharma*, would mean *dr̥ṣṭānta-dharmin*.

But Dharmakīrti rejoins that the apparent redundancy involved in the statement, *dr̥ṣṭānta-dharmidharma*, need not necessarily imply that the probans is the property of *sādhya-dharmin*. The employment of redundant expression is purposeful no doubt. The expression, *dharmidharma*, if interpreted as *dr̥ṣṭānta-dharmidharma*, would be redundant and this redundancy may be avoided by taking *dharmin* in *dharmidharma* to stand for *sādhya-dharmin* no doubt. But this is not the only course left. Redundancy can be justified, if it is used in a restrictive sense, *niyamārtha*, also.

[This is apparent from Dignāga's own example]. A probans must exist necessarily in the homologue. From this

it follows that the probans must not be existent in the heterologue, that is, in those cases in which the probandum is necessarily non-existent. (But Dignāga) expressly states the non-existence [of the probans in the absence of the probandum. This express statement is redundant. But it implies that the probans must be non-existent in those cases only which are devoid of the probandum. The restricted interpretation is the implication of apparent redundancy].

[In the case of the definition of the probans, if it were defined as the property of the example (*dr̥ṣṭāntadharmīn*), though necessarily known to be such, the implication would be a restriction of the probans to the property of the example alone. This would imply that the argument, "Word is perishable, because it is visible, like jar", would pass muster.

This defence also does not satisfy. All this argument is a case of beating about the bush. The probans must be included (*vyāpta*) by the *sādhya* (*sādhya* *dharmā* (probandum). But the probans existing in *a* cannot be supposed to be included by the probandum existing in *b*. Thus it follows that the probans which is included under the probandum must belong to the same subject, *dharmīn*, and as such the expression, *dharmidharma*, would mean that the probans is the property of *sādhya* *dharmīn* (the logical subject, the minor term) and not *dr̥ṣṭāntadharmīn*. So the resort to the transference of meaning is unwarranted.

Dharmakīrti observes that it may be the case that the expression, *dharmidharma*, would imply that the probans must be a property of *sādhya* *dharmīn*, the logical subject]. But the understanding of the meaning by implication necessarily implies an arduous process. [And this is not easily intelligible to a student of average intelligence]. In order that (he) be spared (the hardship involved in the logical process of understanding of implication) that the Master has used the word *pakṣadharmā*. (It is clear therefore that the probans must belong to the logical subject, *sādhya* *dharmīn*.)

[In the definition of the probans, it has been stated that the probans must be *pakṣadharmā*, i. e., the property of the subject. (O) So] the probans *quā* property must be qualified by *pakṣa*, i. e., subject. [So what is the property of the subject *pakṣadharmā*], being determined by it, cannot be supposed to exist in any other subject. It will therefore be an uncommon attribute (and as such it cannot be known to be necessarily concomitant with the probandum which is possible only if it is attested in an example. But as defined, it cannot be a property of any other subject which is stated in an example). (A) This consequence does not arise. Because the adjective, ('a property of the subject'), is to be understood in the sense of *ayogavyavaccheda*, that is to say, it serves to exclude the possibility of the non-existence of the probans in the subject.<sup>1</sup>

(Dharmakīrti gives an example). '*Caitra* is an archer'. [It means that the quality of being an archer is assuredly present in *Caitra*). The second sense of exclusion is not meant here, as in the example, '*Pārtha (Arjuna)* is the archer'.<sup>2</sup> This will be elaborately explained by us.<sup>3</sup>

In the adjective, *tadāmśaḥ*, the word *amśa* means the property of the subject and not a part of it. The word *pakṣa* here does not stand for the whole proposition [consisting of the subject and the predicate. As has been said before, that it stands for the logical subject as its secondary meaning,

1. Of course all assertions are necessarily determinate, and as such it rebuts the opposite possibility. 'To be a property of the subject' may mean it must be so, and not otherwise (*pakṣasyadharmā eva na adharmaḥ*). It may also mean that it is a property exclusively of the subject and not of any other. This is called *anyayogavyavaccheda*. The qualification by the adjective in the case of '*pakṣadharmā*' is to be understood in the first sense. In those cases where the existence of property of the subject is doubted, the emphatic assertion is logically appropriate.

2. It is known to all that *Arjuna* is skilled in archery. So the assertion would be pointless. But it means that *Pārtha* is the superb archer. This superior excellence of archerhood is predicable of *Arjuna* alone and no other. Therefore the charge that if the probans is the property of the subject, it cannot be a property of any other, does not stand. The adjective, *pakṣadharmā*, means that the probans must be a property of and belong to the subject. It is not implied that it does not belong to any other.


3. Ch. IV. 190-194.

the subject being an unitary, monolithic concept cannot have any parts. It may be objected that *aṁśa* means part. How can you use it in the sense of *dharma* (property)? The answer is that] the meaning of a word must be understood by the intention of the speaker.<sup>1</sup>

*Vyāpti* consists in necessary existence of the super-concomitant (*vyāpaka*, i.e., the probandum) in the locus of the probans ; or conversely, the existence of the sub-concomitant (*vyāpya*) necessarily in the locus of the super-concomitant (the probandum).

[C] The idea is this. A probans can prove the probandum because it stands in a necessary relation to the latter (probandum). In other words, the existence of the probans is not possible without the existence of the probandum. Thus, for example, smoke cannot exist independently of fire. This is called *anvaya* which is in the language of J.S. Mill concomitance in agreement. It should be noted in this connection that the probandum may exist independently of the probans, but the latter cannot. The probandum is thus called *vyāpaka*, that is to say, of wider extension than the *vyāpya*. It may be represented thus by Euler's circle.

M—the probans



P—the probandum

The probandum must needs exist in the locus of the probans, though not exclusively. It may exist independently of the probans. But the probans can exist only in the locus of the probandum, that is to say, it cannot exist in a place where the probandum is absent. Thus the relation between the probans and the probandum can be stated as follows :

M exists where P exists. This is *anvaya*.

M does not exist where P does not exist. This is *vyatireka*, i. e., concomitance in difference.

By this (exposition of the relation of the probans and the probandum) the concomitance in agreement and concomitance

1. A word has no natural connection with the meaning, which is the position of the grammarian and the Mīmāṃsaka, but this is strongly refuted by the Buddhist.



in difference are affirmed and they are definitely known by their respective *pramāṇas* (perception etc.) and so also *pakṣa-dharma*, (minor premise, is known by its own *pramāṇa*).

These are the three kinds of probanses, effect (*kārya*), essential identity (*svabhāva*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*, which are endowed with the specified qualification as set forth in the major premise and the minor premise).

(1) There must be fire in this place, because there is smoke. (Effect, i. e., a case of inference based on causality).

(2) This must be a tree, because it is *śimśapā*. (It is a case of essential identity).


(3) In this particular place the jar is absent, because it is not perceived, though all the conditions of its perception (except itself) are present. Were it present, its existence must be an object of perception. It cannot be otherwise, (i.e., present and at the same time not perceived). This implies that the existence (of the jar) is possessed of all the requisite conditions for its perception. [And if it is not perceived in spite of the fullness of the conditions, it follows it is not present in the place under consideration].

Now of these (three), the first two are the probanses of a positive fact, and the third is the probans of negation.

[C] In this connection a question may be raised. The basis of necessary concomitance is said to be twofold, viz., causality and essential identity. But there are three kinds of probans. The negative probans, non-perception of the perceptible fact, is not a case of causality. If it be a case of identity, it will not be stated separately. Accordingly only two kinds of probans should have been set forth.

The answer is that the third probans derives its probative force from the relation of essential identity. The relation between jar and its perceptibility is one of essential identity. It is the nature of a jar to be perceived, if the conditions of perception are present. The absence of its perception is thus

conditioned by the absence of the jar, if other conditions are present. So non-perception functions as the probans, simply because the relation of identity holds between presence of the object and its perception and also between absence and non-perception. Thus we have got only two bases of necessary concomitance, viz, causality and essential identity. There are then these two kinds of probans, but the second based on identity admits of two divisions according as it proves a positive fact or its absence.



Compare K. 24.

*Etāviti svabhāvakāryaliṅgau*

*anupalabdheḥ svabhāvahetavantarbhavāt.*

If there is a real and natural relation (between two terms, then one can be regarded as in necessary concomitance with the other and as such the presence of) one necessarily implies (the presence of) the other. (This natural relation is possible), if the terms under question be bound by essential identity of nature. (O) If the terms be essentially identical, how can they stand in the relation of the probans and the probandum, ground and consequent, which implies numerical difference? (A) No. (The objection does not stand). The two terms (in spite of their identity) are conceived to be possessed of different attributes. This will be explained by us later on. As has been observed (by Dignāga), *all this logical function (of inference based upon the distinction) of the probans and the probandum is made possible by the conceptual differentiation of the subject and the predicate (substance and attribute).* The differentiation by way of substance and attribute is an intellectual construction, but not so the objective fact, (that is to say, this construction revolves round a real objective

entity and does not affect its objective character), 'There are cases of conceptual constructions (created by imagination) which are independent of the reality, (and as such) have no concern with objective facts. If inference were supposed to consist in the knowledge of one purely subjective idea from another, it would not lead to the attainment of real fact.<sup>1</sup>

As regards the relation of cause and effect, there is also natural relation, because the effect by its nature comes into existence from the cause. These two cognitions of the inferable probanda [(1) essentially identical and (2) cause], though not directly derived from the objective real and for that matter are not faithful representatives, are regarded as valid just like perception, because casuality and also identity are necessarily concomitant with objective facts.

[C] What are the valid grounds, i.e., probanses? What again is the warrant of such grounds of inference? These are problems of paramount interest. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and also the Jaina logician set down different kinds of probans. The Buddhist logicians headed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti affirmed that only those terms which stand in relation of causality and identity can be regarded as valid grounds for inference. In other cases, the relation between two terms cannot be regarded as necessary and universal. The proof of the necessity of the relation is furnished by the consideration that the opposite possibility cannot be entertained without contradiction. Such relation can subsist only between effect and cause. Effect cannot be thought to be possible without a relevant cause. Thus, for instance, we cannot conceive that an event can happen without cause. For example, smoke is an effect of fire and as such the former cannot come into existence in the absence of the latter. Thus the relation between cause and effect is necessarily thought to be universally valid, and so also with regard to terms which stand in relation of identity. For example, all geometrical deduc-

1. What is contended by Dharmakīrti is that even in case of essential identity, the two terms function as the probans and the probandum as they are conceived to be qualitatively different. In point of fact the difference is an imaginary construction. So inference is valid, because it is based upon objective truth.

tions are based on this relation. That the triangle has three sides and three angles, the sum of which is equal to two right angles, is based upon identity of nature of the triangle and the properties are deduced from its intrinsic character (*svabhāva*). In all other cases we cannot have the logical warrant that the relation is not accidental.

[Dharmakīrti asserts] that inference has as much title to validity as perception, which is regarded as the only source of valid cognition by the materialist]. The validity of perception is based upon its necessary concomitance with the object. If it (perception) were to occur in the absence of (the relevant) object, it must (be wrong perception and be misleading and) lack in necessary verification. (So the two, perception and inference, are on equal footing). As for necessary concomitance (non-contingency) of one different entity with another different entity what can it be other than causality? There can be no natural necessity of concomitance between two terms of which one is not bound up with the other.

(O) If the effect be the ground of inference, that is, the probans on account of its origination from that (cause), then the relation of being the probans and the probandum should hold in respect of all particular aspects in conformity with the relation of the cause and effect. (A) No. An entity which occurs in the absence of the other (*tadabhāve*)<sup>1</sup> cannot stand in the necessary relation of causality thereto.

[C] It is held by some logicians, such as the Vaiśeṣika, that smoke is the probans of fire, because smoke is conjoined (*sanyogī*) with fire. Dignāga objects to this position of the Vaiśeṣika. If conjunction be the basis of necessary relation of smoke with

1. *Tadabhāve bhavatas tadutpattiniyamābhāvāt*. This sentence requires elucidation. *Tat*, the other, may be interpreted to refer to the specific qualities of the cause, say fire. Thus the specific qualities of fire are not held to enter into the causal relation with smoke, because smoke occurs even when these specific qualities are absent. So *tadabhāve* means *kāraṇagataviśeṣadharmābhāve*. On the other hand, it may mean *kāranābhāve*, i. e., the generic qualities found in the effect, smoke, are found in other substances which occur independently of the cause, fire. So the quality of being existent or a substance etc. found in smoke are not regarded as part and parcel of the effect due to the causality of fire.

fire, then smoke as a whole, that is, with all its generic and specific properties should prove fire with all its generic and specific properties. But it is found that fire with the property of firehood only is inferable and not with its specific qualities, such as the quality of being of a specific colour or temperature, which occur according as fire is produced by dry leaves or dried hay or the like. Again smoke with its character of being smoke is the probans and not with the generic character, such as being a substance or an earthy entity. But smoke and fire as found in conjunction do exhibit these qualities ; and so the whole smoke with its specific and generic qualities should give rise to inference of the whole fire with its generic and specific qualities. But this is never possible. Smoke as possessed of smokeness and not as substance is the probans and fire as possessed of fireness and not as endowed with variant colour and temperature is the probandum. If smoke is understood merely as a substance, it will not be the probans of fire, and if fire is understood as one of a particular shade of colour, temperature or size, it cannot be the probandum. Fire in general is the probandum and smoke *quā* smoke, i. e., a particular substance is the probans. The same reasons which have been adduced by Dignāga against conjunction as the probans and conjoined as the probandum do apply to smoke and fire viewed also as effect and cause. If smoke be the probans on account of being the product of fire, why should it not with all the general qualities such as existence and substancehood associated with it be so ? Again, why should not fire with all its specific qualities be the probandum ? The particular fire which produces the particular smoke is observed with all these qualities. But the relation of logical concomitance is not on all fours with the observed relation of cause and effect. It is not a particular fire that is inferable and smoke becomes the probans when it is understood apart from its generic qualities such as substancehood, existence, earthiness etc. . The logical relation is selective and exclusive. The probans is abstracted from the general qualities and the probandum from its specific ones. The actual causal relation however holds between facts possessed of all the qualities. Such being the case, the objections raised by Dignāga against other logicians also apply to his position. Causality as the basis of necessary concomitance does not fare a whit better than conjunction etc,

We have already seen that what is inferred is only that which is possessed of general character. Thus, for example, fire as such that is characterized by firehood is inferred. But actual fire is possessed of many other qualities, for example, its specific colour, size, temperature and so on. These specific qualities, though they are part and parcel of fire, cannot be inferred. The causal relation between fire and smoke holds between the whole fire and whole smoke, and such causality being the basis of the necessary concomitance, the whole fire with all its general and specific qualities should be inferred, or it must be maintained that the causal relation holds between a part of fire and a part of smoke. Smoke also serves as the probans only in as far as it is characterized by the specific quality of smokehood and not its general attributes such as existence or substantiality. Smoke regarded as mere existence or mere substance, cannot lead to the inference of the fire.<sup>1</sup>

To this objection Dharmakīrti answers that the relation of causality between fire and smoke is to be determined on the basis of concomitance in agreement and in difference. For instance, fire produced by different kinds of fuel, e.g., faggot sticks, leaves, kerosine, petrol and so on has different qualities. But what is common is firehood, that is, the general qualities belonging to fire that is inferred. It is not asserted that smoke is produced by fire possessing particular colour, size or temperature. Smoke is produced even when those qualities are found to vary. As regards existence, substantiality etc., they are found to be present in other substances such as jar or a piece of iron. So they are not taken into account in the assessment of causal relation.<sup>2</sup>

Such being the case, it follows.

**“The effect is the probans of the cause with all those characteristic attributes with which it (the effect) is necessarily concomitant. Or the effect is necessarily concomitant with and thus the probans**

1. K. 27, 4-7.

2. *Tadabhāve bhavatas tadutpattiniyamābhāvāt.* (PV. 3, 11-12).



of the cause, so far as it is endowed with those attributes without which it is not understood as the probans."<sup>1</sup>

(The effect is) "**the probans**" (of the cause in so far as it is understood to be possessed) of those (generic attributes).

The fact of one being the effect of the other (cause) is susceptible of determination only in respect of those (specific) attributes (of the effect) and those (generic) attributes (of the cause) independently of which the former cannot come into existence. (0) But the charge of sectional causality remains [unrefuted. It is only part of fire bereft of its specific qualities that is regarded as cause, that is, the probandum. It is again part of smoke, regardless of its general qualities such as existence, substancehood etc., that is to say, smoke in its particular aspect as smoke, is the probans. Such being the case, the relation of causality should also hold between these two partial aspects. But as a matter of fact, smoke as an individual and fire as an individual cannot be divided into parts or aspects. So the assertion that causality is the basis of necessary concomitance and hence of inference must be abandoned. To this grave charge, Dharmakīrti gives his reply as follows]. (A) No. (The relation of causality is between two simple wholes, no doubt). It is admitted that when the specific qualities (of the effect) are cognized to be engendered (by the specific qualities of the cause), then inference can have reference to [the whole cause together with its specific qualities. Thus a smoke having peculiar fragrance can be the ground of inferring fire produced by a particular fragrant substance.

1. *Svabhāvair yāvadbbhiḥ* is construed as the adjective of both, *kāryam* and *kāraṇa*. In the former case, the effect endowed with those very specific attributes such as smokeness (*dhūmatva*) and not the general attributes such as existence and substancehood etc. can function as the logical probans. In other words, smoke can function as the logical probans (*hetu*), only when it is understood *guā* smoke and not *quā* entity or substance. In the second interpretation, the effect serves as the probans of the cause endowed with those very general characteristics, such as fireness, with which the effect is found to stand in necessary concomitance. In other words, fire as the probandum is understood as fire-substance and not as a specific kind of fire, since necessary concomitance is found between such fire and such smoke as set forth above in conformity with experience.

The specific qualities of cause can be inferred only if the specific qualities of the effect are apprehended]. As regards the general qualities [of the effect, such as the qualities of its being substance (*dravyatva*) and the like], they also can function as the probans, if they are apprehended as qualified by the particular effect (e. g., smoke, i.e., a substance known as smoke-substance can be the probans). Only the general qualities without reference to the specific effect cannot be considered (to be the probans of the probandum) on account of lack of necessary concomitance. [One cannot infer fire on the basis of smoke understood merely as substance. The general attributes are found in other entities, such as water etc. and as such they cannot have any bearing upon the inference under question].

**“Regarding the entity possessed of essential identity (as the probandum), another essentially identical entity can legitimately be (the probans), provided the existence of the former (probandum) follows necessarily from that of the latter. [2]**

The probans is understood, (from the previous sentence to stand in syntactical relation in the present sentence). Essential identity of one entity is possible only with that which follows from it (the probans), and not with any other which is dependent upon another external fact. (For instance), the existence of an entity (*b*), which was not present when the other (*a*) was present, cannot at the subsequent moment be guaranteed by logical necessity. There is no ontological necessity that the cause should have the effect as its concomitant, (since a cause can occur without the effect accompanying it).<sup>1</sup>

1. *Tādātmya* (essential identity) is distinct from causality (*tadutpatti*), though the relation of necessary concomitance is natural in both cases. The relation of cause and effect is not essential identity. The effect is dependent upon and necessarily concomitant with the cause, but not *vice versa*. The effect is not co-existent with the cause in the sense in which identical things are. The effect does not come into being along with the cause, but after the occurrence of the cause and that also is not *eo ipso* necessary. An impediment may occur and the effect in that case will not materialise. Thus the nature of concomitance is different in two cases. In

“The non-operation of pramāṇas, that is all organs of cognition”.

is known as non-cognition

“Which leads to the consequence of the absence of the operation (of cognition) of a non-existent fact.”

(This is explained as follows. When there is no cognition), the result is the absence of the cognition, verbal assertion and volitional behaviour bearing upon an existent fact. These (consequences, viz., cognition, verbal assertion and volitional behaviour) are due to an antecedent positive cognition. These two kinds (of non-cognition, *quā*) probans, (may prove the probandum either in the form) of negation of an entity or affirmation of non-existence and have the same value.<sup>1</sup> Existence is essentially identical with apprehension, it being the nature of the object competent to apprehension. [That is to say, to be apprehended is to be existent. Apprehension is the proof of the existence and existence is the condition of appre-

essential identity the probans and the probandum are necessarily present together, because they are ontologically identical and their difference is conceptual and logical; whereas the cause may occur independently without producing the effect, if a counter-acting agent supervenes (*sambhavatpratibandhatvāt kārāṇānām kutastebhyo 'vāśyambhāvaḥ kāryasya* K. 29). In one word, in essential identity concomitance is bilateral, whereas in causality it is unilateral.

1. Whether the negative judgement takes the form of negation of an entity or assertion of its non-existence, it amounts to the same. To be explicit, when one does not cognize a fact, one asserts that this fact does not exist, or there is an absence of this fact. Difference is only formal and verbal.

In this connection it should be clearly noted that non-cognition of a fact, perceptible or non-perceptible, leads to the same consequences. When one cannot have awareness of its existence, absence of awareness is the first consequence. Absence of verbal assertion is the second. One cannot assert in this case that a thing exists. Absence of volitional activity is the third. In the absence of knowledge of the existence of the fact, there can be no assertion of the existence and no activity to move towards or away from it is possible. Even in the case of imperceptible objects the failure of the operation of the organs of cognition ends in a vacuum. One cannot think that a thing exists, or assert its existence, much less make an effort for its acquisition or avoidance. When the object is perceptible and the conditions of perception are present, one can, of course, assert that it does not exist. As for the second and third consequences, they are consequential to the absence of cognition.

hension. If apprehension is understood as apprehensibility, apprehension and existence are the same thing]. Or (if understood as an act and not as apprehensibility), it (apprehension) would mean the cognition of the object concerned. From this follow the consequences, (1) awareness of existence (The jar exists), (2) assertion (It exists) and (3) volitional behaviour (for its acquisition or avoidance). Non-apprehension is (always) of a non-entity, because it is non-existent. (No cognition is possible of a fact that does not exist. Non-existence leads or is equivalent to non-apprehension).

**“[Non-apprehension by itself cannot lead to a negative conclusion]. But a kind (of non-apprehension) may be the probans and lead to the knowledge of a non-existent, if it is qualified by a differentia.” [3]**

Such non-apprehension is the probans. The differentia consists in the existence of an object fit to be apprehended in the presence of the requisite conditions, (i. e., non-apprehension becomes the logical probans of negation, if it is non-apprehension of an apprehensible fact. In order to be sure of the non-existence of an object, it is necessary not only that one is not aware of the entity, but also that the object is fit to be perceived and must be perceived when the conditions of its perception are present in full). (O) If non-existence is to be inferred on the basis of the non-perception as the probans, this non-perception being the negation of perception can itself be proved by means of another non-perception. This (non-perception again being in the same predicament) will fail to be proved on the pain of *infinite regress*. If (this non-perception *quā*) negation of perception be known without reference to another non-perception, then the non-existence (of object) also should be known independently of non-perception. Non-perception, (therefore, either as the probans as maintained by the Buddhist logicians or as an independent *pramāṇa* by the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka), is thus absolutely nugatory.

If the perception of another object, (sc., the surface of the ground without the jar on it), is construed as the non-perception (of the jar, that is, the object of negation), then it must be admitted that the negation (of the jar) is known by perception.<sup>1</sup> Thus why should then the non-existence (of a co-perceptible fact) be not known by (the perception) of another ?<sup>2</sup>

(A) (Dharmakīrti meets the objection as follows). Now that the non-existence of non-existent facts is found (to be identical with) such non-perception (of a co-perceptible fact, there is no occasion for inference. Yes,) the non-existence of the object (of negation) is known (by perception) without doubt. But there may be a person who is deluded enough to be unable to entertain the idea of the non-existence of the object and hence is not in a position to be sure of his awareness and to make verbal assertion (of the negation) and to have volitional behaviour. In that case, (the employment of the probans)

1. Non-perception being perception of a co-perceptible fact and consequently negation of absent fact being nothing but the existence of the co-perceptible fact, sc., the ground surface, it is known by perception and does not require any other proof.

2. It is maintained that non-existence is known by perception. But non-existence is nothing but non-entity and so cannot be perceived. This is not the position of Dharmakīrti. What is meant is this. When between two co-perceptible facts, for example, the ground and the jar, one (ground) is perceived and the other (jar) not, the non-perception of the other (jar) amounts to the perception of non-existence of the jar. If the jar were present, it could not go unperceived, just as the ground does not. So the perception of one amounts to the non-perception of the other. The idea is this. When it is asserted that non-existence is cognized by perception, it is meant that perception does not assure the existence of the fact, sc., jar. When a perceptible fact is not known to exist, it follows that it is non-existent. Non-cognition of the existence of a fact is tantamount to the cognition of non-existence. The perceptual judgement following in the wake of indeterminate intuition only clarifies what is known by the former. So non-existence is proved by perception. But non-perception has been regarded as the probans, and this is pointless, because what is known by perception does not require to be proved by inference.

It may be argued that though inference is not necessary to prove non-existence, it is needed to make awareness (*jñāna*), assertion and volitional behaviour bearing upon the non-existent possible. But this is also not necessary, as the determinate perceptual judgement is competent to achieve all these consequences. So non-existence cannot be an object of inference and consequently the inclusion of non-perception in the list of the probanses is absolutely nugatory. In order to rebut this objection Dharmakīrti defends Dignāga by giving a new interpretation,

enables him to make this judgement and verbal assertion by showing him the situation (vacant ground bereft of the jar).<sup>1</sup> For instance, (a man may be stupid enough to think that a brown cow is not a cow, because he only knows black cows. In this case he is corrected of his mistake by the argument). It is undoubtedly a cow, since it is an organization of the parts beginning with a dewlap.<sup>2</sup> So the objection based on the absence of example is refuted by the argument. It is observed that there may be persons who are not aware of their awareness, though the object is perceived by them (and it is for their correction the inference is resorted to).

[C] It may be argued that if negation, that is absence, say of a jar, is perceived, how is it that he does not realize the absence? Dharmakīrti's answer is that one man may cognize a fact and yet may not be able to formulate his cognition of it. This sort of delusion is not an impossibility. The Naiyāyika and Kumābila do not believe in the fact that a cognition is self-cognized. One may see the blue without knowing that he knows it. According to them cognition of a thing and cognition of a cognition are two different events. This conclusion is stoutly refuted by the Buddhist, because there is no possibility that a cognition may pass unnoticed, though the object is cognized. Thus though a man actually perceives the negation, he fails to assert his cognition of it. For the correction of such mistake

1. Suppose that a man does not believe that the jar is absent, though he perceives the bare ground, the arguer can convince him of his error by the argument, 'The jar is not existent because it is not perceived, though it is perceptible like the ground.' That the conditions of perception are present in full is proved by the consideration that every one perceives the ground alone and not the jar. The jar is equally perceptible like the ground and that it is not perceived is due to the fact that it is not present. What is effected by inference is not the cognition of negation. It only removes the error of the person concerned and thus enables him to realize the negation of the object and make a verbal assertion. Kumābila made the objection that negation is not inferable, because there is no example in which the concomitance of negation with non-perception is to be perceived. This is shown to be not correct.

2. The Buddhist does not believe that the body is a *whole* (*avayavin*) made of parts. It is only a grouping of the members and so instead of saying 'it is possessed of a dewlap (*sāsnādimattvāt*) it is stated that it consists of the group of members, e.g., dewlap and the rest (*sāsnādisamudāyātmakatvāt*).



on the part of a stupid person, an inference is necessary to enable him to articulate his knowledge of negation. It is for these reasons that Dignāga included non-perception in the list of valid logical grounds (*hetu*). Kumārila runs away with the idea that non-perception is made the ground of inference of the negation by Dignāga. Therefore all his subsequent animadversions are out of place. What the inference based on non-perception of the perceptible fact seeks to achieve is to enable a deluded person to realize his knowledge of absence. The knowledge of absence is not distinctly felt and the argument enables him to articulate his knowledge of absence.

Thus two kinds of non-perception, viz., (1) of a non-perceptible and (2) that of a perceptible fact, lead to the same result, viz., the absence of (the cognition), assertion of existence (and volitional behaviour). In the former case, (the failure of knowledge and assertion) is due to the absence of the proof (of existence) and (in the latter case) it is due to the presence of the contrary proof (of non-existence). In one (the former, non-perception of a non-perceptible) case, it is due to doubt and in the other (latter) case (non-perception of the perceptible), it is due to the opposite (of doubt, i.e., the definite knowledge of absence).<sup>1</sup>

[C] Even if the object is non-perceptible, the very absence of perception disables the observer from making an assertion that it exists. The existence of the imperceptible cannot be denied, but it cannot also be asserted. In the case of a perceptible object, the non-perception of it is the proof of its non-existence. In the case of the imperceptible, the assertion of existence is not possible, because one cannot be sure that the non-perceptible thing, say a ghost, exists, because it is a matter of doubt when there is no proof either for or against it. But in the other case where the object is perceptible, the very non-perception of it is the proof of its non-existence and the impossibility of assertion of its existence is identical in both cases of non-perception.

1. cf. *viṣayāyāditi saṁśayaṁ viṣayāyā niścayaś tasmāt*. (K. 34).

The first alternative (non-perception of a non-perceptible entity) is asserted to be a valid proof (*pramāṇa*), in so far as it bears upon the negation of the assertion of the existence (of the object). It has no validity as condition of the awareness, (assertion and volitional activity) of its non-existence, because of the emergence of doubt. The second (non-perception of the perceptible) is the valid proof (of its non-existence), because it results in definite knowledge.

This (second non-perception) is by reason of the difference of formal assertion divisible into:

**“(1) Knowledge of the opposite or (2) of the effect (of the opposite) or (3) the non-perception of the cause or (4) non-perception of the perceptible—these are the four kinds of non-perception of a perceptible fact resulting in negation.” [4]**

Whatever is a negative assertion, it is all due to non-perception. Now this is made possible in two ways, by assertion of something or by negation. In assertion what is asserted may be an opposite or non-opposite. If the assertion is of non-opposite, negation is not possible because there is no opposition or incompatibility involved in their co-presence, (in other words, the two facts may exist together in one substratum without opposition, and so no negative conclusion follows. (Even in the case of the opposite) if there is absence of the opposite known from its non-perception, the opposition will be understood.<sup>1</sup> When an entity on account of the presence of its unimpaired (*akṣīna*) cause is coming into existence but ceases to be (to continue) when another entity comes into existence (in close proximity), this gives rise to the conception

1. *Viruddhasyāpi anupalabdhyabhāvena virodhāpratipattiḥ* is given in the text of Dr. R. Gnoli, whereas in Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana's text it runs as follows: विरुद्धस्याप्यनुपलब्ध्यभावेन प्रतिषेधगतिः । The Tibetan rendering apparently supports the reading of Dr. R. Gnoli. The original Sanskrit manuscripts are not legible, so both, Dr. R. Gnoli and Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, have reconstructed it from the Tibetan rendering. We have chosen neither of them. It is obvious from Kaṇvakagomin's commentary that one term can be known to be opposite of the other, if in the presence of the former, the latter is not perceived

of opposition. This (opposition) is (understood to be) due to non-perception.<sup>1</sup> The (second kind of) opposition<sup>2</sup> is seen to exist between two terms, when the cognition of one necessarily excludes the cognition of the other. (To be explicit, one is known to be different from the other), just like permanent and impermanent. (Permanent is known to be what is not impermanent and conversely impermanent is what is not permanent). Here (in the second opposition) the perception of

[एवं असौ विरुद्धः स्याद् यदि तत्र स्वविरुद्धस्यानुपलब्धेः (-ब्धिः) K. 35]. A and B can be opposite, if in the presence of A, B is not perceived. The opposition is understood on the basis of non-perception. This is clear from the text, *sa (virodhaḥ) cānupalabdheḥ*. If we interpret *anupalabdhyabhāvena* as a case of the genitive compound, then it will mean 'by the absence of non-perception', that is, 'by perception'. The meaning of the whole sentence will be, 'if (what is regarded as) the opposite is not not perceived, that is to say, is perceived, there is no understanding of opposition'. The other reading gives a different meaning. 'If the other term (other opposite) is not perceived and hence known to be non-existent, the opposition (of the two terms) will be understood'.

Though both the readings can be logically justified, the example given by Dharmakīrti and the interpretation of Kaṇakagomin seem to support the second reading as more plausible. The reading of Dr. R. Gnoli means this. There can be no opposition, if the other term is not not perceived. In other words, the co-presence of two terms shows that there is no opposition. But this would amount to the repetition of the previous statement. If the sentence, *viruddhasyāpi* etc., is interpreted as when what is known to be the opposite is seen to cease to exist by means of non-perception (in the presence of the other), the opposition between them is understandable. Thus in the example given by Dharmakīrti, when one event is seen to continue on account of the continuity of its cause but on the occurrence of another, it ceases to exist, the opposition between the two is understood. So the reading should be *virodhapratipatti* or *virodhagati* and not *virodhāpratipatti*.

But the text given in the edition of HVNRSS is quite different. It is as follows : विरुद्धस्याप्यनुपलब्धिनिषेधस्य अनुपलब्धिरूपत्वात् तत्राप्यथन्तरनिषेधे कार्यकारणमन्तरेण विरोधा-  
प्रतिपत्तिः "Negation of the opposite known on the basis of non-perception is also at bottom a case of non-perception (since negation is reducible to non-perception and *vice versa*). Here also if negation is of an entity numerically different, the opposition will not be understood unless the terms under reference stand in the relation of cause and effect (and it will be stated below that the negation of the cause alone entails the negation of the effect)."

1. This may be illustrated by the example of fire and cold. A is pained by cold and in order to remove this cold, B brings him fire. The cold gradually diminishes and ultimately is replaced by warmth due to the presence of fire. Here the absence of cold entailed by fire gives rise to the idea that fire and cold are mutually opposed because the two cannot exist together. This is the opposition called *sahānavasthāna*, that is, want of co-presence.

2. Compare NB.

one amounts to the non-perception of the other.<sup>1</sup> Otherwise if the perception of the opposite be not barred, it (the perception of one) would not prove the negation (of the other). If the denial of the one is made the ground of the assertion of the non-existence of the other, the non-perception is established automatically, inasmuch as negation consists in non-perception.<sup>2</sup>

Now in this matter of negation of one thing on the ground of negation of another, (it has to be determined whether) the negation of the effect or cause, or of a neutral entity (which is neither cause nor effect, is the ground of such negation). Now, of these, since the negation of the neutral does not stand in necessary concomitance (with non-existence), how can it be maintained (i. e., it cannot be maintained) that on the non-existence of such the other will not come into existence? (That is to say, the non-existence of the neutral will not entail the non-existence of the other). So also on the non-perception of effect, how can it be the ground of the negation of the cause, because there is no universal necessity that causes must be attended by their effects?<sup>3</sup> So it is non-perception of the cause alone, that can lead to the inference of the non-existence (of the effect). As for non-perception of the perceptible by constitution, it (non-perception) by itself is non-existence (and the two are synonymous. Where it is used as a probans) it only leads to (the logical necessity of articulating) the cognition (of the non-existent).

[C] Why should you make non-perception of cause the only ground of negation, when non-perception of a perceptible object

1. The two opposites cannot be predicated of one. For example, if A is known to be impermanent, it cannot be known to be permanent. Cognition of one involves the non-cognition of the other.

2. When a thing is negated, that is asserted to be non-existent, it necessarily presupposes that it is not perceived. If A is perceived, A cannot be negated. So negation and non-perception go together.

3. The presence of the effect leads to the inference of the presence of the cause. But the absence of the effect does not imply the absence of the cause. There may be a counteracting agency preventing the emergence of the effect. For instance, the rise of cloud in the sky may fail to yield rain, if there is a strong wind to disperse it.

also serves as the ground of negation of the object perceptible ? Dharmakīrti, in anticipation of the objection, observes that non-perception of the perceptible entity is not anything different from the negation of it. Perception of a thing is equivalent to its existence. Likewise non-perception of a perceptible object is nothing but non-perception of its existence or perception of its non-existence. So Dharmakīrti does not endorse the proposition that non-perception of a perceptible entity is the ground of inference of its negation. As has been stated above, it only serves to convince a deluded person that he should admit the non-existence of a thing. When a man does not perceive a perceptible object, he certainly feels that the object is not there, but on account of delusion he is not able to assert this non-existence. Non-perception used as the logical ground brings home to him the need of making this negative assertion.

When one asserts the negation of the determinate concomitant on the basis of the non-perception of the determinant concomitant, the non-existence (of the determinate concomitant) is proved also (in addition to its possible assertion).<sup>1</sup>

Now the non-perception of the object to be negated admits of fourfold division on account of differences in the form of statement. For instance, (1) Perception of the opposite is (illustrated) as follows: there is no possible affection by cold because there is fire here. (2) This is tantamount to assertion that perception of the opposite of the determinant concomitant is also the ground of negation. For instance, there is no touch of ice here, because there is fire.<sup>2</sup> (3) Negation based on the effect of the opposite is as follows: there is no cold because there is smoke.<sup>3</sup> (4) The non-perception of cause is illustrated

1. An example is given by Karṇakagomin. One man notices that there is no tree on the top of the mountain and though he may not perceive the absence of a *śimśapā* tree, he may infer it on the ground of the absence of the trees. A more suitable example may be given. There can be no tree in the desert. It follows that there can be no oak or mango or *śimśapā* tree there.

2. In fact the relation of determinate concomitant and determinant concomitant is nothing but identity of essence. And so the first example includes the second.

3. The presence of smoke entails the existence of fire and fire is opposed to cold.

as follows: there is no smoke because there is no fire. (5) Non-perception of the thing perceptible by nature is as follows: there is no smoke because it is not perceived. (6) This explains the negation of the self-identity of the determinant concomitant (of the negated). There can be no *śimśapā* tree here, because it is devoid of trees as such.

In all these cases of inference of negation on the ground of non-perception, it must be understood that non-perception is concerned with (the cause etc.) which are necessarily perceptible by nature; and perception of their opposites is also necessarily of a perceptible (negatum that serves as the logical ground of negation). The reason is (plain) because what are not so, (i. e., a cause which is not perceptible and the object to be negated by the opposite is not again amenable to perception), neither non-existence (of the effect) nor opposition (of non-perceptible opposite) will be established.

If negation can be established on the perception of the effect of the opposite, why should not then the perception of the cause of the opposite be the ground of the inference of negation?

**“The apprehension of the cause of the opposite (of what is to be negated, sc., cold) when employed as a probans, is sure to be erroneous (not concomitant with the probandum), if the two conditions (of the negatum and of its opposite) are not mutually opposed.” [5]**

For example, there is no possible affection by cold, because there is fuel.<sup>1</sup> If the two causes are opposed, (then the apprehension of such a cause) is a valid ground. For instance, a man (present in the hot place) does not experience horripilation (goose-flesh) of the particular kind (caused by cold), because he

1. Cold is what is negated. The cause of cold temperature is the presence of snow and the like, and the cause of fire which is opposed to the cause of cold is fuel. There is no opposition between fuel and snow. So the presence of fuel is not the valid probans of the absence of cold temperature. This argument is thus fallacious. When fuel is actually producing fire, it becomes opposed to the cause of cold temperature no doubt. But then the opposition of the fuel with the cause of cold is understood from the apprehension of the effect, fire. So it will be a case of opposition of the effect. (K. 41, 12-15).



has got close by him fire of the particular kind (which is capable of emitting sufficient heat).<sup>1</sup> By this (example) it is understandable that the inference of the non-existence of the effect of one opposite from (the presence of) the effect of another opposite is logically justified. For instance, this particular place is not occupied by a person suffering from the special kind of goose-flesh, because it is possessed of smoke.<sup>2</sup> The apprehension of the opposite of the cause has already been accounted for (by way of implication) by the non-apprehension of the cause. Thus by the different varieties of syllogistic argument non-apprehension has been shown to be of eight different kinds.

[C] This has been made clear by Kārṇakagomin as follows. (1) The apprehension of the opposite, (2) The apprehension of the effect of the opposite, (3) Non-apprehension of the cause, (4) The non-apprehension of the perceptible entity, have been stated as four kinds of non-apprehension. Now from the apprehension of the opposite, the apprehension of the opposite of the superconcomitant is easily deducible. From the non-apprehension of the perceptible entity, the non-apprehension of its superconcomitant is deducible. From the non-apprehension of the cause, the apprehension of the opposite of the cause and the apprehension of the effect of the opposite of the cause are deducible. Therefore it becomes eightfold. (K. 42, 14-18).

Now the apprehension of the effect of the opposite has been stated (as the probans of negation. For instance, smoke is the effect of fire, which is opposed to cold, and from this the absence of cold is inferred). But there is (a necessary proviso to) this.

**“In the case of the effect of the opposite (employed as the probans) it should have specific reference to particular time and space, otherwise the argument will be liable to be contingent, just as is the case of inference of absence of cold from ashes.” [6]**

1. This is a valid argument, because the fire is strong enough to produce heat capable of removing the cold temperature causing goose-flesh. (K. 41, 18-21).

2. Smoke is the effect of fire which is opposed to cold which causes goose-flesh. This apprehension of the effect of the opposite (i e., of smoke) makes one infer the presence of fire which is opposed to cold, the cause of goose-flesh.

[C] The cause must be bodily present in the time and also in the place. For instance, smoke may be perceived, after the fire has gone out, in the sky, though there is no fire. In all cases of inference of cause from effect and not only in the case of opposites, the qualification of the effect by the time and place is necessary. Thus, for instance, one can infer fire from smoke, where and when smoke and fire are present together. This can be inferred from the particular nature of the effect. But we cannot infer the presence of fire from ashes, though we can infer the existence of the fire in the past.

(Now a question arises). When from entire collocation of causal conditions the origination of effect is inferred, in which of the three probanses is this logical ground to be included ?

[C] It is an inference of the effect from the cause. It cannot therefore be included under non-perception, since it is the inference of a positive fact. Nor can it be included under the head of effect, because it is the cause that is made the ground. And since the probans, cause, and probandum, effect, are two different entities, it cannot be included under essential identity (*svabhāva*) either. This is the question. (K. 43, 4-8).

(The answer is) :

**“In the case where the production of the effect is inferred from the totality of conditions as the probans, the latter (probans) is stated to be a case of essential identity (*svabhāva*), because it does not stand in need of any other condition.” [7]**

Since that (the production of effect) does not stand in need of any other condition over and above the present factors assembled together, it (the probans) is regarded as a case of self-identity of the total cause, because it is bound up with that very totality. It is only the possibility of the production of effect which is inferred from the total cause. And this possibility is nothing but the competency of the total cause for the production of effect. And this competency is a necessary concomitant of the total cause, (and nothing different), and as such identity with its very nature is inferred. [So it is not a

case of inference of a thing different from another. It is a case of inference of the same thing from the same thing. After all what is inferable is the competency of the cause for the possible effect and so it is not a question of inference heterogeneous with the cause]. But what is the reason that the effect itself is not inferred from the total cause ?

**“The effect is the outcome of the (successive) development of the energies produced by the total cause and this (development) is liable to be frustrated by an impediment and so (the cause as the probans of the effect) is inconclusive (being non-concomitant with the effect).” [8]**

It is not a fact that because all the causal factors are present, they will (necessarily) produce the relevant effect. The production of the relevant effect is contingent on the development of the energies set off by the total cause. And in the meantime (that is between the emergence of the cause and the development of its causal efficiency), there may supervene an impediment (and this may thwart the emergence of the effect), and so the inference of the effect is not logically permissible. But so far as the competency is concerned, its inference does not cause any logical incompatibility, because this (competency) does not stand in need of any condition (external to the total cause). The total cause is competent to bring about the emergence of effect by reason of successive development of efficiency.

[C] The totality of conditions gives rise to the competent moment and this competency undergoing successive development in the continuum of similar factors leads to the emergence of the effect. (K. 44, 5-7).

As Manorathanandin observes, mere assemblage of the conditions is not tantamount to the production of the effect. But these conditions require special development to be able to produce the effect. This development of causal efficiency may be frustrated by counteracting agency such as magical spell or some opposing fact.

It does not stand in need of an additional entity as the condition of the development of causal efficiency. Since the emergence of causal efficiency is caused exclusively by the antecedent condition homogeneous with the conditions assembled before, such competency of the totality of conditions is asserted to be independent of any other alien condition.

[C] Now Kaṇvakagomin has raised an intricate issue regarding the inference of competency. It appears from his commentary that the explanation given by Dharmakīrti was not taken at its face value. What is competency? If it is the same thing as causal efficiency, it will be equally liable to frustration. So competency cannot also be inferred. If it is taken to mean mere possibility, it will mean that the effect may occur or may not occur. So there can be no inference of the competency either.

It has been suggested by some logicians that the justification of the inference is hypothetical. If it is granted that such inference is possible, then, according to Dharmakīrti, it must be conditioned by any one of the triple probanses. Furthermore the competency is not intelligible without reference to the relevant effect and in the absence of the effect this competency cannot stand and so there can be no inference. The purport of defence of the inference by Dharmakīrti is this. If there be no impediment to the successive emergence of the causal efficiency, then the effect will come into being, otherwise not. The inference is, therefore, not unconditional. Others again suggest that what is meant is that if there be no impediment, the total cause will necessarily give rise to the efficient moment and the efficiency being related to the effect, the inference of the efficiency will amount to the inference of the effect. No other inference of the effect will be necessary. Here also inference of causal efficiency is conditional on the absence of impediment. But how can the absence of impediment be known? True, if an antecedent knowledge of the absence of the impediment is possible, then such inference will be legitimate.

This defence of the position of Dharmakīrti against the charges of critics brings into relief the fact that the inference of competency of the total cause for the effect is not unconditional.

It also presupposes the absence of impediment and as such stands on the same footing with the inference of the effect from the total cause. Competency is not an abstract concept but has necessary reference to the effect. If the effect does not materialize, there is no point in asserting competency. Furthermore the Buddhist logician does not believe in potential cause. The cause must be that which produces the effect. Causal efficiency and the production of an effect must go together. Potency suspended is a contradiction in terms so far as the Buddhist is concerned. (K. 45).

Now what about the inference of colour from taste which is neither the cause nor effect of the former (colour) ? That also

**“The knowledge of colour which is the co-product (with taste) of the self-same set of causal conditions arising from the presence of taste is made possible through the inference of causal efficiency (of the cause of taste with regard to colour). The case is on a par with smoke (serving as the probans of) transformation of fuel.” [9]**

The cause endowed with that particular efficiency is inferred. The (material) cause of taste produces taste when it serves as the auxiliary condition of the material cause of colour actually exercising its causal efficiency. It is like the production of smoke by fire acting as the auxiliary condition of the material cause (viz., fuel) of the cinders, i. e., the specific transformation of fuel.

[C] When one tastes a lemon in a dark room, one infers the colour of it. But the inference of colour from the taste is at bottom the inference of the cause of colour directly and the knowledge of colour is only a corollary. Taste as effect leads to the inference of its cause and since the cause of taste necessarily co-operates as the auxiliary of the cause of colour, the inference of the cause of taste involves the inference of the cause of colour in active exercise of its causal efficiency. Colour is known not by inference but by necessary implication.

Accordingly,

**“Without the active development of causal efficiency”**

(means without) the ripened aptitude of its own cause for the production of its effect,

**“Taste cannot possibly come into being and this (developed causal efficiency) is the cause of the other (colour).”**

The cause of itself (taste) is the condition of the motivation of the material cause of colour towards the production of effect. (In other words, the development of causal efficiency of the condition of taste is synchronous with the development of causal efficiency of the cause of colour). Again that development of the causal efficiency of the material cause of taste is the auxiliary of the development of the material cause of colour. So taste being produced by its own cause with its developed efficiency makes possible the inference of the developed cause (of colour) and automatically makes inference of colour possible.

**“In this way”**

(means) in this connection, (it should be understood that)

**“the inference of past cause synchronous with the cause of another is logically possible.”**

And not of future cause, because this is subject to contingency. (The presence of cause affords no guarantee for the production of the effect on account of the possibility of obstruction).

**“It (*tat*)”**

therefore this (is)

**“the case (of inference of cause) from the ‘effect as probans (and thus there is no need for positing another kind of probans).” [10]**

So any other kind of supposed probans cannot have probative force. A probans which is not by its nature concomi-



tant (with the probandum) cannot lay claim to the necessity of inseparable co-existence. This accounts for the inference of the advent of rainy season on the ground of the movement of ants (with their larvae) and the peculiar transformation of fish. In all these cases the transformation of natural elements is the cause of rainy season and is also the co-operative cause of the commotion of ants and the like.<sup>1</sup>

“Now when an effect is inferred from inadequate (incomplete) cause, it is called *Śeṣavat*, that is, inference of effect, (such probans is inconclusive, being the cause of doubt), since it is incompetent, just as the inference of passion from the possession of body is (inconclusive).” [11]

Even when requisite conditions are present in their entirety, they are (at best) capable of giving rise to the inference of mere competence. (It follows that) the incomplete cause is totally incapable for this inference, (since it cannot be even the probable occasion for the subsequent emergence of the competent moment). For example, (it is as futile as) the inference of passions of attachment and the like is from the consideration that the person concerned is possessed of body, sense organs and intellect. Such passions of attachment etc. are conditioned by adherence to the belief in the individual soul and that which belongs to the soul. And they have necessarily as the condition precedent the superstition caused by the absence of knowledge of the ultimate truth,<sup>2</sup> inasmuch

1. It is to be definitely noted that we do not infer colour from taste directly, because there is no concomitance between them based on identity of nature or causal relation. Taste is not the cause of colour and *vice versa*. The material cause of taste and the material cause of colour are necessarily associated and either cannot exercise its causal efficiency without the other serving as a co-operative auxiliary. The cause of taste is the auxiliary of the cause of colour, and taste and colour are produced together. So from taste we infer the cause of it, which is also the cause of colour *quā* auxiliary. The cause of colour in active exercise of its power is necessarily productive of colour. So it is a case of inference of cause of colour and not of colour. The presence of colour is known as a necessary corollary without the need of another inference.

2. *Ayonīśomanaskāra*: *Yoni* means the root, the truth, which is the source of true knowledge. *Manaskāra* here means knowledge, awareness. Absence of this awareness of the ultimate truth is the cause of false beliefs.

as the rise of all aberrations and defects is due to (this want of knowledge of truth. Without this defect of ignorance, faults and drawbacks cannot arise). Though the body and the sense-organs are a necessary condition (of these passions), they cannot by themselves develop this efficiency (unaided by wrong belief). The mere non-observation of the occurrence (of the supposed probans) in contrary instances (lacking in the probandum) is a case of *śeṣavat* inference and is the condition of doubt.

Accordingly,

**“The inference of (the specific) cause from the cognition of commonness of effects on the basis of mere non-perception of the probans in the opposite is fallacious reasoning, just like the inference of (evil passions such as) attachment on the basis of (the person’s making) speech.” [12]**

The movement of the face and lips etc. and articulation of words are not necessarily the effect of passion of attachment and the like. They are due to the intention to speak in its most general form. But does not this (intention to speak) amount to passion of attachment? This is endorsed by us, since it does not affect our position in the least. Attachment is said to consist in the adherence of the mind to the five aggregates contaminated with vicious inclinations generated by the obsession of self-love and possessive impulse for eternal happiness. But (such altruistic motives as) universal mercy (and friendship) etc. are not actuated (by these selfish tendencies), inasmuch as they spring from other (causes and conditions), and they will be made abundantly clear (hereafter) by us. In this connection (it should be borne in mind that) because a person affected with passion speaks in the same manner as one who is free from it (passion), no conclusion follows from the merely (analogous manner of) speech, nor even from a special mode of the same (speech). The intention of the speaker is difficult to guess either. So far as the behaviour of persons is

concerned, there is obvious likeness *inter se* and as this (likeness) is not an index of necessary concomitance, all such probanses (are inconclusive).<sup>1</sup> (O) If there is no profit accruing to the speaker, he will have no motive to make any speech at all. (A) No, (this objection cannot stand). Because it is the well-being of others, (that is the motive). (O) Since he is free from all desire and attachment, (this voluntary move to deliver sermons) is not logically justified. (A) No, one may be actuated by mercy to engage (in edification of backward souls). (Q) But is this (altruism) not a kind of attachment? (A) Yes, it is accepted by us. (But this attachment to the amelioration of suffering creatures) is not a defect, since it is not derived from illusion (of self-love). Though there is not the illusion of self (either in one's own person or in others), the observation of the particular kind of suffering and distress (tending to repeat itself *ad infinitum*) gives rise to mercy (in the Bodhisattva) under the impetus of repeated altruistic dispositions caused by long standing practice in the past. Consequently we endorse the possibility of friendliness and the like [mercy (*karunā*), felicity at the prosperity of good men (*muditā*) and equanimity towards enemies (*upekṣā*)] which are necessarily directed towards individuals or (impersonal) entities as their objects.<sup>2</sup> Now these (altruistic passions) stem from corresponding habits and dispositions (accumulated by the past spiritual discipline) and do not require to be inspired by ego-

1. A man inspired by selfish motives and a man inspired by selfless altruism speak often in the same manner and this makes it difficult to divine the inner motive from the mode of speech. This is the idea.

2. Now the mercy that is felt by the unenlightened persons has for its subject the individual persons and in the case of the enlightened it has reference to the impersonal entities, that is the mental stream of consciousness (*santāna*). And these attitudes in the case of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas who have rid themselves of the illusion of subject and object have reference to no object at all, but spontaneously proceed as a consequence of the practice of *pāramitās* in their unregenerate states. The enlightened beings are not moved by considerations of personal gain either to themselves or their beneficiaries. The mere existence of suffering is the reason enough for the exercise of these altruistic activities. The benefactor and the beneficiary are impersonal streams of consciousness but there is suffering felt by the conscious moment and this has to be eradicated. (K. 53, 2-5).

centric passions of self-love. These egocentric passions of attachment and the like are quite different from the former, since they cease to arise on the cessation of delusion. (Q) But is not the exertion of the merciful saint infructuous, since he has no delusion (that the supposed suffering creatures are mere phantoms bereft of personality as they are and the saint too who is to exercise mercy has ceased to be an individual personality)? (A) No, (it is not infructuous), since the benefit of others (irrespective of their personality or otherwise) is aimed as the fruit. A fruit is that which is the object of desire. This (desire) does not contaminate (the enlightened speaker) by any defect, because he is absolutely free from delusion of the ascription of false attributes (of me and mine). If this (speech) is made the ground of proving alleged defect on any other ground (such as intention to speak for enlightening others), it does not affect our position in the least. If one infers selfish motives in the speaker as such on the analogy of the experience of personal self-love, (hate and the like) in one's own self (as the motive of speech), it will lead to undesirable consequences,<sup>1</sup> since there is no necessary concomitance (between speech and selfish desire and other personal idiosyncracies). If it is made the ground of inferring motives not (?)<sup>2</sup> other than (self-interest and self-love), what is then the ground of belief in the necessary concomitance (of speech and passion of self-love alleged in the speaker of religious truth)? Speech should only make one infer efficiency of the organ of speech and intention to speak. If non-observation of speech in (insentient) things (e.g., stocks and stones) which are devoid of the potentiality of developing selfish passions be made the ground of inference (of such potentiality in the speaker), it leads to undesirable conse-

1. If analogical argument were permissible, one might infer the presence of other attributes such as fair or swarthy complexion in the enlightened speaker on one's analogy. But this is absurd. Analogy minus necessary concomitance is undependable as an argument. This is the idea.

2. The text is rather obscure and the commentary (K) is also not quite clear.

quences<sup>1</sup> as stated above. If passions have no bearing (upon speech), how can the potentiality as spring of the passions have any bearing? If the (latent) potentiality were to have necessary relation (with speech), then, in other words, the passions themselves would also have this relation; but it has been shown that they have no (bearing on speech functioning).

It follows therefore that only an effect which is necessarily concomitant (with its cause) can be the ground of inference of the cause, by virtue of the necessary concomitance between them, and no other fact, in spite of its being not observed in the contrary instances (*vipakṣa*). It is only the non-observation of the omniscient that could establish the absence (of the thing not observed) in every case.<sup>2</sup> (So far as the non-observation of ordinary persons is concerned, that is no reliable evidence). The nature of things observed to follow one pattern is seen to be different on account of difference of place, time and mode of chemical treatment. For instance, the *āmalaka* (myrobalan) plants, when sprinkled with milk yield sweet fruits; but they are not found to do so frequently.<sup>3</sup>

1. It may be argued that the cause of selfish attachment is the cause of attachment and speech both. Speech is then the legitimate ground of inference of attachment. Without attachment there can be no speech. But the argument is a case of pure *non sequitur*. It has been shown that the concomitance of speech with selfish passions on the analogy of personal experience is only a coincidence. A selfish man speaks for gaining personal ends. But the cause of selfish passions is belief in the ego and that of speech is the fitness of vocal organ and desire for speech. They are not organically related. A selfless speaker is not an impossible notion. The negative concomitance, 'Where there is no self-love, there is no speech', is alleged to be proved in stocks and stones. But stocks and stones have not only absence of self-love but also of all other human qualities. They have no feeling, cognition, will and also human organism and sense-faculties. How can you single out lack of self-love, and not that of other qualities as the cause of speechlessness? So the whole argument revolving on speech topples down.

2. Only an omniscient who sees every possible fact and event can be in a position to assert that so and so is not omniscient or so and so is absent. Thus denial of omniscience presupposes omniscience on the part of the denier—a case of blatant self-contradiction.

3. So also with the difference of climate. For instance, dates which are found in Mesopotamia are superior to those grown in other places. So also different kinds of flowers are found to occur in different seasons. We make allowance for

It should therefore be proper to say like this. A speaker like me is subject to attachment, because he (like myself) is under the sway of ignorance of the truth which is the cause of attachment. But in that case the citation of speech as the probans is pointless. (Because speech has no necessary concomitance with the attachment to self or the delusion of personal identity). The conclusion follows that mere absence of the probans observed in the opposite cases is not a valid probans (for making an assertion).

**“By mere non-observation in the opposite one cannot be sure of the necessary concomitance of the probans, because there is the possibility of the concomitance proving to be contingent, as it is found to be the case with the grains in a cooking vessel.” [13]**

One may find that most of the grains are cooked and boiled in a vessel; but the mere presence in the vessel is no guarantee of all the grains being cooked. One may observe (contrary instance and thus) the failure of necessary concomitance. One may only make inference like this. The grains which are possessed of the same nature with the cooked ones and which are subject to the operation of the same causes of cooking are cooked, otherwise the inference will be contingent like the *śeṣavat*. What is this *śeṣavat*?<sup>1</sup>

(Dharmakīrti gives us an illustration).

**“That (probans), whose absence (in the heterologous instances) is demonstrated on the basis of mere non-observation as such, such**

different results on account of different circumstances. The point at issue is whether speech is a necessary concomitant of attachment and such-like infirmities. This has been shown to be not invariably correct. There may be speakers of the truth who are perfectly free from delusions of the self and all that belongs to self.

1. *Śeṣavat* means *śeṣaḥ asti iti*, that is, one that is possessed of *śeṣa*, remainder. *Śeṣa* is nothing but an unproved indefinite object. It is different from the *śeṣavat* inference of the Naiyāyika in which the cause is inferred from the effect. But Dharmakīrti uses this term as an instance of inconclusive inference. He follows the etymological meaning—a probans which leaves over a part unproved is incomplete and so inconclusive. (K. 56, 16-57, 1).



**a probans is called incomplete (*śeṣavat*) because it is a cause of doubt". [14]**

The negative concomitance of such probans is not definitely ascertained, and so its possible occurrence in the opposite is liable to doubt, since mere non-observation (of the occurrence of the probans in the opposite cases) used as the proof of the negation (of the probandum) is a potent source of doubt. Not all kinds of non-observation are proofs (of absence). And so when one desires to prove the absence of one (the probans) from the absence of another (the probandum), one must be sure of the necessary concomitance between the two. Otherwise the probans will be inconclusive and unprobative.

[C] Dharmakīrti wants to emphasise this. Mere observation of co-presence or non-observation is not the reliable ground for ascertaining necessary concomitance. For instance, one may assert that speakers are actuated by selfish motives and knowledge of self and not-self. The speaker is found to be conscious of his own personality and also of the personality of others who are addressed by him. This knowledge of self and not-self is based on delusion. The Buddhists do not believe in the reality of a personal and individual self. The conclusion which follows from this assumption is that a speaker must be one who is subject to this illusion of personality and consequential passions of self-love and love of possession. The opponent makes this the ground of attributing self-love and self-attachment to the Buddha, because he was a pre-eminent preacher of religious sermons. Dharmakīrti assails this contention of the opponent on the ground that the assumption is based on a faulty generalization. Speech is not the necessary concomitant of self-love or attachment to one's own personality. It is the result of intention to speak and not self-love. The basic error of the opponent proceeds from the non-observation of speech in inanimate things. He concludes that there is no speech because there is no personal consciousness in these things. So absence of speech is supposed to stand in necessary relation to absence of self-consciousness. The argument is : The Buddha is subject to the delusion of self-consciousness

and self-love, because he is a speaker. When there is no self-consciousness and self-love, there is no speech, e. g., in stocks and stones. Dharmakīrti argues that the absence of a probans, that is speech, is not necessarily concomitant with the absence of the probandum, that is, absence of self-love. Speech has nothing to do with self-love, but is due to the intention to speak. So neither negative nor positive concomitances is valid.

Another consequential objection may be raised. Why should then the Buddha who is admitted to be free from all consciousness of self have the wish to speak? The Buddha is not aware of his own individual personality and as such is not aware of his own existence as an individual. A person who has not ego-consciousness cannot be supposed to have a desire for the edification of others. This is the crucial question. (K. 53, 19-21).

A few have propounded the theory that the Buddha is not subject to the limitations of self-love but is possessed of consciousness of his own personal existence on account of the persistence of that sort of ignorance which is free from contaminating tendencies. The Buddha behaves as a person so long as he exists in the body, though he has seen through the illusion of personal identity. Others opine that the ordinary phenomenal consciousness of personality free from the delusion of self-love appears in the Buddha by reason of his mystic powers. Thirdly, there are others who solve the problem by the theory which reminds one of docetism. The Buddha did not deliver any speech but his disciples were made to hear such sermons proceeding from the Buddha's person.<sup>1</sup>

Any way the Buddhists are agreed that even the Buddha and the Bodhisattva are capable of delivering sermons for the correction of the errors of ordinary mortals. And this does not argue any delusion on their part. The Buddha and the Bodhisattva, free from all self-motivation, have nothing to desire for themselves. It is the interest of others which makes them engage in missionary work. Erring man has to be saved. In Mahāyāna philosophy it is maintained that the enlightened saint, the Bodhisattva, does not care to enter into impersonal *Nirvāṇa*

1. Compare the discourse in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* on *sarvajñāparīkṣa*.

before others. The whole class of living beings have to be saved and delivered from the bondage of ignorance and consequent suffering. He will be the last person to enter *Nirvāna*. Such a saint is called *apratisthita-nirvāna*.

**“(It is for these reasons that Dignāga) has laid emphasis upon the definite knowledge of the probans in three forms, [that is, (1) *pakṣadharma*, existence of the probans in the subject, (2) *anvaya*, existence of the probans in the homologue, (3) *vyatireka*, absence of the probans in the heterologue], in order to rebut (the triple fallacies, viz.) non-existent in the subject (by the first qualification) and fallacy of the contradictory probans (by the second qualification) and contingent (by the third) by way of opposition.” [15]**

If there is no necessary concomitance (between the probans and the probandum), the definite knowledge of concomitance in agreement and concomitance in difference cannot be established. And accordingly he (Dignāga) lays down the definite knowledge (of the condition of inference) in order to show the necessity of the certitude (of the two-fold concomitance). By the certitude of concomitance in agreement the fallacies of the contradictory probans and fallacies allied thereto<sup>1</sup> are rebutted. By the certitude of concomitance in difference the fallacy of inconclusive probans and its ally *śeṣavat* and those (which are doubted to occur in homologue and heterologue are rebutted). [*Śeṣavat* (incomplete) is the probans which is known to exist in the homologue but not observed in heterologue; in other words, an argument based on the probans which is found to be concomitant in agreement but subject to doubt in respect of its concomitance in difference. Dignāga has also stated that the existence of the probans in the subject should be] endorsed *by both parties*. This is meant to rebut those probanses which are endorsed only by one of the parties. (He has also added) *the qualification that the probans must be well-established and*

1. The alleged probans whose absence in the heterologue is definitely known, but presence in the homologue is liable to doubt. This is called *saṇḍighānaikāntika*, that is, the inconclusive probans based on doubtful concomitance. But it is stated here as allied to contradictory in pursuance of the convention of the opponent.

*definitely known.* By this he means to exclude those doubtful probanses which are known as *śeṣavat* and uncommon<sup>1</sup> being of doubtful occurrence in the homologue and the heterologue. If on the other hand mere non-observation were meant to be (the sufficient ground of) concomitance in difference without the backing of necessary concomitance, (then the whole subsequent statement of Dignāga would be pointless).<sup>2</sup>

**“The statement of concomitance in difference is meant to rebut the fallacy of inconclusive reason by opposition.”**

As has been said by (Dignāga), “*this is the logical rule that both (positive and negative concomitance) should be stated in order to rebut by opposition the fallacies of the contradictory and the inconclusive probans.*” The statement of concomitance in difference is meant to exclude the fallacy of inconclusive probans.

**“If this (statement of the concomitance in difference) were meant to bring home the fact (that the probans is) not observed (in the heterologue).”**

If this statement were meant only to prove the fact of non-observation (of the probans) in the heterologue.

**“That would be understood (by implication) even if there were no such statement.” [16]**

Certainly the other party is not subject to delusion of observation (this statement that the probans is not observed in the heterologue would be necessary, if the interlocutor were

1. *Śeṣavat* is the probans which is of doubtful concomitance in difference and uncommon is doubtful in respect of both the homologue and the heterologue. (K.58,11).

2. It has been said in the *Nyāyamukha* by Dignāga that both concomitance in agreement and the same in difference should be stated. The concomitance in agreement is necessary for the exclusion of the contradictory probans and the statement of concomitance in difference is meant to rebut the inconclusive probans.

under the delusion that the probans was observed in the heterologue) which is meant to be rebutted by statement. (O) It may be contended that the statement only serves to revive the memory (of the opponent) regarding the non-observation.<sup>1</sup> (A) (But this is not a sound contention). The knowledge (of the probans in the homologue), if not known, cannot be a condition (conducive to inference) and as such the revival of memory of it is logically necessary. But so far as non-observation (of the probans in the heterologue) is concerned, it is nothing but a case of absence of observation. This can be eliminated by observation. When there is no such observation, (i. e., absence of observation continues as an established fact), the statement (of the negative concomitance stressed by Dignāga) would be devoid of purpose.<sup>2</sup>

(It may be argued that though) the opponent does not perceive the probans in the heterologue, he may not be sure that it does not exist there and the (negative) statement in question is necessary to bring home this fact.

**“By mere statement that it does not exist, it is not proved that the thing does not exist. If the logical proof (by which the necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum is established) is stated, then non-existence is known to be proved.” [17]**

If the person who does not perceive its existence is not convinced of its non-existence, mere statement (that it does not

1. The idea is this. The existence of the probans in the homologue is a fact, but it may be forgotten and the statement of positive concomitance serves to remind the interlocutor of this fact. This may be supposed to be the case also regarding non-existence of the probans in the heterologue. The statement of negative concomitance serves only as a necessary reminder.

2. Kaṇvakagomin elucidates the position as follows. So far as observation is concerned, it may be liable to be forgotten, because the knowledge may not be present in the focus of consciousness. In this case the statement of positive concomitance is necessary for reviving memory of the opponent. But non-observation is nothing but absence of observation and this continues until the opposite observation occurs, which does not take place. So the non-observation of a probans in the opposite heterologue is a felt fact and not perceived before and forgotten after. So no statement is necessary by way of reminder. (K. 59, 12-15).

exist) will not help him to realize this (non-existence). The statement would only show this very absence of perception (and nothing else). Besides the non-observation of one (the probandum) cannot establish the non-existence of the other (the probans without the sanction of necessary concomitance. If this were possible), there would be undesirable extension. [For instance, the absence of a cow would be the proof of the absence of the horse, but this is not logically warranted]. Nor even on (the authority of) his statement that it does not exist (in the heterologue) the non-existence is established, because this again would lead to extravagant consequence. So how can there be elimination of the inconclusive as the result of the statement of the negative instance (non-observation of the probans in the heterologue) ?<sup>1</sup> Therefore one who wants to prove the non-existence (of the probans in the heterologue) must state the logical proof (of the necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum), so that it may carry conviction to the opponent that (the probans) is absent (in the heterologue).

But the non-existence (of the probans) is proved by non-perception (of the probans) in the absence (of the probandum).

**“If mere non-observation can be the proof of the negation, how should the incomplete probans (observed to be concomitant in agreement and though absent in the heterologue, not known to be necessarily concomitant in difference) be regarded as contingent (inconclusive) ?”**

For instance (in the following argument), “These fruits are ripe or have this particular (sweet) taste, because they do not differ in colour, or because they are grown on the same branch of the tree just like the one tasted.” In this (argument) all the fruits (other than the tasted one having the same

1. One may contend that Dignāga has only stated that the probans does not exist in the heterologue and this should be enough evidence for the non-existence of the probans in the heterologue. This is an illogical argument. If mere authority of Dignāga be proof of the non-existence, the statement of the thesis would suffice and no reason should be assigned. (K. 60, 11-14).



colour etc.) are intended to be the subject (minor term). The probans (colour etc.) is not found to be present in the absence of the probandum (particular taste); so why should it be regarded as the case of contingent concomitance? A few logicians (Īśvarasena etc.) hold that the probans here is suspected to be contingent on account of anticipation of contradiction. But no, there is no such (contradiction) in respect of the subject (all the fruits). But it is possibly liable (to be contradicted if occasion arises); but such doubt (of future contradiction) is apt to entail undesirable consequences. Even in other cases, (that is, where the probans is correct), there is not the proof of the necessary absence (of the possible contradiction. The doubt of possible future contradiction without logical proof cannot be regarded as invalidating condition). Only the contradiction, which has happened, should be regarded as conclusive proof. If (a future) unrealized experience is admitted to be contradictory, then there will be no assurance in any case.<sup>1</sup> But so far as the absence (of the probans in the heterologue) is concerned, it becomes a valid probans only when it is known as such (and not by its brute existence). And for this it requires the certitude (of the absence of the probans in the heterologue). By mere non-perception one may infer (from the absence of the probans in a part of the heterologue) the absence of the probandum therein. If the probans is not necessarily concomitant (with the probandum), the absence (of such a probans) in the absence of the probandum in every case is not established. And there arises doubt of want of negative concomitance and this makes the incomplete probans liable to the charge of contingency.

Furthermore,

**“A pure negative fact would also pass muster as the valid probans.”**

1. Unless the necessary concomitance between the probans and the probandum is known to be established on unassailable evidence, doubt of its contingency cannot be entirely debarred.

“This living body is not devoid of soul. Were it so, it would be devoid of vital and the like functions.” Vital functions and the like are not observed in jars and the like things, both observed and un-observed, which are admittedly devoid of soul (animating principle, soullessness being necessarily concomitant with the absence of vital functions). The absence of that (the absence of the vital functions) would prove the existence of the soul. (But why should this argument be regarded as inconclusive and doubtful?) The non-perception of an imperceptible is not the valid proof of absence (or negation); so the absence of soul in jar and the like is not proved and the absence of vital functions therein is not (established as a matter of logical necessity). [But the opponent may argue that their soullessness] is proved on the admission (of the Buddhist also). [If the accepted theory of the Buddhist be regarded as conclusive evidence], how can you now prove the existence of soul (in the living body which is not accepted by the Buddhist)? [The opponent may argue that the affirmation of soullessness in living beings is devoid of proof and hence the Buddhist theory is not accepted in this case. But if the Buddhist position lacks proof, it would have no validity even for non-living things and then], how is the soullessness of things (other than living bodies) accepted as established without proof? On the evidence of traditional admission, entities are divided into two classes, viz., soul-possessing and soulless, (and on the basis of mutual agreement things which are admitted by all to be devoid of soul are found to be devoid of vital functions) and this absence (of vital functions) is made the ground of the proof (of soullessness). This argument only proves that the soul is only accepted on the evidence of tradition, but not on the evidence of inference. So though there is non-perception (of the vital function), the absence of soul (in the jar and the like) is not proved. [The mere non-perception of the soul is not proof of its absence, because it is imperceptible. The absence of soul in inanimate things is thus, logically speaking, an unproved conclusion. And if on

the evidence of popular opinion] the absence of the soul is admitted to be coincident with the absence of vital function in some (inanimate) things, there being no necessary concomitance of vital functions etc. with the soul, the absence (of the soul) in all (inanimate) things is not necessarily entailed (by the absence of vital functions and as such) the argument is inconclusive.

[If mere non-perception were regarded as sufficient proof of the absence of the unperceived thing, as contended by the opponent], the corroboratory exposition (which has been given by Dignāga under the Kārikā) “*What exists and what does not exist in the homologue etc.*”<sup>1</sup> that in such cases, the nature of the unproved probanses *should be stated according as they are appropriate* (should not have been stated at all).

[C] The point at issue seems to be this. Dignāga asserts that the probans must be acceptable to both parties. A probans which is accepted by neither or by one of the parties only is called ‘*asiddha*’ (unproved). The latter is not acceptable because it is dubious. That a probans is doubtful is due to the fact that it is not accepted by one of the parties. Were the probans perceived by both, there would be no occasion for doubt. It becomes doubtful only when it is not perceived. If non-perception were proof of non-existence, there would be no doubt and the probans should be valid. That Dignāga rejects a probans which is not accepted by one of the parties as doubtful and hence invalid proves that, according to him, mere non-perception cannot

1. “*Sapakṣe sannasan dvedhā pakṣadharmāḥ punasvidhā/  
Pratyekapakṣe ca sadasaddvividhatvataḥ||*”

This Kārikā occurs in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, chap. 3, as verified by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa. The gloss is not quoted by Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa. In the absence of the text it is risky to hazard any interpretation. In the *Hetucakra* Dignāga has spoken of nine possible reasons or probanses of which two are valid and the rest invalid. In the Kārikā quoted above it is said that the valid probans may exist partly or wholly in the homologue, literally, the valid probans must exist in the homologue and may both exist or not exist in the homologue, but must not exist in the heterologue partly or wholly. A probans may exist or may not exist and may both exist and may not exist in the heterologue. That which exists in the heterologue partly or wholly is invalid. For detailed exposition we refer the curious reader to ‘A History of Indian Logic’ pp. 283 ff. and 298 and the chart.

be accepted as proof of non-existence. This is the conclusion of Dharmakīrti from the interpretation of unproved probans (*asiddhi*) by Dignāga.

That also,

**“The interpretation of *asiddhi* (as given by the Master) would be unwarranted.” [18]**

Doubt arises only in the case of non-perception (of an imperceptible). In the case of perception (of the probans in the heterologue) there is no room for doubt, (since the probans would be inconclusive being found in both the homologue and the heterologue instances). If negation were admissible on the basis of (mere) non-perception, then doubtful negation would not be excluded, (in other words, the probans leading to doubtful negation would be logically admissible). (O) But this has not been excluded, as the Master has laid stress on the logical possibility in each case. (A) No, (the reason for doubtful negation has not been not excluded). This is apparent from his subsequent statement. *The reason which sets forth (the possibility of the triple character of the probans) as definitely endorsed by both the parties* (the opponent and the proponent etc.. Such a reason will be adequate for refutation of the position and establishment of opposite issue). So (the Master) definitely asserts his view, that even though (the probans in the heterologue) is not perceived, (the factual absence of it) is not exempt from doubt and so he repudiates such probanses [as fallacious by his interpretation of *asiddhi(yojanā)*].

Further,

**“Uncommon (probans) would be the ground of negation on the basis of non-perception.”**

(For instance), audibility (of sound) being not observed in both eternal and non-eternal and thus being (inferred to be) absent (in both) would serve as the probans for the exclusion

of both the possibilities. [Let it be granted that eternal and non-eternal things are not audible. But why should this non-perception be the ground of the negation of both ?] Because there is no other probans except (non-perception entailing) negation for such exclusion. But such exclusion is not (logically possible) because the factual absence (of audibility) in either (eternal or non-eternal) is not capable of being definitely known (on the ground of mere non-perception). In point of fact, when an attribute which is definitely known to be absent in an entity is found to occur somewhere, how can it fail to prove the negation of that entity (in which it is known to be impossible ? In other words, the occurrence of such an attribute proves that the entity is absent).<sup>1</sup>

**“But there is another pramāṇa which contradicts this possibility-”**

[If on the evidence of non-perception of audibility] it is alleged to negate both the contradictories, (e. g., eternal and non-eternal), then there will arise a powerful consideration which contradicts this contingency.<sup>2</sup> Of two attributes which are mutually exclusive and contradictory of one another, the denial (exclusion) of one involves the affirmation of the other. So the denial (of both) is impossible. Affirmation and denial (of the same thing) involve (mutual) contradiction.

**“It follows therefore that absence (negation) cannot be proved on the basis of mere non-perception.” [19]**

1. For example, smoke is impossible in water and so if smoke is seen somewhere, it at once implies that there is no water there.

2. A thing cannot be absent in both the contradictories; in other words, a thing cannot have both the contradictory predicates. For example, a word is alleged to be permanent and impermanent by both the parties alternatively, viz., the Mīmāṃsaka and the Naiyāyika. But sound is audible and it is found that no other eternal or non-eternal things are audible. So sound cannot be both eternal and non-eternal, so far as the evidence of experience goes. But by the law of Excluded Middle, it follows that of the two contradictory predicates, one must be true and both cannot be false. So the denial of contradictory attributes, eternality and non-eternality in respect of word would involve the infringement of the law of Excluded Middle and this is called by Dharmakīrti contradiction by another *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇāntarabādhā*).

Mere non-perception cannot be proof (of negation), because it is liable to be set aside by contradiction.

[C] For instance, audibility is not found in eternal and non-eternal things. If non-perception be the proof of absence, audibility will exclude both. But this is not possible. For, if sound is alleged to be eternal, it will exclude non-eternity. If it is asserted to be non-eternal, it will exclude eternity. Admission of non-perception as proof of negation will mean that sound is neither eternal nor non-eternal or both eternal and non-eternal. On the former alternative it will contradict the law of Excluded Middle and on the latter the law of Contradiction. (K. 65).

A cannot be both B and not-B.—The law of Contradiction which shows the absurdity of affirmation of two contradictories as predicates of the same subject.

A must be either B or not-B.—The law of Excluded Middle which shows the impossibility of the denial of two contradictory predicates of the same subject.

**“Likewise the presumption of contradiction by another *pramāṇa* in other cases is not ruled out (it is also possible).”**

If contradiction is liable to occur in an entity conforming to a definition, the definition itself will be proved to be vicious, and so there would arise lack of certitude in every such case.<sup>1</sup>

(O) But this possibility of lack of certitude (that is scepticism) is also liable to apply even to inference, because it is sometimes found to be contradicted by perception and another inference. (A) No, this is not possible (in the case of valid probans) as

1. One may contend that this contradiction may apply to audibility and not to other cases. But this is not logically sound. If you adhere to the definition, ‘non-perception in the opposite is the proof of its absence therefrom’, this will land you in contradiction. Mere non-perception is not evidence of absence and this has been demonstrated by the examination of the proposition, ‘Sound is eternal because it is audible.’ The attribute, audibility, is not found in anything else which is admitted to be non-eternal. But it is not found also in what are supposed to be eternal things, e.g., space, time etc.. The fallacy involved in the argument has already been exposed. This definition as the formulation of a rule is therefore wrong.



defined by us. (Causality or essential identity as the characteristic of valid probans is not liable to invalidation). Those (middle terms) which are so liable (to be contradicted) are not conformable to the requisite definition. (O) (But if it is so), there should be no statement of the fallacy called *viruddhā-vyabhicāri*, not-not-concomitant (necessarily concomitant) with the contradictory. (A) Yes, the assertion of this fallacy has no scope, so far as inference is concerned. The scope of this fallacy will be expounded elsewhere.

Moreover.

**“The absence of touch in observed cases on the ground of non-perception would not be illegitimate.” [20]**

[C] This requires a preliminary explanation of the context in which the existence of air as the substrate of neutral (neither hot nor cold) touch is established by the Vaiśeṣika. The existence of air is proved on the ground of the touch, which is neither warm nor cold and yet uncaused by heat, being a distinct quality. Now a quality cannot exist without a substance as its substratum. This neutral touch cannot be a quality of earthy things, because the touch of earthy things is caused by heat, that is to say, in contact with fire. It is not natural but accidental. If an earthy substance is in contact or out of contact with fire, it will be warm or not warm. But the particular quality of touch which is a neutral property must belong to some other substance, and this is called air. This argument is not regarded as valid by Dignāga. The absence of this touch (neither warm nor cold) in earthy substances that have been observed is made the ground of inferring its absence in all such cases ; but this is not legitimate. Because the possibility of its occurrence in other unobserved instances of earthy substance is not ruled out by overwhelming logic. Now this assertion of illegitimacy by Dignāga would be unwarranted, if non-observation were deemed sufficient reason for absence.

If negation were liable to be proved on the ground of non-perception, then what (Dignāga) says (would be unjustified); *“If on the ground of mere non-perception the negation (of*

*the neutral touch) is deduced from observed instances (of earth), that will not be legitimate.*" Why should it not be legitimate? Because from non-perception negation is (supposed to be) proved. It may be urged that, touch being possessed of full conditions of being perceived (in other words, being perceptible), its denial is quite legitimate. No, it is not legitimate. The denial (of this neutral touch) cannot possibly have reference to other instances (of earth) equally perceptible and possessed of the same nature (with observed ones). He (Vaiśeṣika) asserts this negation (of touch) in earth and the rest taken in their universal reference as class-concepts. Since among instances of them (there may be occurrence of such a touch and they are not all open to observation) such as cotton, stone, twigs and leaves of tree (which are all admitted to belong to the class of earthy substances and thus) though possessed of the nature of earth, different kinds of touch are perceived.<sup>1</sup> Now the possibility of the occurrence of this (neutral touch) in some (unobserved) cases is open to doubt and, such being the case, the denial (of an entity) on the ground of mere non-perception is not legitimate in all cases. It follows that some (stupid) follower of Dignāga who has made (unqualified) non-perception the ground of inference of absence has thus been subjected to censure.

[C] The upshot is that mere non-perception cannot be the sufficient ground of inference of absence. Only non-perception of a thing which is not perceived in spite of all the conditions of perception being fulfilled is the legitimate ground of such negative inference.

We think it necessary to refer to the controversy on this point between the Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist. The Vaiśeṣika may rejoin that all instances of earth, observed and non-observed, must have an uniform nature, otherwise they would not belong to the same class. Now all observed instances of earth are known to be possessed of a touch which is either warm or cold due to the

1. Cotton has a touch which is smooth and soft. The touch of stone is hard and that of leaves is of another kind. (K. 67).

contact of or want of contact of fire. As regards smoothness, hardness, roughness of touch, these variations are due to the closeness or slackness of the conjunction of earthy atoms. But this is not regarded as sound defence by the Buddhist. The conjunction of earthy atoms must be possessed of the same degree of closeness. If they are not closely joined together, they would not be perceived as such. Thus the conjunction of earthy atoms must be uniform in both cotton and stone. The difference of tactile qualities must then be set down to the intrinsic nature of the earthy substances. And though they are all varieties of earth, they may exhibit different characteristics. It is quite possible there may be an instance of earth which may be possessed of this neutral kind of touch. A human being who has a limited range of experience is not likely to have discovered all such variations. So this sweeping assertion of absence of this kind of touch in earth and other un-observed substances is not logically warrantable.

The controversy taken by itself is not possessed of much philosophical interest. Dignāga himself is not concerned to prove that there is no air other than earth, water etc.. In fact there is a felt difference between the touch of visible entity such as earth and water and the touch of an invisible one. This invisible entity is called air. But the contention of Dignāga moves round the issue that there is no substance in addition to so-called qualities. The distinction between quality and substance is gratuitous according to the Buddhist. J. S. Mill also holds a similar view.

Furthermore,

**“The powers of substances are seen to be variant in different climes and times. And now (in view of apparently identical substances possessing different powers and attributes) it is not logically warranted to infer the uniform character of things in other circumstances on the basis of the observation of one kind (of behaviour).”**

**[21]**

If on the mere non-observation (of a fact used as a probāns) in the opposite in some respect its necessary concomi-

tance is admitted, though it does not stand in necessary concomitance (with the probandum, then a thing observed in one place having a particular character would have that character in other places also on the basis of non-observation. But such is not the case). Some substances are observed in one place to have one kind of behaviour, but they are observed to have a different behaviour in other places. For instance, some plants growing in a particular piece of land are seen to possess a particular kind of juice (or taste), power and particular effects ; but those very (plants) are found to lack in them in other places. Likewise with the variation of time and culture (such as the fact of being nourished with milk and other nutriments).<sup>1</sup> It is not a fact that (these plants and herbs), observed by people of a particular place to have particular kinds of behaviour, will exhibit the same character by their intrinsic nature in every case. The specific difference in qualities is due to the difference of conditions and causes (under which they come into existence). If however (the conditions and) causes be not different, then inference (of the same behaviour) may be legitimate. For instance, a sentence, though not known to be uttered by a particular speaker, can be inferred to be the result of the effort of a particular person, because there is no special character discernible in sentences as such. (In spite of the difference in literary grace) sentences of all possible varieties are seen to be produced by persons (and not in any other way).<sup>2</sup>

1. Plants exhibit diverse qualities according to the quality of soil and also fertilizer. For instance, it is reported that if milk is poured into the roots, the plants bear sweet fruits. In fact different chemical fertilizers contribute to the development of different efficacy of the plants and herbs. Thus cocoanuts grow luxuriantly in sea-coast but yield poor fruits when grown in another soil. This must be attributed to the different qualities of soil. Again certain trees, e. g., mango trees, growing in particular seasons produce good fruits. In premature growth they may give poor results. Besides by scientific treatment and tending of soil and nurture of the seeds improved yields are obtained. This accounts for the difference in quality and quantity of agricultural products as the consequence of difference of place and time and of culture.

2. For instance, a poet may compose a beautiful sentence and an ordinary man may turn out a dry-as-dust one. But there is no difference in the fact that they require some person to compose them.

[C] The Mīmāṃsakas believe that the Vedas which are nothing but sentences are not created by any person, human and divine. The Buddhist does not agree. Though the authors of Vedic Mantras are not known, yet they must have been composed by some persons. A sentence cannot be regarded as uncreated fact. In this connection the Mīmāṃsaka raises the issue whether a perfect pure enlightened man who has completely got rid of all desires and wants can have any reason to speak on any subject even for the benefit of others. Only those who have any need for it speak a sentence for a purpose. But the Buddha is supposed to be freed from all needs and desires and so the sermons attributed to him are spurious forgeries. If they are the genuine utterances of the Buddha, he must be like an ordinary speaker in spite of the supposed excellence of his speech. All our cognitions are seen to have reference to a limited range of objects, determinate, and charged with emotional tones and our activities are inspired by motives of self-interest. There has been no deviation from this standard. Nobody has been seen to be omniscient and free from passions of self-glorification. The Buddha, being a human being, must be subject to these limitations. Now in reply to this counter-charge of the Mīmāṃsaka, Dharmakīrti observes as follows.

Not so are persons devoid of special reasons (for possessing special moral and spiritual excellences). [The case of speakers is not exactly on the same level with sentences. No sentences and even Vedic sentences possess any special characteristic which may place them in a different class from those spoken by persons. But a man differs in intellectual, moral and spiritual equipment. There are intellectual giants and moral and spiritual stalwarts who differ from the ordinary run of people]. Thus it is not warranted to infer equality in every respect (of the speakers) on the analogy of some specific characteristics of speeches and the like activities, for there are differences observable in respect of all (mental) attributes. These attributes are found to exhibit different degrees of

excellence on account of difference in discipline and culture.<sup>1</sup> Likewise the existence of other qualities (such as omniscience)<sup>2</sup> is possible. In your inference of impossibility (of this attribute) there is no reason discernible which can contradict the possibility (of omniscience). Dispassion (and omniscience) are not liable to perception and the relation of contradiction (i.e., one thing being contradictorily opposed to another) cannot be established with regard to a fact which is not perceptible. Nor again (is speech) the necessarily concomitant effect of attachment and desire (for temporal advantage).

1. A man with dull intellect and opaque morality is seen to improve by reason of discipline and labour. The intellectual and moral qualities are capable of infinite improvement provided the person concerned is willing or determined to undergo the course of training and labour involved in it.

2. The point at issue is whether the Buddha was omniscient and for that matter whether any human being can possibly become omniscient. The Mīmāṃsaka denies this possibility of a human being becoming omniscient. In the absence of an omniscient person no word of a human being is acceptable as authority for the existence of heaven, hell and the like which are to be experienced after death. If there is no after-life, religion will have no *raison d'être*. The existence of after-life, heaven and hell etc., is known only from scripture which must not be the creation of any human person. The Buddhist denies the possibility of uncreated scripture and asserts the possibility of a person becoming omniscient.

Regarding the possibility of omniscience, he says a man can become omniscient by continuous and uninterrupted meditation on the truth of *nairātmya*. This possibility of omniscience and perfect dispassion could be invalidated, only if these three conditions can be alleged to be present. For instance, if knowledge of *nairātmya* and consequential knowledge of all that exists be impossible. Secondly, even if they are possible, the excellence of intellectual and moral faculties be impossible. Thirdly, even if this moral and spiritual excellence be possible, the condition for the acquisition of this excellence be not accessible to knowledge. But the possibility of knowledge of the ultimate reality which is summed up by the expression of *nairātmya* is not open to denial. And the condition for moral and spiritual excellences which lead to this perfection is practice of discipline and this discipline is not unknowable. These are the conditions of realization of omniscience. The casual relation between spiritual exercise and omniscience cannot be denied. If this discipline is practised for a long time without break and incessant application, the perfect moral freedom induced by complete dispassion and detachment resulting in omniscience will be the necessary consequence. There is no reason why this result be impossible. The presence of dispassion and also of omniscience cannot be denied, because they are not open to the observation by another person. And so the reason assigned by the Mīmāṃsaka that the Buddha has delivered speeches cannot be understood to stand in opposition to this unobservable fact, viz., omniscience and dispassion.



[C] One may argue that delivery of sermons is not made the ground of denying perfect detachment and the like, but it is put forward as the ground for inferring desire and intention to make speeches and utterances. Why should the enlightened one who has no delusion and no unfulfilled want be disposed to make speeches ? This shows that he is actuated by desire, and desire always has reference to an unattained end. The presence of these desires being incompatible with perfect dispassion shows that the so-called omniscient is not what you suppose him to be. In reply the Buddhist answers that speech is not necessarily concomitant with passion and personal desire. What is needed for making a speech is that one must have knowledge of language and knowledge of things as they are. Thus the correct knowledge of things and the use of language for communicating this knowledge is an intellectual process on which emotional idiosyncrasy has no bearing. But one may ask if a person is perfectly dispassionate, why should we not perceive this fact ? The reason is that these mental characteristics occurring in another person are not open to perception by a different individual.

These special attributes, though existentially possible, are not open to observation (by another person). Thus the possibility of such persons possessing such attributes is not liable to denial. [Now the Mīmāṃsaka argues : If there be perfect beings and their existence be not liable to denial, because different men may possibly develop special moral and intellectual excellences, why should you not admit this possibility in the case of Vedic sentences ?] Sentences are not so, since (whether they are sacred or profane) all their characteristics, (general or special), are open to perception. If there were imperceptible characteristics (in Vedic sentences), that cannot be made the reason for inferring (the Vedic sentences) to belong to a different class, since these special attributes are not observed, (and on the basis of unobserved facts one cannot make any assertion at all). [But the Mīmāṃsaka argues that there are different characteristics which are perceived. Vedic

sentences are difficult to pronounce and not always sonorous]. But such special characteristics are capable of being produced in other (secular sentences also). Moreover it is logically impossible that the words which are perceptible should have imperceptible characteristics, (since one identical entity cannot be possessed of two opposite characters, one, perceptible and another, imperceptible). [These special attributes, it may be urged, which place the Vedic sentences in a different class are perceptible no doubt, but they are skipped over by error as in the case of poisonous substances which are mistaken to be non-poisonous]. There is no reason for error. [The reason for error is the similarity of structure, colour and so on in the case of poison, but there is no such ground for error in Vedic sentences. But how do you know that it is not an error to regard Vedic word as similar to ordinary word?] There is no contradiction and so the plea of error is not established. [One ought not to be sceptical without reason. A judgement must be regarded as true, unless and until it is proved to be false by contradictory experience. The illusion of silver in the shell is set aside by the subsequent knowledge of shell. But the judgement that Vedic sentences are just like profane statements is not liable to be dubbed as error, because there is no subsequent experience which contradicts its validity. But if this line of argument be sound, then the Mīmāṃsaka's denial of omniscience in a person should not be dismissed as erroneous, because there is no contradiction]. But the argument is not analogous, because the observation of special excellences (due to exercise of spiritual discipline) in men (of saintly character) furnishes the contradiction. [Well, the argument that a perceptible entity cannot have an imperceptible character is valid, so far as the imperceptible quality in question is regarded as intrinsic to it. But the difference in Vedic sentences is not intrinsic, but an extrinsic quality superadded to them]. (If so), an extrinsic attribute superadded as a special quality does not belong to the specific (Vedic) sentences. So the

conclusion follows that all sentences (Vedic or non-Vedic) being possessed of identical character should be regarded as the composition of a person or persons. Otherwise none of (the sentences including secular ones should be regarded as being composed by an intelligent person).

Furthermore.

**“Non-perception has been considered to be incompetent to prove the absence of the soul (by the Vaiśeṣika) or the absence of consciousness in earth (by the Cārvākas). How can this non-perception be the proof of the absence of the probans (vital activities in material things) ?” [22]**

[The Vaiśeṣika] who makes out non-perception as the proof of negation would be obliged to admit that the doctrine of self is without basis.<sup>1</sup> [But though perception be not available as the proof of the self, inference will establish its existence. But this also is not a sound contention]. Since the self is imperceptible, there can possibly be no fact which can be accepted as its effect. [(O) This is not a sound argument. If imperceptible things cannot be admitted to be existent, how can sense-faculties be admitted by the Buddhist] ? So far as the sense-faculties and others (such as memory-impression) are concerned, they are established by the consideration that cognition is an effect and happens only occasionally (in spite of the presence of the other conditions such as light, attention and so on), and so they must be dependent (upon something else and this something else is called sense-faculty. Inference) is of the form that the occurrence of cognition must have a cause and not of the form that the cause is of such and such nature. But the establishment of a cause having

1. The Vaiśeṣika (Praśastapāda) has declared that the self is not perceptible. If non-perception be the proof of the absence of the thing unperceived, there will be no ground for affirming the existence of self. Thus this would involve him in self-contradiction.

pleasure, (pain) and the like as effects cannot be made the ground of establishing the entity (called self). Since the establishment of any sort of cause will make them the effects of the cause (and this cause need not necessarily be an eternal unitary self as desired by the Vaiśeṣika and the like. In the absence of inference proving the existence of self), the self will be a thing which is not perceived, (literally, there will be non-perception of it and this will prove its non-existence according to this line of argument pursued by the opponent). How can then (the Materialist) who denies the existence of the self on the very ground (of non-perception) be refuted (by the Vaiśeṣika) on the plea that non-perception cannot be the proof (of the absence of the self)? If so, how can then (non-perception again being) an incompetent probans prove the absence (of vital activities in material things like jar)? Some one (the Materialist) asserts the absence of speech and the like (in the omniscient) on the ground of the non-perception (of omniscience), though he admits (at the same breath) the existence of consciousness although unperceived in earth. And the other (the Sāṃkhya) again admits the existence of curd and the like though unperceived in milk and the like, and again asserts on the basis of non-perception the absence of composite structure, (in fictions like hare's horn) which do not subserve the interests of an other. What is the necessary concomitance that composite things should necessarily be conducive to the interest of another? [The Sāṃkhya may retort] there is knowledge of curd etc. in milk and the like by means of inference, inasmuch as an effect cannot be produced by a thing which is incapable of it. [But the question may be posed]. What is this capacity? Is it the same entity (as the effect, curd etc.) or different from it? If it be the same, it would be perceived in its own nature, since there is no difference between (the effect and the capacity). If it be another entity, then how can it be admitted to be existent on the existence of another? It will be a merely metaphorical statement (that curd is existent in milk because the latter is capable of producing the former). In this way there is mutual

contradiction (on the part of the opponents who affirm the validity and invalidity of non-perception according as it suits their convenience).

**“It follows therefore that (the probandum which stands in the relation of) essential identity which is bound up with the very essence (of the probans) entails (by its absence) the absence (of the probans) sharing identical being with it.”**

For instance, the tree as such (being absent) entails (the absence of) *śimśapā*. Since a particular species having branches etc. (twigs, leaves and the like) is known by that name. The fact (of being tree as such) constitutes its very essence. How can an entity continue to exist after having forfeited its essential nature? The essential nature (of tree) is the constitutive principle of the entity (*śimśapā*). Such being the case, the species (*śimśapā*) being necessarily bound up with the essential character (of the tree), the former stands in necessary concomitance (with the latter).

**“(The absence of) the cause entails (the absence of) the effect because of the very relation of necessary concomitance.” [23]**

The cause by becoming absent entails the absence of the effect. Were it otherwise, the latter would not be the effect of the former. The relation of causality being established determines the being of the effect (as dependent upon) that of the cause. It follows as the logical consequence that absence of one determines the absence of an other by reason of natural concomitance in both ways (i.e., by identity or causality).

**“Otherwise, how can the absence of one entail the absence of an other? How can the proposition that a man is not possessed of a horse imply that he is not possessed of a cow?” [24]**

**“Likewise, how can the presence of one (supposed probans) entail the presence of the other (probandum without involving**

**necessary concomitance)? Does the proposition that a man is possessed of a cow entail his possession of a horse ?” [25]**

Accordingly (the occurrence of) the probans implies (the occurrence of) the probandum only because it stands in the relation of necessary concomitance (with the probandum). This (necessary concomitance) again is (of two kinds, viz.) essential identity or causal relation. This necessary concomitance is demonstrated by both examples (positive and negative).<sup>1</sup>

**“Accordingly the citation of the existent logical subject is not necessarily required in the negative example. Because it follows automatically from the statement of the negative concomitance that the absence of the probandum entails the absence of the probans.” [26]**

Because

**“The relation of identity and that of causality (obtaining between the probans and the probandum) are shown in the example to a person who is unaquainted with them.”**

In the example (showing the concomitance in identity) the probandum is set forth to stand in the relation of identity to the other term (probans) on the basis of the necessary concomitance (with the probans) in respect of identity of nature. The example demonstrates the proof that what produces an

1. The apprehension of necessary concomitance entails the apprehension of the fact that the probans is dependent upon the probandum for its existence and so the absence of the probandum makes the absence of the probans inevitable. The positive concomitance in agreement exhibited in the positive example and negative concomitance in difference in which the absence of the probandum is shown to involve the absence of the probans are only aids to recollection of necessary concomitance and they are not, logically speaking, indispensable factors of the process of inference. It should also be borne in mind that the negative concomitance is a necessary corollary of the positive concomitance. The apprehension of the latter involves that of the former.



event endowed with the nature of effect endows at the same time the event with the character of being impermanent. Were it otherwise, there would be no logical necessity that the existence of one fact will entail the existence of another and thus the doubt of the probans being contingent to the probandum will not be overruled. The necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum is shown by that very proof. The event which is produced at the determinate time by its own cause is necessarily born as perishable existing only for one mathematical instant. It cannot be said to derive its character (as perishable) from any other circumstance. [In other words, a thing which is brought into being as a product of its own cause is necessarily endowed with the character of being perishable. To be a product is to be liable to destruction. The two characters are rather necessary concomitants and so these two characters are rather consequences of the cause of the event]. As regards causality, it is shown in the example that *b* necessarily comes into being when *a* precedes it as a different entity. [The relation of causality holds between two numerically different entities, whereas identity is a relation between apparently two different facts, but in reality they are one and the same fact]. Thus when the relation of identity or causality is established (between the probans and the probandum, their necessary relation is established thereby. It follows as a necessary corollary that) the character of being a product is impossible without the character of being perishable and smoke is not possible without fire (as its antecedent). To be explicit, the other term (probandum) is either the self-identity (of the probans) or its cause. Such being the case, how can it (the probans) relinquish (the probandum which is) its self-identity or its cause and come into existence by itself?<sup>1</sup> [The effect is

1. In other words an event cannot happen without a cause. And between two necessary concomitants such as the fact of being a triangle and being a three-sided-figure, one cannot occur without the other. Also the relation of genus and species is one of essential identity. Thus teak or *śimśapā* are species of trees and the species

necessarily bound up with the cause and between two necessarily concomitant characters such as three sides and three angles, one must be present together with the other. It follows that the effect is impossible if there is no cause and about the essential characters one cannot exist without the other]. Thus the relation of negation is understood in the counter-example without reference to a substratum. With regard to persons to whom the relation of identity and that of causality are already known,

**“To those enlightened persons the probans alone should be stated.”<sup>1</sup> [27]**

The example is stated for the purpose (of exemplifying the necessary concomitance between the probans and the probandum) and when this necessary concomitance is already known, what will the statement (of the example) serve? And when this is shown (in the positive example) what need is there for stating the substratum of the negative example? With this consideration in view he (Dignāga) has denied the reference to the substratum (*āśraya*).

[C] It has been urged by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and also Uddyotakara that the necessary concomitance between the probans and the probandum cannot be established beyond doubt, unless it is shown that one cannot possibly occur without the other. For example, the relation of being a product and being a perishable entity cannot be established, unless it is shown that an imperish-

cannot exist without being members of the genus. This relation of necessary concomitance between two co-existent facts is called essential identity. Though the species exhibits its differences from the genus and also from other species, they are not regarded as essentially different entities. The oak differs from the teak, but both are trees and as such being identical with the common fact must be identical with one another. The so-called difference is only an appearance and not reality. This is the contention of the Buddhist.

1. The statement of the major premise which states necessary concomitance and the assertion of example in which the concomitance is illustrated are superfluous for persons who know that the probans stands in the relation of the effect to the cause or self-identity to the probandum. This is the idea.

able entity is not a product. The relation thus between two attributes, being perishable and being product, though shown in the positive example such as jar or table, cannot be accepted as necessary, unless the relation between their opposites is shown in the counter-example. But there is no counter-example possible according to the Buddhist, since the Buddhist does not believe in any imperishable entity.

In order to meet this contention, Dharmakīrti argues that the negative example is not necessary. The incompatibility of being an event with being uncaused or the incompatibility of the species with the absence of generic character, sc., treeness, is necessarily entailed by the very fact that the effect and the cause are inseparable. Such is the case with natural attributes, being a product and being perishable. If a thing is a product, it must be perishable. If it is not perishable, it is not a product. If smoke be an effect, it must be caused, as an uncaused effect is a contradiction in terms. Here the realist makes a protest. How can you speak of anything being uncaused when you cannot point to any fact which is observable as an uncaused one? So your necessary concomitance is only a show. As the concomitance in agreement is shown in a positive example that is a fact which is observed by both parties to the debate. Similarly the negative concomitance between opposites must be shown to be exemplified by concrete observable facts in the example. The Buddhist contends that the negative concomitance follows *a priori* from the positive concomitance. It is an ideal construction which is self-evident. To insist on a concrete observable fact as substratum of a negative concomitance is only an idle assumption.

**“The necessary concomitance being known by means of that (example), the statement of either of the two (examples showing positive and negative concomitance) will occasion the recollection of the other by necessary implication.” [28]**

As has been said by the Master (Dignāga in the *Nyāya-mukha*), “*Either (of the examples stated as alternative) will serve the purpose of showing the two-fold concomitance (in*

*agreement and in difference) by necessary implication."* Further in that very text the Master endorses the view that the example sets forth the relation of identity or that of causality and affirms that the statement of one serves the purpose of establishing the concomitance of the second. To be explicit, when the proposition, "Whatever is a product is impermanent", is asserted, it becomes evident that the probandum being not numerically different (from the probans), the fact (of being impermanent) is the very nature (of being a product) and is the necessary concomitant established by authentic proof (*pramāṇadṛṣṭa*) on the ground that one (being a product) is necessarily concomitant with the other (being impermanent). A person who is acquainted with the essential identity (of the probans and the probandum) arrives at the conclusion by way of implication that in the absence of impermanence the fact of being a product is not logically possible. It is not possible that an entity can come into existence without the self-identity of its nature (with the probandum), because they (probans and probandum) are ontologically identical. Were it not so, it would not be possible to conceive that one occurs necessarily on the occurrence of the other. Likewise when the proposition is stated negatively that one (product) does not occur without the occurrence of the other (impermanent), it becomes evident from the very statement itself to a person who knows the relation of identity that one is identical with the other by nature and thus one (the probans) cannot possibly come into being in the absence of the other (probandum). In default (of identity) the logical impossibility of the occurrence (of the probans without the occurrence of the probandum) would not be realized; hence the recollection of concomitance in agreement happens to the person who has realized the necessary identity of the probans and the probandum in each such case<sup>1</sup>. Similarly when the proposition,

1. What is emphasized by Dharmakīrti is the fact that the positive concomitance in identity of the probans and the probandum necessarily implies the negative concomitance that one cannot occur without the other. Conversely the statement of

“Wherever<sup>1</sup> there is smoke there is fire”, is asserted, it follows that smoke is the effect of fire, since the occurrence of smoke is necessarily (a consequence of) the occurrence of fire. Were it otherwise, there would be no ontological necessity that between two different things one (fire) must be necessarily determinant (antecedent) of the other (smoke), and consequently the consequent entity would be independent (of the antecedent). And in that case the absence (of the antecedent) would not affect the existence of the consequent and thus would not entail the absence (of the latter). But if the consequent (smoke) be known as the effect, it must necessarily have a cause (preceding it). What constitutes the character of the cause is that it (cause) necessarily comes into existence (literally, presents itself antecedently) to the occurrence of another entity (sc., the effect). And it is again the unfailing character of the effect that it comes into existence on the occurrence of that (cause). This is found to be the case with smoke. Therefore, a person who understands that smoke is the effect (of fire) and thus by concomitance in agreement understands the relation of the cause and the effect (subsisting between fire and smoke) comes to the conclusion that smoke cannot come into existence without the antecedent occurrence of fire, and thus by implication becomes aware of the negative concomitance. Likewise from the proposition ‘There can be no smoke if there be no fire (as its antecedent)’, (a knowledgeable person) arrives at the conclusion that fire must necessarily occur, if smoke occurs, and thus becomes aware of the concomitance in agreement by implication. Be it not the case (that knowledge of concomitance in agreement is implied by concomitance in difference), there will be no logical necessity why the effect (smoke) should not occur even in the absence of that (fire).

necessary concomitance in difference implies the truth of the positive concomitance. One follows as the logical consequence of the other. It is a case of immediate inference of formal logic.

1. In original text *yatra* or ‘where’ is used, but the meaning should be understood in universal reference, that is to say, all cases of smoke are necessarily cases of fire occurring antecedently to the former. (K. 83, 5-6).

[Now Dharmakīrti introduces the notorious problem in Indian Philosophy whether word is eternal or non-eternal. The problem is here concerned with the epistemological issue as to whether the audible perception of word is possible if the latter (word) be neither permanent nor impermanent. The audible perception would not be an effect of word]. If audible perception be not the product of both eternal or non-eternal entity (sc., word), then it will have no possibility for coming into existence in the absence of antecedent cause (either eternal or non-eternal; that is to say, it will not occur at all, if there is no cause of it. Dharmakīrti observes) it is not a fact that audible perception can be ascertained as not liable to happen (in the absence of an eternal and non-eternal cause). [It cannot be definitely known that audible perception does not occur on account of the absence of an eternal or non-eternal cause. Were it known that the non-occurrence of audible perception is due to the previous absence of any eternal or non-eternal cause, it would be the effect of either of them. But no such knowledge is possible]. On the contrary the eternity or non-eternity of the cause becomes liable to doubt. Be it otherwise, if the cause were definitely known to be absent, how could doubt arise on the occurrence (of audible perception regarding the eternity and non-eternity? Thus the absence of audibility cannot be asserted of eternal and non-eternal. Why then is audibility, being uncommon attribute as it is, absent in both eternal and non-eternal, that is heterologue and homologue, asserted as not being possible in both? The answer is :) It is said to be non-existent (both in eternal and non-eternal), only because the existence (of audibility) is not definitely known (to belong to either).

[C] It is contended that audible perception cannot be set down as the effect of a non-eternal entity nor of an eternal. Jar and the like which are non-eternal facts are not audible. So the absence of an eternal cause does not entail the absence of audible perception as its supposed effect. Nor again does the absence of a non-eternal cause entail its absence, because it is



also not perceived in space and the like which are regarded as eternal entities. So there can be no inference from the fact that word is audible to its cause being either eternal or non-eternal. Dignāga asserts that word is non-eternal, because it is an object of audible perception. The contention of the opponents, Uddyotakara and Kumārilabhaṭṭa, is that this argument is an instance of the fallacy called *non sequitur*. They contend that the syllogism, 'Word is non-eternal, because it is audible', is pointless, since no conclusion follows and so the argument must be dismissed as inconsequential. It cannot be regarded as a case of doubt, because doubt would have been possible, if the quality of being audible were found to be present alike in eternal and non-eternal ; like the attribute, cognizability. For instance, the argument, 'Word is impermanent, because it is cognizable', is a case of doubt, since both eternal and non-eternal facts are cognizable alike. But the attribute of audibility stands on a different footing. It is found in neither eternal nor non-eternal entities. The argument might be put as follows. Word is a substance which is either eternal or non-eternal ; and audibility is the quality of a substance. Hence arises a doubt whether it is a quality of an eternal or non-eternal fact. But this would make the fact of *being a quality* the probans and as such audibility would not be the cause of doubt.

In reply to the contention, it is asserted that the argument would have been a case of *non sequitur*, if it were previously known that all the cases which are known to be audible were all known to be neither eternal nor non-eternal. But this is not the case. Though a jar, table, chair and the like are not possessed of the quality of being audible, they are non-eternal facts. It does not follow that a non-eternal entity cannot be audible. Word, for instance, being audible, may be non-eternal. It may also be eternal. And so it is a case of doubt.

Dharmakīrti regards the argument, 'Word is non-eternal, because it is audible', as a case of doubtful issue. Of course word is non-eternal but this conclusion does not follow from the fact of its being audible. If audibility be understood as the causal efficiency for generating audible perception, it is natural that what is audible must be impermanent. A supposed permanent cannot have any causal efficiency. Thus the argument cannot

be a case of doubtful inference. Why then does Dharmakīrti set it down as a case of doubt? The answer is given as follows. If audibility be interpreted as causal efficiency as such, then it becomes equivalent to existence. And existence, according to the Buddhist, is nothing but causal efficiency and as such is possible only of non-eternal facts. The attribute of existence is found in all non-eternal things. If however audibility stands for particular causal efficiency for audible perception, then it becomes a case of the uncommon probans. Nothing but word is audible. So the occurrence of audibility in other non-eternal facts is not possible and hence it cannot be concluded that word is non-eternal as the concomitance between audible and non-eternal is not ascertained before. If however it is contended that the concomitance is known in the word itself, then the assertion of a probans, audible, is futile. The word is already known to be audible and non-eternal by the very act of the knowledge of concomitance. This is the reason why the argument is regarded as a case of doubt and not *non sequitur* and also not as a definitive syllogism yielding definite conclusion. This holds good of all uncommon probanses which are all guilty of being inconclusive.

When, on the other hand, the causal relation, sc., between fire and smoke, is not demonstrated in the example, then the proposition, 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire', will not be established, because necessary concomitance will not be evident. Consequently how can the negative concomitance 'There is no smoke there, where there is no fire' be deduced by implication? Likewise if the negative concomitance be not set forth in the counter-example, how can the positive concomitance (in agreement) be known (by implication)? It follows therefore that the example demonstrates the necessary concomitance based on the relation of identity and causality as set forth before, with a view to bringing home the truth that the existence of one (effect or identity) leads to the existence of the other (cause or natural concomitance). In the absence of such relation the deduction (of another) will be impossible.

**“It follows therefore from the aforesaid discussion that negation of cause or of (the superconcomitant, svabhāva, in case of) natural identity is the probans of the negation of another (effect or subconcomitant).”**

Since the two cases (cause and superconcomitant) alone, when found to be absent, are competent to drive home the absence of the other facts necessarily concomitant with them. Therefore a person who seeks to establish the negation of any other fact must show the absence of the cause or of the superconcomitant as the necessary probans. If there be no logical nexus (by way of causality and identity), how can the negation of one imply the negation of another ?

**“Again non-perception of a fact competent to perception (is also a condition of negation).” [29]**

(The above) is the probans for negation (of the perceptible object). Though (non-perception of a perceptible fact) is the condition of the *judgement* of negation (and not negation itself), it is called the condition of that (negation by way of abbreviation. Why is it not regarded as a case of negative inference ?) Because the non-perception of a fact (as described before, that is competent to be perceived and in the presence of all conditions of perception) is itself of the nature of negative judgement.<sup>1</sup> The non-perception of cause or superconcomitant serves as the probans for the both, (that is to say, it proves the non-existence of an object concerned and also makes the judgement and assertion of negation in the form, “The jar does not exist”, possible).

1. When one does not perceive an object which is as much perceptible as other objects which are perceived, he becomes automatically aware of its non-existence. So the negative probans, non-perception of the perceptible, does not prove the actual absence of the object, because the very act of non-perception is tantamount to the knowledge of the absence. It however becomes necessary when another person, owing to dogmatic bias or stupidity, fails to realize the absence of a fact in spite of the presence of the conditions of the perception. Therefore it is called the condition of the *judgement* or *assertion* of negation (*pariśedhavyavahāra*) only.

**"As set forth, this non-perception described to be of three kinds has again been elucidated under various heads according as the syllogistic statements are employed differently on the basis of non-perception of that (the perceptible entity, cause, superconcomitant) and the perception of contradictory opposites (of them)." [30]**

The probans for negation is three-fold only. The non-perception of what is perceptible by itself (is the universal character of all the probanses for negation). When it is known as such (as fit to be perceived), the non-perception of the (perceptible) cause, the (perceptible) superconcomitant and of the (perceptible) entity itself (are the logical grounds for negation). This (triple negative condition) admits of various divisions according as the syllogistic statements are variously used, setting forth different ways of non-perception of the perceptible or perception of the contradictory opposites. (The syllogistic statements variously used are) the non-perception of the perceptible (and its cause and super-concomitant) and perception of their opposites (consecutively of the perceptible, of the cause of the perceptible and of the super-concomitant of the perceptible) and also perception of the effect of the opposite and so forth as has been demonstrated before<sup>1</sup>.

**"The law of necessary concomitance (literally, the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum as a matter of infallible necessity) is definitely ascertained from the relation of cause and effect and the relation of identity which alone can serve as the determining principles of necessary concomitance and not from mere non-observation (of the probans in the absence of the probandum) or observation (of the probans in the presence of the probandum)." [31]**

**"How can the necessity of the occurrence of one entity on the occurrence of another be possible? Or if the occurrence of A be due to the occurrence of B like the colouring of the cloth, then (the necessary concomitance of the two will not be capable of being determined)." [32]**

1. See PV. [14], K. 35 seq.

These two verses inserted in between (sum up the result attained).

Moreover,

“An attribute which is caused by another entity will be different (from what is the intrinsic character of the entity it is supposed to qualify)<sup>1</sup>.”

A quality (*a*, probandum) which is not generated when the other quality (*b*, probans) is generated or *b* caused by another circumstance should not be logically considered to be identical in nature. Now numerical difference of entities consists in the occurrence of contradictorily opposed attributes and the *raison d'être* of this numerical difference is but the difference of causes. If these two circumstances (viz., the difference of attributes and the difference of causes) be not the condition of distinction, then there will be no difference of anything from any other thing and the upshot will be that the whole universe will be reduced to one substance. And consequently all things should be subject to simultaneous generation and simultaneous destruction and all things should function as the cause of all. If these consequences (simultaneous generation and simultaneous destruction and promiscuous causation) be not admitted, then things would not be reduced to one common entity. (If different entities be postulated, then description of them as one) will be only a technical name (without the meaning usually conveyed by it and used only in pickwickian sense); because the designation by one name is proposed of things postulated as numerically different.

(O) But though perishability (according to the Buddhist, being natural to a thing) is not caused by another entity, it is

1. The point at issue is whether to be an effect and to be perishable are two different attributes caused by different circumstances or identical in essence, the difference being only a case of abstraction. The latter is the position of the Buddhist logician. If the two are not essentially identical, one will not necessarily imply the other.

not found to come into existence when an entity comes into being and as such the charge that it (perishability) is not the natural property of the entity would be in force alike.<sup>1</sup> (A) (Dharmakīrti refutes the charge as follows): Perishability is not anything different from or external (to the thing), which (may be supposed to) come into existence at a subsequent time. The entity itself is born, endowed with the character of existing only for a moment and this is the meaning of perishability (the two attributes, existence and perishability, are the same fact). That they are expressed by two terms (one as a probans and another as a probandum) as the subject and the predicate is due to a condition which will be explained later on.<sup>2</sup> The fact that a thing exists for one moment and this is the very character of it which is derived from the very cause of the entity itself is perceived (by all, and does not admit of doubt); yet an average person (of dull understanding deluded by his ignorance and false belief) does not realize this truth, since he only perceives its existence and is deluded into the belief of its continuance for all the subsequent moments; or in this he is deceived by the uninterrupted generation of similar entities.<sup>3</sup> The definite knowledge (of the momentary

1. The point at issue is the Buddhist asserts that an entity perishes by its own nature. It is the nature of a thing to be perishable and as such does not require the service of a destructive agent like the stroke of a club. The Naiyāyika asserts that a thing is destroyed if a destructive agent is brought to bear upon it. But a thing does not perish during its existence, short or long. So the destruction must be a subsequent event whether it be automatic or due to an external condition. Consequently the charge that the destruction would not be natural remains unaffected whether it is regarded as spontaneous or externally caused.

2. If the entity be identical with perishability as it is with existence, why should such a statement as 'perishability is the attribute of an entity' be not dismissed as nonsensical? But such statement is not nonsensical. The difference of the subject and the predicate is intelligible. The Buddhist admits the necessity of such differential statement. But the verbal difference is not tantamount to ontological difference.

3. A thing exists only one moment and perishes in the next but because it is followed immediately by another entity similar to it in all appearance, an average man believes that the same entity endures for a length of time. When however a different series of entities takes place, he thinks that the old thing has been destroyed and a new thing comes into existence. Take a concrete example. A jar is



existence of things) occurs to those who see the last moment (of its existence, i.e., when it is superseded by another).<sup>1</sup> Subsequently when the (previous) entity is not perceived, it is understood to have ceased to exist and this is the time when its extinction is realized and then it is determined to be perishable (by nature). [This is a case analogous to the realization of causal relation as explained in the following]. The efficiency for the production of an effect is constitutionally the nature of the cause ; yet a person who perceives the cause and has not seen its relevant effect does not realize its causal efficiency for the effect. But this is realized after observing the effect produced. If it were not (constitutionally a property of an entity), perishability would be a different entity, whether it be regarded as produced by another cause or an event without cause. Consequently an entity would not be possessed of it (perishability) as its property, since the latter (perishability) would have no concern with the former. If, on the contrary, perishability would bear upon the entity, it would become integrated with its very constitution and thus (the postulation of perishability) as an external property would be superfluous. An entity, on the other hand, which is by its nature permanent and imperishable, would not possibly develop a contrary character in spite of another entity being brought to bear upon it.

Now let this perishability be a different entity and let it be (supposed to be) produced by another entity. (But what will be the relation in which it will stand to the latter entity ?) It must be either the cause or the effect (of the entity to which it comes to be related), since a fact which is neither cause nor effect cannot stand in necessary relation (to another fact) and

not one entity existing for a long span of time. Every second moment it is the recurrence of a similar entity and the belief of the observer in the continuity of things, fostered by superstition, does not allow him to understand the truth that nothing persists beyond one moment.

1. From a fact that faggot is seen to be reduced to ashes, it becomes obvious that the faggot is impermanent. This gives the clue to its momentary existence, since a thing which is not perishable by nature cannot be brought to an end. And being naturally perishable, it must perish in the next moment.

as such the inference of its existence (in the entity) will not be logically possible.

Regarding the issue,

**“It (perishability) cannot be the cause of the entity because it happens later on. If on the other hand it be the effect, there is no definite guaranty of its (occurrence).” [33]**

If it (perishability) comes into existence under the influence of some other conditions subsequently to the emergence of the entity, how can it be the cause of the latter (entity)? If it be regarded as the effect, then there is no ontological necessity that it must occur, because the presence of the cause is not necessarily attended with the occurrence of the effect. Consequently an attribute which is due to another entity as its condition cannot be held to occur as a matter of necessity on the occurrence (of the former) and so there can be no inference (of the effect from the cause).

[C] The matter of contention is this. An entity, like a jar, is found to be perishable. But is the attribute of perishability natural to it or due to other conditions apart from the jar? The Vaiśeṣika holds that the jar will continue until a condition of destruction appears. For instance, it is destroyed when one strikes it with the club or dashes it to the ground and so forth. The destruction is not natural to it. The Buddhist, on the other hand, maintains that unless a thing be perishable by nature, it cannot be made to perish by any external agent. For instance, space, time, soul and etc. are regarded as imperishable eternal substances by the Vaiśeṣika and no destructive agent can make them cease to exist. The external agent or condition does not destroy the thing but makes the process of destruction intelligible even to the meanest understanding. This is the issue of controversy.

Now Dharmakīrti poses the question. Is the fact that it is perishable, in one word, the attribute of perishability, the cause of the entity which is perishable or effect of it? Now a jar perishes only after it has come into existence and not before,

because in that case it will not happen at all. And because the destruction happens to it after it has come into existence, it cannot be its antecedent and as such it cannot be regarded as its cause. Let it be supposed that the entity develops the attribute of being perishable after its emergence. But that also is not a tenable position. The entity, sc., a jar, will then be one of its conditions but not the whole cause. The presence of one of the conditions is not the sufficient guaranty that the effect will happen as a matter of necessity. It requires the presence of other conditions also. And as such we cannot infer that a thing which is produced must be perishable. So the basis of necessary concomitance between 'a product' and 'perishable' cannot be found in causality. But it is admitted on all hands that what is a product is perishable, *yad utpattimat tad vināśi*. What can then be the basis of this concomitance other than identity of nature? So Dharmakīrti regards perishability as a natural attribute of an entity produced by a cause. And it has been shown that a thing exists only one moment and perishes in the next and this constitutes the attribute of perishability.

If again observation (of co-presence) and non-observation (that is observation of the absence of both) be not the requisite conditions of the concomitance in agreement and the concomitance in difference, how can we be sure that smoke will not fail to accompany fire? The reason is :

**"Smoke is the effect of fire, as the characteristics of the effect are observed to be present in it."**

Now what was not observed before is observed when certain facts have been observed and is again not observed when one (antecedent) is not observed, it is deduced that the (subsequent) entity is the effect of the (antecedent) entity. This (triple) test is found to be satisfied by smoke.

[C] The relation of cause and effect is ascertained by the application of triple test. If one is to demonstrate by experiment that smoke is the effect of fire, one has to show that (1) there is neither smoke nor fire previously present in a place, (2) fire is produced and smoke is observed to follow, (3) fire is removed

from the place and so not observed, smoke also is not observed. In all (1) non-observation of the smoke before its emergence, (2) observation of fire and observation of smoke, (3) lastly, non-observation of fire and non-observation of smoke, these are the three steps in which there are three cases of non-observation and two cases of observation, and this necessary concomitance shows that the subsequent entity is the effect and the antecedent is the cause. This is an anticipation of the position of J. S. Mill's third Canon—the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference.

**“If it (effect) were to come into existence even when it (the cause) were absent, it would forfeit the character of being conditioned by the cause.” [34]**

Even when it is observed in one single case to conform (to the canon) it is proved that (the subsequent event) is the effect. If it were not the effect it would not follow even once from what is not its cause. If the effect could happen in the absence of its own cause, it would be a case of an event happening without cause. For when an event comes into existence in the absence of another, the latter cannot be a cause. (On your supposition) smoke can come into existence in the absence of fire and so it cannot have fire as its cause.

But one may contend that it will not be a case of uncaused production, because the event may be due to another cause. No, the problem will be the same even on that (hypothesis). (Suppose that smoke is produced from an anthill, but that will not be a tenable hypothesis) because even in the absence of that (anthill) it (smoke) comes into existence when fire is present. [Thus so far as other conditions open to perception are concerned, they fail to account for the occurrence of smoke]. Again how can it come into existence from any other entity (*a* or *b*) which is not possessed of the capacity of producing the effect in question? The supposed cause is by itself devoid of the nature of the cause which is capable of producing the effect and so the effect (sc., smoke) will be devoid of a cause. (But

the opponent may urge that) it is not contended that it is the self-same effect that is produced but something which is similar to it. But how can the effect be similar (to the usual one), when it springs from a cause qualitatively different (from the well-known cause, fire)? A similar effect can spring into existence from the similar cause.

[C] It is admitted that there are different kinds of smokes produced from different fuels, sc., faggot or leaves. Of course the qualitative difference of the variety of the smoke is due to the difference in the fuel, but fire is present in all. So there is similarity between the different kinds of smokes. Similarity, therefore, cannot be predicated of things which are entirely diverse. But it may be argued that according to the Buddhist the first instance of smoke is produced from fire and then the smoke produces similar smoke as a successor. So there may be similarity in the effects in spite of the difference of causes. But this is not a valid objection. The first smoke that is produced from fire and the second smoke that is also produced from fire are similar. The smoke that is produced from smoke is similar to the smoke similarly produced from smoke. So there is no exception to the rule that similars produce similars and dissimilars produce dissimilars. If fire be the cause of smoke and also anything not-fire be supposed to be capable of producing the smoke, there must be something common between them, otherwise the similarity of smokes would not be accounted for. However much the smokes may be supposed to differ, they will not be different to the extent that a jar differs from smoke. The point at issue is that an event must have a cause and if both the event and the cause be open to observation, we must seek to affiliate an observable effect to an observable cause. And if it is supposed that it is not fire but some unobservable fact associated with it is the cause of smoke, then it is not logically permissible to infer fire from smoke. This contention may not be theoretically assailed, but it will be an instance of extreme scepticism. (K. 99). The question is, "Have you observed any case of smoke without fire? If not, why should you deny that smoke is the effect of fire?" It is observed that smoke is possible only when fire is present

and if it is said that it is a case of fortuitous combination, it will be a very unprecedented way of judging causal relation.

If a similar effect could come into existence from a dissimilar one, then there will be no determination of causal efficiency and hence difference of the cause would not be necessary for difference (of the effect). Thus the multiple form and variation of the world would have no cause (of their own). All things might come into existence from all things. Therefore it must be admitted (in view of the impossibility of promiscuity) that the difference and the identity of the cause are responsible for the difference and the identity of the effect. Therefore smoke cannot be generated by an entity qualitatively different from what is seen, because (denial of this rule) would lead to the conclusion that things are produced without any causal principle.

Consequently.

**"If the effect were uncaused, it would have perpetual existence or perpetual non-existence, since it would be independent (of the service) of another. The fact that entities have the possibility of occasional existence, (that is, the character of contingency) is due to their dependence." [35]**

(For instance), the smoke, if it is to happen uncaused, it would not happen not occasionally, (that is to say, it would be existent in all time), because of the independence (of the service of another), since it would not be subject to deficiency (of the conditions) of its existence just as it is not at the time in which it is known to endure. Or it would not even be existent at the time (of its own duration) inasmuch as the (supposed) time of its existence is not different from the time in which it is non-existent. That entities are liable to occur periodically (contingently) is due to the fact of their dependence upon (another event as condition). The time of their existence and the time of their non-existence respectively constitute the competency and incompetency of their occurrence. If time and place (as such) were supposed to be possessed of competency or incompetency in the same degree (without



distinction), then there would be no determining principle for one (time and place) being endowed with the entity or being destitute of it. This competency is not anything different from the principle of the causality. In consequence it must be admitted that when an entity occurs in one particular place and time avoiding another place and time, the entity in question is dependent upon the former circumstances. Accordingly its occurrence in that way (in that particular place and time) is (to be interpreted as) dependence, since an entity independent of the services rendered by them is not governed by the necessity that it would occur in the precise manner. Therefore when smoke whose occurrence is determined by a determinate place and time is observed to occur (in that place and time) and not observed to occur even for once if there is a deficiency in the conditions, it follows that the specific character (of smoke) is generated by the conditions. Were it not so, it would not occur even once (under the circumstances in question). How can the smoke determined as it is by the conditions occur in another setting? If it were to occur (elsewhere), it would not be smoke. Smoke is nothing but one whose specific character is determined by those very conditions. Conversely the cause also must be possessed of the character of producing the effect of such description. If the smoke were to be generated by any other condition (than fire), it (fire) would not be possessed of the character of being cause. (And consequently) it would not be able to produce smoke even for once. Nor again would the effect be smoke, if it could come into existence from what is not possessed of capacity for producing smoke. If the causal entity (supposed to be other than fire) be possessed of the nature (of producing smoke), it would transpire to be nothing but fire. And so the necessary concomitance is established (between fire and smoke).

**"If the head of *Sakra* (i. e., anthill) were of the nature of fire, it would be nothing but natural fire (capable of producing smoke).**

If, on the other hand, it were of the nature different from that of fire, how can smoke be possibly there ?” [36]

“Fire is possessed of the nature (capacity) of serving as the cause of smoke, possessed, as it is, of the particular power of producing that (smoke in question). If smoke were to be brought into existence by what is not the cause of smoke, it (smoke) would be tantamount to an uncaused event.” [37]

These are the two summarizing verses. (Now a question is raised. If an effect, sc., smoke, cannot be produced by a different cause), how is it that the effect is supposed to be generated by an auxiliary of a heterogeneous character ? For instance, visual cognition is produced by the combination of the visual organ, colour (light, attention) etc.. [The question arises from misconception]. It is not maintained that any particular condition is possessed of the causal efficiency and is the cause of it, but the totality of the conditions has that capacity and is the cause (of the effect), and this total cause is inferred from the effect. This totality is the cause of the effect by its natural existence and so the auxiliaries (though of heterogeneous character) produce the effect simultaneously and not in succession.

[C] No particular causal factor can produce an effect but only when all the factors are combined. But why should we then infer fire from smoke ? The answer is that the different causal factors, fire, fuel, air etc. develop the causal efficiency individually when they are brought together and not in isolation. But what is this totality ? Is it different from the causal factors ? If different, all the factors are to be considered as unproductive. But that will go against the evidence of experience. We do not find anything different from or in excess of the factors present. The answer is that by the totality of causal factors it is not meant that something else in excess of causal factors supervenes to bring about the effect. It is nothing but factors present together. But if the different causal factors be each endowed with the causal efficiency, why should they not produce a plurality

of effects and not one alone ? This contingency is also not admitted as necessary. There is nothing to deter the possibility of different factors from producing one single effect. It is not the position of the Buddhist that the cause and the effect are identical in substance, but this is maintained by the Sāṃkhya philosopher. So theoretically or empirically, there is no incompatibility involved in the supposition that different conditions may combine to produce one particular effect, though each of them is possessed of causal efficiency for the same. We have to admit that the causal factors develop the efficiency in the state of combination. There are philosophers who hold that totality is the relation of conjunction which is produced by the different factors. But this is superfluous. If the factors can produce the relation of conjunction, why should not they produce the causal efficiency for the effect without any such medium ?

As regards such cases as a kind of weed (*śāluka*) etc. which are observed to be generated from cowdung and others, though different in kind from their proper causes, there must needs be difference in the nature of the product born of its own cause (from one born of cowdung), in spite of the same designation. The reason for the qualitative difference of the product is the difference of natural cause. For instance, (one kind of) banana plant is found to be produced from its own seed and (another) from the roots, (but they are found to exhibit qualitative difference). Even average people clearly and unmistakably spot out the qualitative difference constituted by structural variation. Accordingly (it must be admitted that) an effect clearly distinguished by reason of structural and qualitative difference (from those resembling it) is never found to fail in its necessary concomitance with its relevant cause.

**“When one thing is seen to be the necessary consequent of another by concomitane in agreement and concomitance in difference, it must be deduced that it is so as the nature of the consequent (the effect is determined by the cause of it and conversely it is the very nature of the cause to be productive of the effect). It follows therefore that no effect can derive its being from what is other than the cause.” [38]**

This is a summarizing verse. Therefore from a single instance of observation and non-observation (as set forth in the five stages), the causal relation is established and from this (the necessity of the concomitance of both kinds) is understood. It cannot be ascertained in any other manner, (that is, without the comprehension of causal relation). It cannot be determined by the empirical knowledge of co-presence and co-absence, because that would require the observation of concomitance in agreement and non-observation of concomitance in difference in each and all cases (which is humanly impossible).

[C] The knowledge of relation of causality is not based purely on empirical evidence, that is, actual observation. Our experience is by the very nature of the case confined to a limited number of instances. So by mere observation of two events in association and non-observation, that is, observation of the absence of the two cannot give us the guaranty that the concomitance in agreement and difference will hold good. It is only when the relation between the events is understood to be one of causality that we can be sure of the universal necessity of the concomitance.

Thus, (for instance), an amorphous entity (such as space) is found to be eternal, but in other cases it is seen to be otherwise (for instance, pleasure and pain, though amorphous, are found to be transitory). Again though amorphousness is not seen in things believed to be not eternal, (e.g., jar), yet it is seen (in things which are alike non-eternal such as pleasure and pain).

[C] Being amorphous and being eternal or non-eternal, though observed to be present together in a number of instances, are also found to be absent in others. On the contrary an eternal entity is observed to be amorphous and so also non-eternal. Thus from mere observation of the association of two attributes one cannot arrive at the conclusion that the two will go together in every case. The necessity of a relation of two events in succession can be definitely ascertained if it were found to be a case of causality. The effect must have a cause and nothing can

happen without cause. This is an *a priori* belief which cannot be set aside by any amount of logical cogitation. Nāgārjuna also asserts that it is impossible to believe that an event can occur without cause preceding it. In logic inference is found to be possible only if there is a universal proposition showing the necessary connection of two facts. In case of succession, when *a* is necessarily believed to be followed by *b*, the necessity and universality of the relation of the two can be accepted only on the assurance that they stand in the relation of cause and effect.

Let it be agreed that the effect stands in the relation of necessary concomitance to the cause, since the former is generated by the latter. But how can identity of essence be regarded as a case of necessary concomitance ?

**“Necessary concomitance is also inevitable in essential identity (of the probans and the probandum), since the latter is bound up with the former in its essence.”**

The relation of necessary concomitance holds between one entity and another which is necessarily entailed by its very existence (for example, between ‘a product’ and ‘perishable’ as the latter follows from the very nature of the former).

**“(The reason is) since the absence (of the probandum) necessarily entails the absence (of the probans) automatically, because the two stand in the relation of identity.” [39]**

Now that which is called the self-nature (essence) is the character of a thing which follows from its very existence and this by itself constitutes its very nature and being.<sup>1</sup> So how can one come to be after repudiating its own self ? What is a product is necessarily perishable because there is no onto-

1. That what is a product is necessarily perishable follows from the nature of the product itself. It cannot be a product without being perishable. The one is the obverse and the other is the reverse of the same coin. They are two only conceptually and not in reality.

logical difference between them. (So if it be one, it must be the other).

But does not this make the argument liable to the fallacy called the fallacy of a part of the thesis being adduced as the probans ?<sup>1</sup> No, the fallacy does not arise, because.

“In pursuance of the law of nature, all entities are established respectively in their own character (and thus each has the distinctive individuality of its own) and by reason of this (individuality) each and all are distinguished from other similar and dissimilar things.” [40]

“Therefore things are distinguished from others (possessing different individuality) and on the ground of this differentiation class concepts are constructed having reference to the difference of individuals (as the source).” [41]

“Accordingly the difference which is expressed by a particular attribute (i. e., a word) is not capable of being expressed by another and this is the *raison d’etre* of the differentiation (of the probans ‘being a product’ from the probandum ‘being perishable’, though identical in essence).” [42]

Each and all entities exist in their own nature (without exception). They do not commingle their self (character) with others. (Were this process of coincidence involved in the act

1. *Pratijñā* is the thesis. It is the proposition which is to be established by reasoning. Thus ‘The hill is possessed of fire’ is the thesis which has to be proved. But it cannot be proved if the probandum ‘being possessed of fire’ which is not a proved fact is itself adduced as the probans as in the proposition ‘The hill is possessed of fire, because it is possessed of fire’. An entity is to be proved to be perishable on the basis of its being product. The argument will be of the form, ‘A is perishable, because it is a product’. This is understandable if the two attributes be different. That which proves (a probans) cannot be that which is *to be* proved (probandum). But according to the Buddhist logician the two attributes, viz., ‘to be a product’ and ‘to be perishable’, are identical. So the argument on analysis turns out to be as follows. ‘A is perishable because it is perishable’. This is the fallacy which is called a part of the thesis employed as a probans. It corresponds to *petitio principii*. (K. 108, 5-7).



of commingling possible), the other thing (*b*) would cease to be the other (*b*) (and would become *a*). Again what is said to be its identical character, not different from the thing (of which it is predicated), cannot be said to belong to them (other things), since the other entities would cease to be others (having this identical character). If again they be identical with the same (universal), they would become that (very universal and one), since they have one undifferent character and have no other character different from the same. The one identical universal is, on the contrary, opposed to difference, [that is to say, a thing which is identical with (*a*) must not be different from (*a*) and so precludes its difference from it. If the universal be one, and appear to be different only through the particular individuals in which it occurs, the universal and the individuals would be absolutely different and] that (universal) then is definitely established in its own character and as such cannot be identical with (individual). If, on the other hand, it is supposed not to be identical (but different from individuals), it (universal) would not be the universal common character of them, (since it has a self-character of its own) which is not the character of the individuals (in which it is supposed to be subsistant), in spite of its relation with the manifold individuals. (If the so-called universal were supposed to inhere in many individuals, though it is different from them), then such things, as duality and the like (plurality), conjunction and substantive wholes (produced from the parts), would also have to be regarded (as the common universal, since these entities are found to belong to many. But they are not accorded the status of universal).

[C] It is a perennial problem of philosophy that a large number of individuals are folded into one class and designated by one name. For instance, cow, man, horse etc. are class names and each comprises a large number of individuals within its denotation. The individuals belonging to the same class are found to be different numerically and qualitatively. One individual horse is different from another horse. The same is the case

with the rest. The individuals are called by one name, though admittedly they are different from one another *quā* individuals. So there is difference and identity both in each member of a class. Kumārila in conformity with the plain verdict of common sense asserts that there is one common universal class-character which is identical with and different from the individuals. This accounts for the unitive reference of the numerical different individuals. The individuals preserve their distinctive individuality, though they are identical with the universal. The universal is thus identical with and different both from the individuals. Dharmakīrti has criticized this conception in the following sentences. He contends that if universal is identical with the individuals, the individuals will lose their mutual differences and must be lumped together in one identity. If, on the other hand, the universal were different from the individuals, it would fail to be the common character of them.

Uddyotakara posits one universal as inherent in numerous individuals. It is different from the individuals existentially, but it serves as the common unitive entity. Dharmakīrti thinks that this theory also is open to fatal objections. If one thing, supposed to be existent in many, be regarded as the common point of reference, then duality, plurality, conjunction and one whole made of parts would also have similar claims. Thus, for instance, two things have one common quality, viz., twoness or duality. So also the case with plurality or manyness which is a quality common to many individuals. Conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is the quality of two substances and thus the common quality of both. As for the whole which is believed to be the effect of combination of different factors after a pattern, it becomes the product of them and is supposed to be inherent in all. For instance, a table is constructed by combining several pieces of timber after a plan. So also all things are supposed to be produced by the juxtaposition of the parts. The whole belongs to all the parts, though it is different from them. The whole is one and the parts are many. If common relation to many parts be the criterion of the universal, then all these cases would lay claim to the status of universal (*sāmānya*). This is the gravamen of Dharmakīrti's contention. (K. 116, 22-23).

[It has been contended that not all common things are regarded as universal but only those which by their presence make the individuals appear as similar. The cow universal (*gotva*) makes the individual cows similar by virtue of which they are called by one common name and referred to by one concept. This is also not regarded as sound argument by Dharmakīrti]. Assuredly one common entity, numerically different, cannot make others similar in spite of being related to them. That would only make them perceived as possessed of one common attribute and not as identical, just as is the case with the different entities, such as planets and stars (represented by the different images) which are connected by one long thread put round the neck. [The Naiyāyika contends that the case of universal's inherence in individuals is different, as it is amorphous and not of a perceptible shape like the thread and so the universal is not perceived as different. No, this also does not help, since] this common universal should not make them appear as identical (just as the thread) on the images (does not make them appear identical, being equally different from the individuals like the thread from the images).<sup>1</sup> Our understanding appears to take stock of the universal by connecting the individuals (by a conceptual construction, which is an error, since there is no objective universal inherent in individuals). It never cognizes the individuals as related to one common entity like (the thread on) the representations of planets. (But the Naiyāyikas contend) the understanding sees it (universal, but as the relation of inherence is too subtle, it escapes notice and so the universal appears as identical with the individual). And this (apparent perception of identity) is downright error (on the part of the understanding).

(But the Buddhist asks) : What is the evidence that it (understanding) perceives the universal? (The Naiyāyika rejoins that) there can possibly be no error which is not rooted

1. Planets etc. represented by figures are decorated with one common garland, but that does not make them identical with the latter.

in (experienced fact as its) seed (sc., condition. The experience of identity of the universal with the individuals is an error and this is possible only if the universal were perceived, as a previously unperceived fact cannot be experienced in error. The Buddhist rejoins) it is the individuals which serve as the occasion and ground (of this error), as each and all of them discharge one common function, (viz., giving rise to the cognition of the common universal).

[C] The Naiyāyika contends that there is no ground for this perception of the universal being affirmed as erroneous. The universal is not perceived according to the Buddhist. So it cannot be supposed to be wrongly perceived. The mother of pearl is mistaken as silver on account of its close similarity. So also a rope is mistaken for a snake in dim light. But no such previous experience of the universal is admitted by the Buddhist. Neither is there similarity between the universal and the individuals. The universal is without colour and shape, whereas individuals have these distinctive qualities. So there can be no shade of resemblance between them which can account for the possibility of erroneous perception of the universal. The Buddhist retorts that the postulation of one common object serving as the connective link cannot account for the identification of the terms with the connective link.

This is not found to be the case with regard to objects possessing one (common) number, conjunction, one whole as the effect of parts and the images (referred to as having one common thread. These things do not appear as identical in spite of being connected by a common object and the universal, though common, cannot make individuals appear as identical). But since the perception does not have a distinctive universal as its content, the universal is not anything numerically different (from the individual). Be it possible, it (universal) will exist by itself preserving its self-identity and would not mix itself up with any other (sc., individual). So these individuals (sc., jar, table and the like having their own self-identity) are distinguished from what are regarded as homo-

geneous and heterogeneous, because they have by their very nature one uniform individuality. In order to make known their difference from whatever things they differ, they are designated by words which are by convention affixed to them, and though identical in character, they appear to be possessed of varying attributes on the basis of their (conceptual) difference from their opposites. These words again do not take cognisance of all the aspects of qualitative differences (possessed by the individual), but they communicate difference in respect of one attribute (of the individual), and as such have necessary reference to the individual, because the individual is possessed of the difference from that one class of opposites. [The reason is that the thing meant by a word is conceived as different from its opposite and such is also the real individual (*svalakṣaṇa*). And things from which the individual is conceptually differentiated from one whole without reference to the other aspects of difference present in the individual]. Accordingly one entity has as many differences as the opposites from which it is distinguished. An entity (which is the cause of one thing and the effect of another) is differentiated from what cannot possibly be the cause or the effect of that (entity). Again the number of words differs in relation to the number of differences and these words are not affixed to those things which are not the cause of particular effects or the effects of particular causes (but to their opposites) for the sake of pragmatic behaviour, (i.e., *pravṛttinivṛttilakṣaṇa*, positive and negative action). For instance, "Sound is the immediate consequent of volitional effort and the cause of auditory cognition", is the proposition (in which the predicates have distinctive meanings. The immediate consequent of volitional effort) implies the exclusion of what are not the effects of volition, (for instance, lightning, etc.) and (the cause of auditory cognition) implies the exclusion of what is not such a cause (e. g., colour, touch and the like).

[C] All verbal operations and also non-verbal ones have their validity from the effect they produce. In other words, it

is causal efficiency, which consists in a thing being the effect of something and being the cause of some other thing, that is the sole criterion of the validity of all linguistic usage. A word denotes a meaning which has a negative reference in that the meaning is distinguished from what is its opposites.

The attributes, viz., (1) being an effect of volitional effort, and (2) being the cause of auditory cognition, are conceptually different and are conceived to belong to one self-identical entity, viz., sound. But the sound as an entity is one individual real which has no intrinsic difference in its character.

Therefore, though the entity has no intrinsic difference in character, yet it is conceived to have different attributes which are expressed by different words. One word signifies one difference which cannot be expressed by another word, [for instance, impermanent and being a product are inexpressible by one word. They are expressed by different words and appear to be different, though in reality they are identical. In view of the conceptual difference of meanings conveyed by different words] it follows that each and all words cannot express the same meaning and so the charge of the probans being a part of the thesis (i. e., being the same thing as the probandum) does not hold good.

[C] In the syllogistic argument, "Sound is perishable, because it is a product", the probans and the probandum bear different meanings and so cannot be regarded as identical, in spite of the fact that the two attributes are really one identical fact being identical with the subject, viz., sound. Dharmakīrti has shown that the meanings of words derive their differences from their opposites from which they are distinguished. Thus *perishable* means what is not-not perishable and *product* means what is not not-product.

How can it be established that a word and also the probans (in a syllogism) connote only exclusion<sup>1</sup> (of the

1. Kaṇvakagomin has made the meaning of the word, *vyavaccheda*, clear by asserting that, though it means exclusion, it has reference to the conceptual construction which is hypostatized as an external objective fact. This accounts for the



opposites) and do not connote real attributes, though they are affirmative in form and content ? Because there is scope for the application of another proof and another verbal proposition.

[C] The cryptic statement of Dharmakīrti requires further elucidation. The differentiation of one indivisible, monolithic entity into a subject and a predicate is not ontologically valid. Were this differentiation a part of the real entity, it would have been cognized by one cognitive organ, that is, one cognitional act. One cognition would cognize the whole with all its contents and so assertion of a probans to prove a probandum would not be necessary. The probandum and the subject would be cognized, when the subject is cognized, because the probandum is a part and parcel of the subject. But the employment of syllogistic argument is a necessity. This shows that the difference of one entity into a subject and a predicate is only a conceptual construction and does not give a glimpse of the real as it is.

Accordingly,

**“One objective entity which is directly perceived as it is itself (is perceived in its entirety). How can it have any part which is not perceived along with it and as such would admit of being examined (and proved) by acts of inference (as a separate cognition) ?” [43]**

[C] Though the distinction of an entity into a subject and a predicate has been shown to be a conceptual construction, the author adduces the following argument from another point of view in order to clinch the issue. (K. 121, 7-8).

The object *per se* is one (indivisible whole) and that is susceptible to perception (and as such is cognized by perception). It is the subject (*dharmīn*) and, if uncognized, the probans could not be applied to it. For example, word is the subject

positive reference of a word. But in reality it does not concern the objective real individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) which does not admit of being dichotomized into a subject and a predicate.

and impermanence is the probandum (i. e., predicate in the proposition, "word is impermanent"). That (word) is known by perception (as the organ of cognition) and as such is known in its entirety with all its aspects, since there is no other aspect which is unknown. Were such an unknown element possible, it would not be integral to the self-same nature of (the subject, sc., word). [An entity cannot be simultaneously known and unknown, which is incompatible with its integrity]. Certainly an entity (a) which is not identical in all characteristics and incidents with an entity (b)<sup>1</sup> cannot be supposed to be possessed of self-identical nature. This alone is the *raison d'être* of (conceptual and verbal) differentiation. As has been said, were it not the case (that difference of attributes is the condition of differentiation), there would be no possibility of differentiation at all. Accordingly when the subject is known by perception and its whole nature is entirely apprehended by it, the scope of application of another *pramāṇa*, cognitive proof, is ruled out (for the ascertainment of any property connected with it).

[C] The charge of futility of the employment of another cognitive proof in respect of a perceived subject is also inevitable in the case of the Buddhist logician also and this would make inference equally infructuous. Anticipating such an objection the author makes the following statement.

**"(It would be so), if another attribute were not superimposed by a certain condition of error, just as the form of silver is superimposed upon the mother of pearl on account of the observation of the community of colour." (44)**

If there were no superimposition of another character on account of the presence of the condition of error (such as the successive emergence of similar entities which gives rise to

1. *Ekayogakṣema*. This is the commonplace *cliché* in philosophical parlance. Things supposed to be identical must have identical *yoga* and *kṣema*. *Yoga* means accrual of a new advantage and *kṣema* means the continuity of the *status quo*. That which has the same incidents, gain or loss with another, is identical with the other. An equivalent expression in Sanskrit is *tulyāvyaya*, being subject to the same profit and loss.

error of permanence) which thwarts the definite comprehension of the entity as it is, when the entity in question is cognized in its full character by perception, (there would be no occasion for the employment of another cognitive proof). For example, (it may be cited that) the character of the silver is superimposed upon the mother of pearl (on account of the observation of the bright whiteness in the mother of pearl which is also seen in silver).

[C] The mother of pearl is perceived as it is. But the similarity of its bright white colour to that of silver obstructs the perception of the mother of pearl as it is. On the contrary, this similar character gives rise to illusion that one perceives the silver and not the mother of pearl. It is the similarity of the attributes of the two entities, viz., mother of pearl and silver, which occasions error. So also the successive emergence of similar entities gives rise to illusion of permanence. One is tempted to believe that he perceives the same entity in different moments. Here also similarity is the cause of error. If there be no such case of error, the occasion for seeking the help of another *pramāṇa* will not arise.

In this connection Dharmakīrti rebuts the explanation of the realist that the error is due to the presence of one common character in the mother of pearl and silver both. Every entity, according to Kumārila and also Jaina philosophers, is possessed of two different characters, viz., one, common and another, specific. And it is the former which is responsible for erroneous perception when the specific character is slurred over on account of a defect. Dharmakīrti does not subscribe to this interpretation.

It is not a fact that there are two different characters in the mother of pearl, one, common (to the mother of pearl and silver) and the other, specific. Were it so, it would be perceived to have this twofold character for all times (both in normal and abnormal perception). If, on the other hand, it (the double character) were not perceived, there would be no reason for the supposal that it (the mother of pearl) was possessed of two distinct characters (which are not the factual state. If in spite

of its being one entity with one character it were supposed to be capable of being perceived with the double character), it would lead to undesirable consequences (i. e., everything would appear to be of double character, though it did not have it). [Furthermore if silver character and that of the mother of pearl were actually present, the perception 'it is silver' would be veridical and as such would not be contradicted by the subsequent perceptual judgement 'it is not silver'. These undesirable issues prove that the mother of pearl and so also other entities cannot be possessed of twofold character as maintained by Kumābila. (K. 123, 13-14)]. It must therefore be maintained that when a person perceives the mother of pearl (with all its attributes), he perceives it as a particular distinct individual (and not any common universal in it). On account of the lack of the conditions (such as repeated perception and verification) of definite judgement, he fails to have definitive cognition and is persuaded that he perceives common character. And this leads to the illusory perception of silver. Likewise an average person who fails to notice the numerical difference of things on account of the emergence of similar entities (in quick succession) comes to believe wrongly that the thing perceived is one enduring entity, (whereas he perceives many entities in succession). The number of errors (*samāropa*) is possibly as many as the opposite entities (from which the particular entity is distinguished) due to the previous operation of respective conditions (of error). So there would necessarily be in request as many cognitive proofs (instances of inference) as would be necessary for the successful rebuttal of those errors. These cognitive proofs however are necessarily effective in rebutting the illusions and as such cannot have any function in the way of revealing an unknown trait of the (known) entity, because it has been already perceived in full. Furthermore, entities are devoid of parts and as such there can be no scope for (separate) cognition of an unknown part of it.

**"Therefore the whole character of an entity is perceived when the entity is perceived. But it is not definitely cognized (to be so)**

on account of an error and so (for the rebuttal thereof) an inferential proof is to be adduced." [45]

This is the summarizing verse. Consequently the employment of another *pramāṇa* (inference) is not necessary for the perception of an unperceived character in an entity which has been fully apprehended (by perception).

"But also when an entity is cognized by inference and one attribute (probans) is definitely known, it follows that the entity is known with all other attributes also (and so the inference of the unknown probandum would be as superfluous as was found to be the case with perception)."

[C] According to Dharmakīrti an entity is an indivisible whole which is not capable of being distinguished into a substance and attributes. The substance and the attributes, which are thought of by analytic discrimination, are in reality one identical fact. The distinction is only a conceptual construction. So when an entity is perceived, it is perceived in its entirety, that is to say, with all its attributes. Consequently the entity need not be cognized again by inference or verbal testimony. This has been made out in the previous argument. But inference is also regarded as a separate cognitive proof by the Buddhist logician, though he does not believe in the independent validity of verbal testimony. And inference is possible only on the basis of observed data. The hill is perceived with smoke. The hill and smoke and fire constitute one indivisible whole. When, therefore, the hill is perceived, it must be perceived together with smoke and fire, and so an inference of fire will be redundant. This is the charge against Dharmakīrti's argument and the answer to this charge is given in the second line of the verse.

"But this charge (of the superfluity of inference) does not hold in respect of the negation (of the opposite). [46]

Not only in the case of an entity cognized by perception there is no scope for another cognitive proof (*pramāṇa*), but

even when an inference is also thought to make known an existent fact by way of affirmation without any negative implication, then also the definite cognition of one attribute perforce implies the definite cognition of all other attributes, since the attributes are not different (from the entity known). Such being the case, there would be no scope for another proof. Certainly it is not amenable to reason that when an entity is definitely known, it is not known in respect of a character which is identical with it. But when an inference, on the other hand, serves to rebut a misconception (entailing an error), it does not necessarily rebut any other possible misconception by reason of rebutting one misconception. And for this reason the resort to another inference is made necessary.

[C] An entity is inferred to be perishable on the ground of its being a product. Whatever is a product and as such a new event (*kṛtaka*) is inferred to be perishable (*anitya*). Both the attributes, viz., being a product and being perishable, are predicable of the same entity. But the predicates are not different from the subject, sc., jar. When a jar is known to be a product, it must also be known to be perishable, because the two attributes are part and parcel of and as such identical with the entity in question. So when the minor premise, 'A jar is a product', is known, it must also be known that 'It is perishable', because the two are only conceptually differentiated and in reality they form one indivisible whole. And so the conclusion must have been known beforehand. To this objection Dharmakīrti gives the answer as follows. The objection is irrefutable on the face of it. But inference does not set out to give the positive knowledge of the thing, but aims at rebutting a natural misconception. A thing ought to be known to be perishable if it is known as a product. The analysis of a thing into a substance and attribute, product and perishability, is the outcome of the analytic thought. Though it is perceived as a whole, yet on account of an inherent incapacity induced by the imperfect constitution of the human mind, it is not definitely understood that it has all these attributes. It is the nature of conceptual thought (*vikalpa*) to take hold of one part



or aspect and leave out other aspects. So the minor premise (it is a product) does not deliver the knowledge of the probandum 'it is perishable.' Concepts, though affirmative in form and pattern, are negative in their implication. Thus the concept of a product implies that it is not not-product and does not suffice to enlighten us about its being perishable. The concept of 'perishable' only rebuts the misconception that it is imperishable. Inference has thus a necessary scope of its own which is not covered by perception. The probans and the probandum are both concepts (*vikalpa*) and serve to negative the opposite. Product is one concept and perishable is another and the knowledge of the former does not *eo ipso* extend to the latter. Inference only gives us concepts and not the knowledge of the reality as it is, though the former have a necessary bearing upon the objective real. So the charge of the superfluity against inference is inspired by misconception. And this is what Dharmakīrti seeks to assert in the aphorism '*apohe nāyam doṣaḥ prasajyate*'.

(0) But certainly it cannot be maintained that the cognition of an unknown fact (by means of inference) is always preceded by a misconception (due to error). For instance, the knowledge of fire occasioned by the sudden appearance of smoke (is a case in point), for which no antecedent misconception of non-fire can be supposed to have occurred. (Such being the case), it is not admissible that in every case inference serves to rebut (an antecedent misconception). As has been said (in this connection regarding the contention that inference serves to take stock of a reality), when the subject is cognized, all the attributes belonging to it must be liable to be cognized, because of the identity (of the latter with the former). If, on the other hand, the latter are considered to be different from and other than (the subject), then (the attributes, such as perishability), would not be related (by identity or causality to the subject). In that case it would not be possible that (these attributes unrelated as they are) can be cognized (in the subject). Consequently it must be conceded that a person who observes the site (of smoke) does not have the definite knowledge of its nature (as being possessed of fire). (Q) Why is it so that the

person does not have the knowledge of the full nature of the locality constituted by the possession of fire)? (A) Because of his misconception (as a matter of irrefutable fact that the place of the smoke is not different from one destitute of fire). When a person definitely cognizes the place in question as one (possessed of smoke and) devoid of fire and entertains this belief without slightest reference to the possible occurrence of fire, how can he (such a person) be thought to be free from error? Assuredly if he is not affected by doubt or illusion of its being devoid of the occurrence of fire and has the conviction that it is possessed of fire, he would not take the trouble of investigating the probans (smoke as present in the place as the ground of inference). Now again would he take interest in ascertaining the concomitance in agreement and in difference (of the probans with the probandum. It must therefore be admitted that when a person in a situation takes pains to ascertain the necessary concomitance of smoke with fire, he was certainly suffering from either doubt or illusion regarding the possibility of fire and consequently seeks to eliminate this doubt by the knowledge of fire as a necessary concomitant of smoke).

**“Therefore it has been asserted for the reason set forth above that the probans (that is the minor premise) is employed to secure the knowledge of the elimination of the opposite misconception. Otherwise what would remain uncognized when the subject is known (in full, for the cognition of which particular uncognized element inference would be requisitioned).” [47]**

This verse sums up the argument.

[C] The idea is this. The relation of substantive and adjective as distinct elements is only an abstraction. In fact the adjective is a part and parcel of the substantive and it can be so only if the adjective is identical with the substantive. The hill, for instance, with smoke and fire, is one indivisible whole. Neither the hill nor fire has an independent existence. The two elements are only ideally distinguished. The relation, therefore, of the subject and the predicate which is the datum of logical

thought is only a conceptual construction which may be necessary and unavoidable, but is nothing but a distortion of the real. It is, therefore, contended by Dharmakīrti that when a person makes an inference of fire from smoke, he was not antecedently aware of the real situation that the hill-cum-smoke-cum-fire is an undistinguishable simple fact. So every inference, nay, every judgement is conditioned by an antecedent doubt and ignorance.

But the realist who believes in the numerical difference of the subject and the predicate, the substantive and the adjective, may contend that this assessment of the logical situation is not correct. The occurrence of antecedent doubt or error is not felt. Though the probandum is not known before, it does not argue that the subject is not correctly sized up. The employment of the probans is necessary for the knowledge of the probandum. The knowledge of the subject does not necessarily entail the knowledge of the probandum or of the probans. If the contention of the Buddhist logician were correct, the knowledge of the subject apart from the probans and the probandum also would be erroneous. But this would lead to absolute scepticism. So it cannot be maintained that inference entails the elimination of an error as its presupposition.

This objection is not implausible. But it has to be considered that unless there is knowledge of the minor premise, there is no knowledge of the conclusion. The minor premise states that the probans is present in the subject, sc., hill. When a person sees smoke in a place, actually possessed of fire, but not cognized as such, the knowledge of the presence of smoke in the hill without reference to fire is neither complete nor correct. Assuredly it is not accepted that inference of fire on the ground of observed smoke is preceded by the knowledge that the place was devoid of fire. Certainly this previous knowledge would be accounted as downright error. But though the knowledge of the absence of fire is not the necessary condition of inference, it must be admitted that before inference of fire the place was known to be one as other than one possessed of fire. For instance, the hill in which the fire is inferred was not previously known to be possessed of fire. The difference of hill from other places devoid of fire was not apprehended. The hill possessed of fire and the hill bereft of

fire are different entities. Certainly the previous knowledge of the hill as bereft of fire is not correct and so must be accounted as misconception. Error is not necessarily an act of commission in which a wrong predicate is asserted. Error may consist in an act of omission also. If a necessary element is not cognized and as such the subject is not distinguished from what is not possessed of that element, this imperfect knowledge becomes misleading and as such cannot be distinguished from error. The contention of Dharmakīrti that all inference is antecedently conditioned by such a misconception is inspired by this reflection and it cannot be denied that this reflection is founded on sound appraisal of the psychology of inference.

[Now a question is raised. Let inference be conceded to function by way of elimination of the doubt and error of the opposite and that inference does not directly take stock of a real. The real is only susceptible to perceptual intuition according to the Buddhist. But why should inference fail to apprehend reality? The answer is that inference deals with a conceptual construction, because it is concerned with a concept. All conceptual constructions (*vikalpas*) are by their very nature out of touch with reality. They only serve to rebut a misconception, either in the form of doubt or error. This contention is intelligible, so far as it relates to inference, that is, non-perceptual cognition. But with regard to a determinate perception which arises immediately in the trail of perceptual intuition and only interpretes the content (*ākāra*) of the intuition, it cannot be alleged that it dispenses with misconception. The blue envisaged in perceptual intuition is conceptualized by the determinate perception (*savikalpa*), and there is no doubt or error that the content is not blue. Thus the argument of the Buddhist that all conceptual thought is concerned with the elimination of the opposite misconception falls to the ground, so far as the conceptual knowledge following in the wake of intuition is concerned. This objection is going to be considered in what follows].

“Now when in respect of a perceived datum a determinate judgement arises (in its trail) referring to a conceptualized construction without the obtrusion of the opposite misconception, it also serves to eliminate the unperceived misconception (or doubt) of the opposite of that very datum.” [48]

(Q) When a determinate judgement (*niścayaajñāna*) not occasioned by the knowledge of a probans (that is, not inferential judgement) arises immediately after the intuition of some colour and other (sense-data, such as sound), how can it (the determinate judgement) be considered to be conversant with elimination (of a doubt or error) occurring as it does at the time, when there is no such misconception (present to the mind)?

(A) This (determinate judgement) cannot have a reference to an object which is still subject to misconception. A determinate corrective judgement (which is always of the form that it is so and not otherwise) cannot arise in respect of an aspect which is assailed by an error or doubt as in the judgement ‘It is permanent and possessed of a soul’ in the form (that it is impermanent and devoid of soul).

[C] The verse as well as the gloss of Dharmakīrti are telegraphically brief and the matter is not clearly intelligible without clarification. According to Dharmakīrti the real is one indivisible entity and the differentiation of it into substance, quality and relation binding them in one complex is only the trickery of abstract thought which is necessitated by the constitution of the human intellect. The real, in the language of Kant, a thing in itself, is envisaged according to Dharmakīrti in the simple sense-intuition unmixed with conceptual distinctions. A thing is neither a substance nor quality but an unrelated simple. But the human intellect cannot understand it in its native simplicity. It introduces concepts and seeks to understand it piecemeal. The understanding gives judgement and judgement (*vikalpa*) dealing with the subject and the predicate along with the relation holding them together as parts cannot be supposed to give us the true picture of the real. Though by its very nature it is a distortion of the

intuited real, it serves a useful purpose of rebutting a misconception. The judgement is definitive in character. The simple blue intuited is interpreted in a definite way that it is blue and not anything else. In inference we have seen how Dharmakīrti succeeds in making out the presence of a misconception, either in the form of doubt or wrong judgement. In perceptual judgement following immediately in the wake of a sense-intuition, the content of the latter is only made definite that it is blue or harsh or sweet. But the datum clarified and made definite by the judgement was not apparently subject to doubt or error. So the general rule formulated by Dharmakīrti that it (judgement) eliminates an actual misconception antecedent to it cannot hold good in the case of the perceptual judgement (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*).

Dharmakīrti meets this charge as follows. True, there is no felt misconception, error or doubt regarding the datum. The blue intuited is determined just as blue and thus put under a class concept. This blue is understood as an instance of the blue class which comprises an infinite number of blues. The judgement may be intrinsically untrue, being interspersed with concepts. In the language of Kant, it is categorized knowledge. But this categorization and conceptualization does not eliminate a misconception. The judgement 'it is blue' is not preceded by the error 'it is not blue' or doubt 'it is blue or not blue'. Dharmakīrti admits all this argument as correct. But he asserts that the judgement 'it is blue' implies the negation of the opposite 'it is not blue'. This opposite conception may not be felt, but it is logically presupposed. It, therefore, follows that the judgement, whether inferential or perceptual, is only a logical construction and necessarily contradicts the opposite conception.

But an objection may be raised. In inference the misconception is bodily present as an antecedent condition, whereas in perceptual judgement the negation of the opposite (*anyāpoha*) is a logical implication. So there is admittedly a pronounced difference in the procedure of the negation of the opposite. Kaṇṇaka-gomin meets this objection in the following way. Even in the case of antecedent misconception bodily present, the verbal or inferential judgement does not directly negate the opposite



misconception. The probans only stands in relation with the probandum, e. g., smoke with fire. A word also gives a positive meaning. But the negation of the opposite takes place in the following way. The previous misconception, doubt or error of the absence of the probandum, fire, being a momentary event, ceases to exist in the next moment. When the definite knowledge of the probandum or of the verbal meaning occurs, re-emergence of the misconception is made impossible. The judgement 'it is shell' by its very presence makes impossible the re-emergence of the wrong judgement 'it is silver'. In the case of the perceptual judgement the knowledge of blue does not leave room for the emergence of the opposite misconception 'it is not blue'. In other words, when a definite judgement occurs, the opposite judgement does not emerge, because the two are contradictorily opposed. Thus when the shell-silver error is succeeded by the judgement 'it is shell', the erroneous judgement 'it is silver' gives way and does not arise again. So there is no lack of uniformity in the procedure of the negation of the opposite. A word also gives a positive meaning, cow etc. . The negation of the opposite that it is not not-cow is effected by the definite knowledge of the meaning 'it is a cow and so not not-cow'. The objection of Kumārila that a pure negation is unintelligible and is opposed to the testimony of experience is wide of the mark. The negation of the opposite is the equivalent of the universal and present in all conceptual thought. The perceptual judgement 'it is blue' implies automatical elimination of the misconception 'it is not blue'. This is clarified in the next verse.

(Why should it be so ?)

**'Inasmuch as definite judgement and misconception (are contradictorily opposed in character), the former being contradictor and the latter being the contradicted.'**

It is notorious that an entity, though intuited as different from all (similar and dissimilar things), is not recognized to be such (as a unique particular different from all other similar and dissimilar entities). (Why is it not so recognized ?)

Because some particular aspect may be liable to be intercepted (and thus shut out from the ken of judgement following it). As for instance, the shell character of the shell (is shut out from the view by the presence of a defect leading to error). But in a situation where the percipient is not subject to (a defect which is) the condition of error, there necessarily occurs to him a recollective judgement,<sup>1</sup> though the content of it has been perceived in all its aspects (by the previous intuition). Since a definitive judgement is opposed to and supplants the opposite misconception, the definitive judgement (perceptual, recollective, inferential or verbal)—

**“Finds its scope to function on the elimination of the misconception and this is understood by implication, (when the antecedent misconception is not felt).” [49]**

The elimination of this (misconception) is verily tantamount to the negation of the other (opposite). Such being the case, this (perceptual judgement) also is conversant with the elimination of the opposite misconception (antecedent to it). It is not of the nature of the definite knowledge of a real in its true character. This is apparent from the consideration that when a definite judgement having reference to a particular (aspect as its content) occurs, the knowledge of the other aspects is not found to materialize. Had this (perceptual judgement) been cognisant of the entity in its whole character,

1. The judgement following in the wake of sense-intuition is here set down as recollective in character. But how can it be regarded as recollective, when it does not refer to its content as *that* (*tal*)? A thing cognized in the past is remembered as a past event expressed by the pronoun *that*. *That* is the symbol of a past content of previous cognition. The perceptual judgement identifies the content of the intuition with its own content and thus being conversant with the past datum is characterized as recollection. Though it is of the nature of the recollection, it does not take stock of the entire real in all its aspects. It only gives a fragment which, being abstraction, is only a mental construction. Dharmakīrti contends that all conceptual thought, being piecemeal in character, distorts the real datum and as such cannot be regarded as a valid cognition. This explains the studious exclusion of concepts (*vikalpa*) from the definition of the perceptual cognition by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

this (omission of the other aspects from its content) would not have been possible. [As it has been found that all judgements are cognisant of conceptual constructions and not cognisant of reality in its true character, it follows that]:

**“All definitive judgements as well as verbal assertions correspond by one-to-one relation to the number of misconceptions ascribing wrong attributes and they serve to eliminate these misconceptions and so they have reference to different contents (believed to be objective facts).” [50]**

**“Were it otherwise (that words and judgements are cognisant of a real in its true character), a real would be completely comprehended by one word or one judgement and there would be no other aspect left for (comprehension by) another word or judgement. And thus all words would become synonyms being conversant with the self-same object.” [51]**

These two verses are inserted (with the view of clarification of the antecedent argument).

[C] The argument of Dharmakīrti disposes of the objection of Kumāṛila that, unless words have reference to a real entity, all volitional activity would be impossible. Kumāṛila further argues that if words were occupied only with concepts, they would not give any idea of the external world. It may be contended that the concepts are engendered by funded predispositions and preconceptions and the meanings, though mental constructs are hypostatized as objective facts and so lead to activity towards the external world. But this defence would condemn all verbal statements to play the role of dealing out false ideas and cut them off from the world of reality. This objection does not affect the Buddhist, as he frankly accepts the charge that words deal out unreal concepts and have no truck with reality. But the concepts engendered by intuition have affinity with the perceptual content and are identified with the latter. This accounts for the volitional activity and its success,

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आचार्य धर्मकीर्ति .  
कृतं  
**प्रमाणवार्तिकम्**  
[ स्वार्थानुमानपरिच्छेदः ]  
( स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिसहितम् )



# प्रमाणवार्तिकम्

ॐ नमो बुद्धाय ॥

विधूतकल्पनाजालगम्भीरोदारमूर्तये ।  
नमः समन्तभद्राय समन्तस्फरणत्विषे ॥  
प्रायः प्राकृतसक्तिरप्रतिबलप्रज्ञो जनः केवलं  
नानर्थ्येव सुभाषितैः परिगतो विद्वेष्ट्यपीष्यामलैः ।  
तेनायं न परोपकार इति नश्चिन्तापि चेतश्चिरं  
सूक्ताभ्यासविवर्धितव्यसनमित्यत्रानुबद्धस्पृहम् ॥

अर्थनिर्णयविवेचनस्यानुमानाश्रयत्वात्तद्विप्रतिपत्तेस्तद्व्यवस्थापनायाह ।

पक्षधर्मस्तदंशेन व्याप्तो हेतुस्त्रिधैव सः ।  
अविनाभावनियमाद्धेत्वाभासास्ततोऽपरे ॥ १ ॥

पक्षो धर्मी । अवयवे समुदायोपचारात् । प्रयोजनाभावादनुपचार इति चेत् ।  
न । सर्वधर्मिधर्मप्रतिषेधार्थत्वात्, तदेकदेशत्वात्तदुपचारयोग्यधर्मिधर्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम् । तथा  
च चाक्षुषत्वादिपरिहारः । धर्मवचनेनापि धर्म्याश्रयसिद्धौ धर्मिग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् प्रत्यासत्त्या  
साध्यधर्मिसिद्धिरिति चेत् । न । दृष्टान्तधर्मिणोऽपि प्रत्यासत्तेः । तदंशव्याप्त्या दृष्टान्त-  
धर्मिणि सत्त्वसिद्धेर्धर्मिवचनात् साध्यधर्मिपरिग्रहः । सिद्धे पुनर्वचनं नियमार्थमा-  
शङ्क्येत । सजातीय एव सत्त्वमिति सिद्धेऽपि विजातीयव्यतिरेके साध्याभावेऽसत्त्व-  
वचनवत् । सामर्थ्यादर्थगतौ प्रतिपत्तिगौरवपरिहारार्थं च पक्षवचनम् । पक्षस्य  
धर्मत्वे तद्विशेषणापेक्षस्यान्यत्रानुवृत्तेरसाधारणतेति चेत् । न । अयोगव्यवच्छेदेन  
विशेषणात्, यथा चैत्रो धनुर्धरः । नान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदेन, यथा पार्थो धनुर्धर इत्या-  
क्षेप्स्यामः । तदंशस्तद्धर्मः । वक्तुरभिप्रायवशात् । न तदेकदेशः । पक्षशब्देन  
समुदायावचनात् । व्याप्तिर्व्यापकस्य तत्र भाव एव । व्याप्यस्य वा तत्रैव भावः ।  
एतेनान्वयव्यतिरेकौ यथास्वं प्रमाणेन निश्चितावुक्तौ पक्षधर्मश्च । त एते कार्यस्वभाव-  
नुपलब्धिलक्षणास्त्रयो हेतवः । यथाऽग्निरत्र धूमात् । वृक्षोऽयं शिशपात्वात् ।



प्रदेशविशेषे कचिन्न धट उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धेः । यदि स्यादुपलभ्यसत्त्व एव स्यान्नान्यथा । तेनोपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तसत्त्वस्येत्युक्तं भवति । तत्र द्वौ वस्तुसाधनावेकः प्रतिषेधहेतुः । स्वभावप्रतिबन्धे हि सत्यर्थोऽर्थं न व्यभिचरति । स च तदात्मत्वात् । तदात्मत्वे साध्यसाधनभेदाभाव इति चेत् । न ! धर्मभेदपरिकल्पनादिति वक्ष्यामः । तथा चाह । सर्व एवायमनुमानानुमेयव्यवहारो बुद्ध्यारूढेन धर्मधर्मिभेदेनेति । भेदो धर्मधर्मितया बुद्ध्याकारकृतो नार्थोऽपि । विकल्पभेदानां स्वतन्त्राणामनर्थाश्रयत्वात् । तत्कल्पितविषयादर्थप्रतीतावनर्थप्रतिलम्भ एव स्यात् । कार्यस्यापि स्वभावप्रतिबन्धः । तत्स्वभावस्य तदुत्पत्तेरिति । एतौ द्वावनुमेयप्रत्ययौ साक्षादनुत्पत्तेरतत्प्रतिभासित्वेऽपि तदुत्पत्तेस्तदव्यभिचारिणाविति प्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षवत् । प्रत्यक्षस्यापि ह्यर्थाव्यभिचार एव प्रामाण्यम् । तदभावे भाविनस्तद्विप्रलम्भात् । अव्यभिचारश्चान्यस्य कोऽन्यस्तदुत्पत्तेः । अनायत्तरूपाणाम् सहभावनियमाभावात् ।

यदि तदुत्पत्तेः कार्यं गमकम्, सर्वथा गम्यगमकभावः सर्वथा जन्यजनकभावात् । न । तदभावे भवतस्तदुत्पत्तिनियमाभावात् ।

तस्मात् ।

कार्यं स्वभावैर्यावद्भिरविनाभावि कारणे ।

तेषां

हेतुः

तत्कार्यत्वनियमात् तैरेव धर्मैर्यै तैर्विना न भवन्ति । अंशेन जन्यजनकत्वप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् । न । तज्जन्यविशेषग्रहणेऽभिमतत्वाल्लिङ्गविशेषोपाधीनां च सामान्यानाम् । अविशिष्टसामान्यविवक्षायां व्यभिचारान्नेष्यते ।

स्वभावे भावोऽपि भावमात्रानुरोधिनि ॥२॥

हेतुरिति वर्तते । तादात्म्यं ह्यर्थस्य तन्मात्रानुरोधिन्येव नान्यायत्ते । तद्भावेऽभूतस्य पश्चाद्भावनियमाभावात् । कारणानां कार्यव्यभिचारात् ।

अप्रवृत्तिः प्रमाणानाम्

अनुपलब्धिः

अप्रवृत्तिफलाऽसति ।

सज्ज्ञानशब्दव्यवहारप्रतिषेधफला । उपलब्धिपूर्वकत्वात्तेषामिति । इदं सदसत्प्रतिषेधविधिहेत्वोस्तुल्यं रूपम् । तथा हि सत्त्वमुपलब्धिरेव वस्तुयोग्यतालक्षणा तदाश्रया वा ज्ञानप्रवृत्तिः । ततः सज्ज्ञानशब्दव्यवहारवृत्तेः । असतां चासत्त्वमनुपलब्धिः

असज्ज्ञानफला काचिद्धेतुर्भेदव्यपेक्षया ॥३॥

हेतुरनुपलब्धिः । भेदोऽस्या विशेषणमुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तसत्त्वम् । अत्रानुपलब्धेरलिङ्गादसत्तायामुपलब्धेरभावोऽप्यन्ययानुपलब्ध्या साध्य इत्यनवस्थानादप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । अथोपलब्ध्यभावो विनाऽनुपलब्ध्या स्यात् । तथा सत्ताऽभावोऽपि स्यात् । अपार्थिकानुपलब्धिः । अथान्योपलब्ध्याऽनुपलब्धिसिद्धिरिति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धाऽनुपलब्धिः । तथान्यसत्तयाऽसत्ता किन्न सिध्यतीति । यदा पुनरेवंविधानुपलब्धिरेवासतामसत्ता, तदा सिद्धेऽपि विषये मोहाद्विषयिणोऽसज्ज्ञानशब्दव्यवहारानप्रतिपद्यमानो विषयप्रदर्शनेन समये प्रवर्त्यते । यथा गौरयं सास्नादिसमुदायात्मकत्वादिति । तथा च दृष्टान्तसिद्धिचोदनापि प्रतिव्यूढा । विषयप्रतिपत्तावप्यप्रतिपन्नविषयिणां दर्शनात् । एवमनयोरनुपलब्ध्योः स्वविपर्ययहेत्वभावभावाभ्यां सद्व्यवहारप्रतिषेधफलत्वं तुल्यम् । एकत्र संशयादन्यत्र विपर्ययात् । तत्राद्या सद्व्यवहारनिषेधोपयोगात् प्रमाणमुक्ता । न तु व्यतिरेकदर्शनादावुपयुज्यते । संशयात् । द्वितीया त्वत्र प्रमाणं निश्चयफलत्वात् ।

सा च प्रयोगभेदात्

विरुद्धकार्ययोः सिद्धिरसिद्धिर्हेतुभावयोः ।

दृश्यात्मनोरभावार्थानुपलब्धिश्चतुर्विधा ॥४॥

यावान् कश्चित् प्रतिषेधः स सर्वोऽनुपलब्धेः । तथा हि स द्विधा क्रियेत कस्यचिद्विधिना निषेधेन वा । विधौ विरुद्धो वा विधीयेताविरुद्धो वा । अविरुद्धस्य विधौ सहभावविरोधाभावादप्रतिषेधः । विरुद्धस्याप्यनुपलब्ध्यभावेन विरोधप्रतिपत्तिः<sup>१</sup> । तथा ह्यपर्यन्तकारणस्य भवतोऽन्यभावेऽभावाद्विरोधगतिः । स चानुपलब्धेः । अन्योन्योपलब्धिपरिहारस्थितिलक्षणता वा विरोधो नित्यानित्यत्ववत् । तत्राप्येकोप-

1. Virodhāpratipattiḥ SOR.

विरुद्धस्याप्यनुपलब्धिनिषेधस्य अनुपलब्धिरूपत्वात् तत्राप्यर्थान्तरनिषेधे कार्यकारणमन्तरेण विरोधाऽप्रतिपत्तिः HVNRSS.

लब्ध्याऽन्यानुपलब्धिरेवोच्यते । अन्यथाऽनिषिद्धोपलब्धेरभावासिद्धेः । एकस्य निषेधेनान्याभावसाधने सिद्धैवानुपलब्धिः । निषेधस्यानुपलब्धिरूपत्वात् । तत्राप्यर्थान्तरनिषेधे कार्यकारणयोरनुभयस्य वा । तत्रानुभयस्याप्रतिबन्धात् तदभावेऽन्येन न भवितव्यमिति कुत एतत् । कार्यानुपलब्धावपि नावश्यं कारणानि तद्वन्ति भवन्तीति तदभावः कुतः । तस्मात् कारणानुपलब्धिरेवाभावं गमयतीति । स्वभावानुपलब्धिस्तु स्वयमसत्तैव । तत्र केवलं विषयो साध्यते । अस्यामपि यदा व्यापकधर्मानुपलब्ध्या व्याप्याभावमाह तदाऽभावोऽपीति । इयं प्रतिषेधविषयानुपलब्धिः प्रयोगभेदेन चतुर्धा भवति । विरुद्धसिद्ध्या यथा न शीतस्पर्शोऽत्राग्नेः । एतेन व्यापकविरुद्धसिद्धिरुक्ता वेदितव्या यथा न तुषारस्पर्शोऽत्राग्नेः । विरुद्धकार्यसिद्ध्या यथा न शीतस्पर्शोऽत्र धूमात् । हेत्वसिद्ध्या यथा नात्र धूमोऽनग्नेः । स्वभावासिद्ध्या यथा नात्र धूमोऽनुपलब्धेः । एतेन व्यापकस्वभावासिद्धिरुक्ता यथा नात्र शिशपा वृक्षाभावात् । सर्वत्र चास्यामभावसाधन्यामनुपलब्धौ दृश्यात्मनामेव तेषां तद्विरुद्धानां च सिद्धिरसिद्धिश्च वेदितव्या । अन्येषामभावविरोधासिद्धेः ।

यदि विरुद्धकार्योपलब्ध्याप्यभावसिद्धिः, तत्कारणोपलब्ध्या किं न सिध्यति ?

तद्विरुद्धनिमित्तस्य योपलब्धिः प्रयुज्यते ।

निमित्तयोर्विरुद्धत्वाभावे सा व्यभिचारिणी ॥ ५ ॥

यथा न शीतस्पर्शोऽत्र काष्ठादिति । निमित्तयोः पुनर्विरोधे गमिकैव यथा नास्य रोमहर्षादिविशेषाः सन्ति सन्निहितदहनविशेषत्वात् । एतेन तत्कार्यादपि तद्विरुद्धकार्याभावगतिरुक्ता वेदितव्या यथा न रोमहर्षादिविशेषयुक्तपुरुषवानयं प्रदेशो धूमात् । इयं च हेत्वसिद्धयैव तद्विरुद्धसिद्धिः प्रागेव निर्दिष्टेतीयं प्रयोगभेदादष्टधानुपलब्धिः । तत्र येयं विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धिरुक्ता, तत्र

इष्टं विरुद्धकार्येऽपि देशकालाद्यपेक्षणम् ।

अन्यथा व्यभिचारि स्याद्भस्मेवाशीतसाधने ॥ ६ ॥

यस्तर्हि समग्रेण हेतुना कार्योत्पादोऽनुमीयते स कथं त्रिविधे हेतावन्तर्भवति ।

हेतुना यः समग्रेण कार्योत्पादोऽनुमीयते ।

अर्थान्तरानपेक्षत्वात् स स्वभावोऽनुवर्णितः ॥ ७ ॥

असावपि यथासंनिहितान्नान्यमपेक्षत इति तन्मात्रानुबन्धी स्वभावो भावस्य । तत्र हि केवलं समग्रात् कारणात् कार्योत्पत्तिसंभवोऽनुमीयते समग्राणां कार्योत्पादनयोग्यतानुमानात् । योग्यता च सामग्रीमात्रानुबन्धिनीति स्वभावभूतैवानुमीयते । किं पुनः कारणं सामग्र्याः कार्यमेव नानुमीयते ?

सामग्रीफलशक्तीनां परिणामानुबन्धिनि ।

अनैकान्तिकता कार्ये प्रतिबन्धस्य संभवात् ॥ ८ ॥

न हि समग्राणोत्येव कारणद्रव्याणि स्वकार्यं जनयन्ति । सामग्रीजन्मनां शक्तीनां परिणामापेक्षत्वात् कार्योत्पादस्य । अत्रान्तरे च प्रतिबन्धसंभवान्न कार्यानुमानम् । योग्यतायास्तु द्रव्यान्तरानपेक्षत्वान्न विरुध्यतेऽनुमानम् । उत्तरोत्तरशक्तिपरिणामेन कार्योत्पादनसमर्थेयं कारणसामग्री । शक्तिपरिणामप्रत्ययस्यान्यस्यापेक्षणीयस्याभावादिति । पूर्वसजातिमात्रहेतुत्वात् शक्तिप्रसूतेः सामग्र्या योग्यताऽनन्यापेक्षणीयुच्यते ।

या तर्ह्यकार्यकारणभूतेनान्येन रसादिना रूपादिगतिः, सा कथम् । सापि

एकसामग्र्यधीनस्य रूपादे रसतो गतिः ।

हेतुधर्मानुमानेन धूमेन्धनविकारवत् ॥ ९ ॥

तत्र हेतुरेव तथाभूतोऽनुमीयते । प्रवृत्तशक्तिरूपोपादानकारणसहकारिप्रत्ययो हि रसहेतू रसं जनयति । इन्धनविकारविशेषोपादानहेतुसहकारिप्रत्ययाग्निधूमजननवत् ।

तथा हि ।

शक्तिप्रवृत्त्या

स्वकारणस्य फलोत्पादनं प्रत्याभिमुख्येन

न विना रसः सैवान्यकारणम् ।

रूपोपादानहेतूनां प्रवृत्तिकारणम् । सापि रसोपादानकारणप्रवृत्ती रूपोपादानकारणप्रवृत्तिसहकारिणी । तस्माद्यथाभूताद्धेतो रस उत्पन्नस्तथाभूतमनुमापयन् रूपमनुमापयति

इत्य्

तत्रापि

अतीतैकैकालानां गतिसू

नाऽनागतानां व्यभिचारात्

तत्

तस्मादियम्

कार्यलिङ्गजा ॥ १० ॥

तेन नान्यो हेतुर्गमकोऽस्ति । अप्रतिबद्धस्वभावस्याविनाभावनियमाभावात् । एतेन पिपीलिकोत्सरणमत्स्यविकारादेर्वर्षाद्यनुमानमुक्तम् । तत्रापि भूतपरिणाम एव वर्षहेतुः पिपीलिकादिसंक्षोभादिहेतुरिति ।

हेतुना त्वसमग्रेण यत्कार्यमनुमीयते ।

शेषवत्तदसामर्थ्याद्देहाद्रागानुमानवत् ॥ ११ ॥

समग्राण्येव हि कारणानि योग्यतामप्यनुमापयन्त्यसमग्रस्यैकान्तासामर्थ्यात् । यथा देहेन्द्रियबुद्धिभ्यो रागाद्यनुमानम् । आत्मात्मीयाभिनिवेशपूर्वका हि रागादयोऽयोनिशो-मनस्कारपूर्वकत्वात् सर्वदोषोत्पत्तेः । देहादीनां हेतुत्वेऽपि न केवलानां सामर्थ्य-मस्तीति विपक्षवृत्तेरदृष्टावपि शेषवदनुमानात् संशयः ।

तथा ।

विपक्षेऽदृष्टिमात्रेण कार्यसामान्यदर्शनात् ।

हेतुज्ञानं प्रमाणाभं वचनाद्रागितादिवत् ॥ १२ ॥

न हि रागादीनामेव कार्यं स्पन्दनवचनादयः, वक्तुकामतासामान्यहेतुत्वात् । सैव राग इति चेत्, इष्टत्वान्न किञ्चिद्वाधितं स्यात् । नित्यसुखात्मात्मीयदर्शनाक्षिप्तं सास्त्रवधर्म-विषयं चेतसोऽभिष्वङ्गं रागमाहुः । नैवं करुणादयोऽन्यथापि संभवादिति निवेदयिष्यामः । अत्र यथा रक्तो ब्रवीति तथा विरक्तोऽपीति वचनमात्रादप्रतिपत्तिः । नापि विशेषात् । अभिप्रायस्य दुर्बोधत्वात् । व्यवहारसंकरेण सर्वेषां व्यभिचारात् । प्रयोजनाभावादव्याहार इति चेत्, न, परार्थत्वात् । न युक्तो वीतरागत्वादिति चेत्, न, करुणयापि वृत्तेः । सैव राग इति चेत् । इष्टम् । अविपर्याससमुद्भवान्न दोषः । असत्यप्यात्मग्रहे दुःखविशेषदर्शन-मात्रेणाभ्यासबलोत्पादिनी भवत्येव करुणा । तथा हि सत्त्वधर्माद्यालम्बना मैत्र्यादय इष्यन्ते । एताश्च सजातीयाभ्यासवृत्तयो न रागापेक्षिण्यः । नैवं रागादयो विपर्यासाभावेऽ-भावात् । कारुणिकस्यापि निष्फल आरम्भोऽविपर्यासादिति चेत् । न । परार्थस्यैव

फलत्वेनेष्टत्वात् । इच्छालक्षणत्वात् फलस्य । सर्वथाऽभूतासमारोपान्निर्दोषः । तदन्येन दोषवत्त्वसाधने न किञ्चिदनिष्टम् । वक्तुर्यात्मनि रागादिदर्शनेनान्यत्र तदनुमानेऽतिप्रसङ्गः । व्यभिचारात् । अनन्यानुमाने इहाव्यभिचार इति को निश्चयः । करणगुणवक्तुकामते हि वचनमनुमापयेत् । रागोत्पादनयोग्यतारहिते वचनादर्शनात्तदनुमानेऽतिप्रसङ्ग उक्तः । रागस्यानुपयोगे कथं तच्छक्तिरुपयुज्यते । शक्त्युपयोगे हि स एवोपयुक्तः स्यात् तच्च नास्तीत्युक्तम् । तस्मान्नान्तरीयकमेव कार्यं कारणमनुमापयति, तत्प्रतिबन्धात्, नान्यद्विपक्षेऽदर्शनेऽपि । सर्वदर्शिनो हि दर्शनव्यावृत्तिः सर्वत्राभावं गमयेत् । क्वचित्तथा दृष्टानामपि देशकालसंस्कारभेदेनान्यथादर्शनाद् । यथामलक्यः क्षीरावसेकेन मधुरफला भवन्ति । न चैवं बहुलं दृश्यन्ते । तेनैवं स्याद्युक्तं वक्तुम्, मादृशो वक्ता रागीति रागोत्पत्तिप्रत्ययविशेषेणात्मदर्शनायोनिशोमनस्कारेण योगात् । तदाप्यपार्थको वचनोदाहारः । तस्माद्विपक्षेऽदृष्टिरहेतुः ।

न चादर्शनमात्रेण विपक्षेऽव्यभिचारिता ।

संभाव्यव्यभिचारत्वात् स्थालीतण्डुलपाकवत् ॥१३॥

न हि बहुलं पक्वदर्शनेऽपि स्थाल्यन्तर्गमनमात्रेण पाकः सिध्यति । व्यभिचारदर्शनात् । एवं तु स्यादेवंस्वभावा एतत्समानपाकहेतवः पक्वा इति । अन्यथा तु शेषवदेतदनुमानं व्यभिचारि । किं पुनरेतच्छेषवत् ।

यस्यादर्शनमात्रेण व्यतिरेकः प्रदर्श्यते ।

तस्य संशयहेतुत्वाच्छेषवत्तदुदाहृतम् ॥१४॥

स तस्य व्यतिरेको न निश्चित इति विपक्षे वृत्तिराशङ्क्येत । व्यतिरेकसाधनस्यादर्शनमात्रस्य संशयहेतुत्वात् । न सर्वानुपलब्धिर्गमिका । तस्मादेकनिवृत्त्याऽन्यनिवृत्तिमिच्छता तयोः कश्चित्स्वभावप्रतिबन्धोऽप्येष्टव्यः । अन्यथाऽगमको हेतुः स्यात् ।

हेतोस्त्रिष्वपि रूपेषु निश्चयस्तेन वर्णितः ।

असिद्धविपरीतार्थव्यभिचारिविपक्षतः ॥१५॥

न ह्यसति प्रतिबन्धेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकनिश्चयोऽस्ति । तेन तमेव दर्शयन्निश्चयमाह । तत्रान्वयस्य निश्चयेन विरुद्धतत्पक्ष्याणां निरासः । व्यतिरेकस्यानैकान्तिकस्य तत्पक्ष्यस्य च शेषवदादेः । द्वयोरित्येकसिद्धप्रतिषेधः । प्रसिद्धवचनेन संदिग्धयोः शेषवदसाधारणयोः सपक्षविपक्षयोरपि । अन्यथा ह्यसति प्रतिबन्धेऽदर्शनमात्रेण व्यतिरेके



व्यभिचारिविपक्षेण वैधर्म्यवचनं च यत् ।

यदाह । एष तावन्न्यायो यदुभयं वक्तव्यम्, विरुद्धानैकान्तिकप्रतिपक्षेणेति ।

वैधर्म्यवचनमनैकान्तिकप्रतिपक्षेण ।

यद्यदृष्टिफलं तच्च

यदि तेन विपक्षेऽदर्शनं ख्याप्यते ।

तदनुक्तेऽपि गम्यते ॥१६॥

न हि तस्य प्राग्दर्शनभ्रान्तिर्या वचनेन निवर्त्येत । स्मृतिर्वाचादर्शने क्रियत इति चेत् । दर्शनं खल्वप्रतीयमानमनङ्गमिति युक्तं तत्र स्मरणाधानम् । अदर्शनं तु दर्शनाभावः । स दर्शनेन बाध्यते । तदभावे तु सिद्ध एवेत्यपार्थक्यं तत्सिद्धये वचनम् ।

न वै अनुपलभमानस्य तावता नास्तीति भवति तदर्थं वचनमिति चेत् ।

न च नास्तीति वचनात्तन्नास्त्येव यथा यदि ।

नास्ति स ख्याप्यते न्यायस्तदा नास्तीति गम्यते ॥ १७ ॥

यद्यनुपलभमानो नास्तीति न प्रत्येति वचनादपि नैव प्रत्येप्यति । तदपि ह्यनुपलम्भमेव ख्यापयति । न चैकानुपलम्भोऽन्याभावं साधयत्यतिप्रसङ्गात् । न च तेन नास्तीति वचनात्तथा भवत्यतिप्रसङ्गात् । तत्कथं वैधर्म्यवचनेनानैकान्तिकपरिहारः । तस्माद्वावृत्तिमिच्छता तत्र न्यायो वक्तव्यः, यतोऽस्य व्यावृत्तमिति भवति ।

ननु तदभावेऽनुपलम्भात् सिद्धा व्यावृत्तिः ।

यद्यदृष्ट्या निवृत्तिः स्याच्छेषवद्व्यभिचारि किम् ।

यथा पक्वान्येतानि फलान्येवंरसानि वा रूपाविशेषादेकशाखाप्रभवत्वाद्वा उपयुक्त-  
वदिति । अत्रापि विवक्षिताशेषपक्षीकरणे हेतोः साध्याभावेऽनुपलम्भोऽस्तीति कथं  
व्यभिचारः ? प्रत्यक्षबाधाशङ्का व्यभिचार इत्येके । न । पक्षीकृतविषयेऽभावात् ।  
कदाचिद्भवेदिति चेत् । तथा शङ्कायामतिप्रसङ्गः । अन्यत्राप्यभावनियमाभावात् ।  
वृत्तं प्रमाणं बाधकम् । अवृत्तबाधने सर्वत्रानाश्वासः । व्यतिरेकस्तु सिद्ध एव  
साधनमिति तथाभावनिश्चयमपेक्षते । अनुपलम्भात् क्वचिदभावसिद्धावप्यप्रतिबद्धस्य  
तदभावे सर्वत्राभावासिद्धेः संशयादव्यतिरेको व्यभिचारः शेषवतः ।

किं च

व्यतिरेक्यपि हेतुः स्यान्

नेदं निरात्मकं जीवच्छरीरमप्राणादिमत्त्वप्रसङ्गादिति । निरात्मकेषु घटादिषु दृष्टादृष्टेषु प्राणाद्यदर्शनात् । तन्निवृत्त्यात्मगतिः स्यात् । अदृश्यानुपलम्भादभावा-  
सिद्धौ घटादीनां नैरात्म्यासिद्धेः प्राणादेरनिवृत्तिः । अभ्युपगमात् सिद्धमिति चेत् ।  
कथमिदानीमात्मसिद्धिः । परस्याप्यप्रमाणिका कथं नैरात्म्यसिद्धिः । अभ्युपगमेन च  
सात्मकानात्मकौ विभज्य तत्राभावेन गमकत्वं कथयता आगमिकत्वमात्मनि प्रतिपन्नं  
स्यात् । नानुमेयत्वम् । तस्माददर्शनेऽप्यात्मनोनिवृत्त्यसिद्धेः, तन्निवृत्तौ कचिन्नि-  
वृत्तावपि प्राणादीनामप्रतिबन्धात् सर्वत्र निवृत्त्यसिद्धेरगमकत्वम् । याप्यसिद्धियोजना  
तथा सपक्षे सन्नसन्नित्येवमादिष्वपि यथायोगमुदाहर्यमित्येवमादिका ।

सापि

न वाच्याऽसिद्धियोजना ॥१८॥

अनुपलम्भ एव संशयात् । उपलम्भे तदभावात् । अनुपलम्भाच्च व्यतिरेक इति  
संशयितोऽनिवार्यः स्यात् । यथायोगवचनादनिवारित एवेति चेत् । न । य एव  
तूभयनिश्चितवाचीत्यादिवचनात् । तेनानुपलम्भेऽपि संशयादनिवृत्तिं मन्यमानः  
तत्प्रतिषेधमाह ।

किं च

विशेषस्य व्यवच्छेदहेतुता स्याददर्शनात् ।

श्रावणत्वस्यापि नित्यानित्ययोरदर्शनाद्व्यावृत्तिरिति तद्व्यवच्छेदहेतुता स्यात् ।  
न हि तद्व्यावृत्तेरन्यद्व्यवच्छेदनम् । अव्यवच्छेदस्तु कुतश्चिद्व्यावृत्तेरेवानिश्चयात् ।  
यो हि यत्र नास्तीति निश्चितः स भवंस्तदभावं कथं न गमयेत् ।

प्रमाणान्तरबाधा चेन्

अथापि स्यादुभयव्यवच्छेदे प्रमाणान्तरं बाधकमस्ति । अन्योन्यव्यवच्छेदरूपा-  
णामेकव्यवच्छेदेनान्यविधानादप्रतिषेधः । विधिप्रतिषेधयोर्विरोधात् ।

नेदानीं नास्तिताऽदृशः ॥१९॥

नैवमदर्शनं प्रमाणं बाधासंभवात् ।

तथान्यत्रापि संभाव्यं प्रमाणान्तरबाधनम् ।

लक्षणयुक्ते बाधासंभवे तल्लक्षणमेव दूषितं स्यादिति सर्वत्रानाश्वासः । अनुमान-  
विषयेऽपि प्रत्यक्षानुमानविरोधदर्शनादनाश्वासप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् । न । यथोक्तेऽसंभवात् ।  
संभविनश्चातल्लक्षणत्वात् । विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यवचनमिति चेत् । अनुमानविषयेऽवचना-  
दिष्टम् । विषयं चास्य निवेदयिष्यामः ।

किं च

दृष्टाऽयुक्तिरदृष्टेश्च स्यात् स्पर्शस्याविरोधिनी ॥२०॥

यदि ह्यनुपलम्भेनाभावः सिध्येत् । यदाह । यद्यदर्शनमात्रेण दृष्टेभ्यः  
प्रतिषेधः क्रियते । न च सोऽपि युक्त इति । कथमयुक्तः अनुपलम्भादभावसिद्धेः ।  
ननुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तेः स्पर्शस्य युक्त एव प्रतिषेधः । न युक्तः । दृश्यतस्त्वभाव-  
विषयमात्राप्रतिषेधात् । पृथिव्यादि सामान्येन गृहीत्वाऽयं प्रतिषेधमाह । तत्र च  
तूलोपलपल्लादिषु तद्भावेऽपि स्पर्शभेददर्शनात् । अस्यापि क्वचिद्विशेषे संभवाशङ्कया  
भवितव्यमिति सर्वत्रादर्शनमात्रेणायुक्तः प्रतिषेध इति । एवमाचार्यीयः कश्चिदनुपलम्भा-  
दभावं ब्रुवाण उपालब्धः ।

अपि च

देशादिभेदाद् दृश्यन्ते भिन्ना द्रव्येषु शक्तयः ।

तत्रैकदृष्ट्या नान्यत्र युक्तस्तद्भावनिश्चयः ॥ २१ ॥

यदि कथंचिद्विपक्षेऽदर्शनमात्रेणाप्रतिबद्धस्यापि तदव्यभिचारः । कचिद्देशे  
कानिचिद् द्रव्याणि कथंचिद् दृष्टानि पुनरन्यथान्यत्र दृश्यन्ते । यथा काश्चिदोषधयः  
क्षेत्रविशेषे विशिष्टरसवीर्यविपाका भवन्ति । नान्यत्र । तथा कालसंस्कारभेदात् ।  
न च तद्देशैस्तथा दृष्टा इति सर्वास्तत्त्वेन तथाभूताः सिध्यन्ति । गुणान्तराणां  
कारणान्तरापेक्षत्वात् । विशेषहेत्वभावे तु स्यादनुमानम् । यथाऽदृष्टकर्तृकमपि  
वाक्यं पुरुषसंस्कारपूर्वकमिति । वाक्येषु विशेषाभावात् । सर्वप्रकाराणां पुरुषैः  
करणस्य दर्शनात् ।

नैवमसंभवद्विशेषहेतवः पुरुषा येन वचनादेः किञ्चिन्मात्रसाधर्म्यात्  
 सर्वाकारसाम्यमनुमीयेत । सर्वगुणेषु विशेषदर्शनात् । संस्कारभेदेन विशेषप्रतिपत्तेः ।  
 तद्वदन्यस्यापि संभवात् । असंभवानुमाने च बाधकहेत्वभावात् । वैराग्यादृष्टेः ।  
 अदृष्टेन च बाध्यबाधकभावासिद्धेः । रागाद्यव्यभिचारिकार्याभावात् । संभवेऽपि  
 विशेषाणां द्रष्टुमशक्यत्वात् । तादृशाञ्चाप्रतिक्षेपार्हत्वात् । नैवं वाक्यानि दृश्यविशेष-  
 त्वात् । अदृश्यत्वेऽप्यदृष्टविशेषाणां विजातीयत्वोपगमविरोधात् । तद्विशेषाणाम-  
 न्यत्रापि शक्यक्रियत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षाणां शब्दानामप्रत्यक्षस्वभावाभावात् । भ्रान्ति-  
 निमित्ताभावात् । बाधकाभावाद् भ्रान्त्यसिद्धेः । पुरुषेषु विशेषदर्शनस्य बाधकत्वा-  
 दसमानम् । परभावभूतस्य च वाक्यविशेषस्यातद्विशेषत्वात् । तदभिन्नस्वभावानां सर्वेषाम्  
 पुरुषक्रिया न वा कस्यचित् ।

किं च

आत्ममृच्चेतनादीनां योऽभावस्याप्रसाधकः ।

स एवानुपलम्भः किं हेत्वभावस्य साधकः ॥ २२ ॥

अनुपलम्भं चास्य प्रमाणयत आत्मवादो निरालम्बः स्यात् । अप्रत्यक्षत्वादात्मन-  
 स्तत्कार्यासिद्धेः । इन्द्रियादीनां तु विज्ञानकार्यस्य कादाचित्कत्वात् सापेक्ष्यसिद्ध्या  
 प्रसिद्धिरुच्यते किमप्यस्य कारणमस्तीति । न त्वेवंभूतमिति । नैवं सुखादिकार्यं  
 प्रसाधितं कश्चिदर्थं पुष्णाति । येन केनचित् कारणवत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् । तथा चानुपलम्भ  
 एवात्मनः स्यात् । तं तेन प्रत्याचक्षाणः किमिति प्रतिव्यूढोऽनुपलम्भस्यासाधनत्वादिति ।  
 कथमसाधनं व्यतिरेकं साधयेत् । मृदः खल्वपि कश्चिच्चैतन्यमनुपलभ्यमानमपीच्छन्न-  
 दर्शनाद्वचनादेर्व्यावृत्तिमाह । दध्यादिकं चापरः क्षीरादिष्वपरार्थेषु संघातत्वाददर्शनाद्व्य-  
 तिरेकम् । को ह्यत्र नियमः संहतैरवश्यं परार्थैर्भवितव्यमिति । अस्त्येवोपलम्भो  
 दध्यादीनां क्षीरादिष्वनुमानम् । अशक्तादनुत्पत्तेः । अथ केयं शक्तिः, स एव भावः,  
 उतान्यदेव किञ्चित् । स एव चेत् तथैवोपलभ्येत विशेषाभावात् । अन्यच्चेत्कथमन्यभावे  
 तदस्ति । उपचारमात्रं तु स्यादित्ययमेषां परस्परव्याघातः ।

तस्मात्तन्मात्रसंबन्धः स्वभावो भावमेव वा ।

निवर्तयेत्

यथा वृक्षः शिंशपाम् । शाखादिमद्विशेषस्यैव कस्यचित्तथाप्रसिद्धेः स तस्य स्वभावः । स्वं च स्वभावं परित्यज्य कथं भावो भवेत् । स्वभावस्यैव भावत्वादिति तस्य स्वभावप्रतिबन्धादव्यभिचारः ।

कारणं वा कार्यमव्यभिचारतः ॥ २३ ॥

कारणं निवर्तमानं कार्यं निवर्तयति । अन्यथा तत्तस्य कार्यमेव न स्यात् । सिद्धस्तु कार्यकारणभावः स्वभावं नियमयतीत्युभयथा स्वभावप्रतिबन्धादेव निवृत्तिः ।

अन्यथैकनिवृत्त्यान्यविनिवृत्तिः कथं भवेत् ।

नाश्ववानिति मर्त्येन न भाव्यं गोमतापि किम् ॥ २४ ॥

संनिधानात्तथैकस्य कथमन्यस्य संनिधिः ।

गोमानित्येव मर्त्येन भाव्यमश्ववतापि किम् ॥ २५ ॥

तस्मात्स्वभावप्रतिबन्धादेव हेतुः साध्यं गमयति । स च तद्भावलक्षणस्तदुत्पत्ति-  
लक्षणो वा । स एवाविनाभावो दृष्टान्ताभ्यां प्रदर्श्यते ।

तस्माद्वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ते नेष्टोऽवश्यमिहाश्रयः ।

तदभावे च तन्नेति वचनादपि तद्गतेः ॥ २६ ॥

यतः

तद्भावहेतुभावौ हि दृष्टान्ते तदवेदिनः ।

ख्याप्येते

दृष्टान्ते हि साध्यधर्मस्य तद्भावस्तन्मात्रानुबन्धेन तत्स्वभावतया ख्याप्यते । यः कृतकं स्वभावं जनयति सोऽनित्यस्वभावं सन्तं जनयतीति प्रमाणं दृष्टान्तेनोपदर्श्यते । अन्यथैकधर्मसद्भावात् तदन्येनापि भवितव्यमिति नियमाभावात् साधनस्य साध्यव्यभिचारा-  
शङ्का स्यात् । तेन च प्रमाणेन साध्यधर्मस्य तन्मात्रानुबन्धः ख्याप्यते । स्वकारणादेव कृतकस्तथाभूतो जातो यो नश्वरः क्षणस्थितिधर्मा । अन्यतस्तस्य तद्भावनिषेधात् । हेतुभावो वा तस्मिन् सत्येव भावादिति दृष्टान्तेन प्रदर्श्यतेऽर्थान्तरस्य । तथा प्रसिद्धे तद्भावे हेतुभावे वानित्यत्वाभावे कृतकत्वं न भवति दहनाभावे च धूमः । तथा हि स तस्य स्वभावो हेतुर्वा । कथं स्वं स्वभावं हेतुं वान्तरेण भवेदित्याश्रयमन्तरेणापि वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ते प्रसिध्यति व्यतिरेकः । येषां पुनः प्रसिद्धावेव तद्भावहेतुभावौ तेषाम्

विदुषां वाच्यो हेतुरेव हि केवलः ॥२७॥

यदर्थे दृष्टान्त उच्यते सोऽर्थः सिद्ध इति किं तद्वचनेन तदा । तत्प्रदर्शनेऽपि किं वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताश्रयेणेति मन्यमान आश्रयं प्रतिक्षिपति स्म ।

तेनैव ज्ञातसंबन्धे द्वयोरन्यतरोक्तिः ।

अर्थापत्त्या द्वितीयेऽपि स्मृतिः समुपजायते ॥२८॥

यदाह अर्थापत्त्या वान्यतरेणोभयप्रदर्शनादिति । तत्रापि दृष्टान्तेन तद्भावहेतु-  
भावप्रदर्शनं मन्यमानोऽर्थापत्त्यैकवचनेन द्वितीयसिद्धिमाह । तथा हि यत्कृतकं  
तदनित्यमित्युक्तेऽनर्थान्तरभावे व्यक्तमयमस्य स्वभावस्तन्मात्रानुबन्धी प्रमाणदृष्ट-  
स्तद्भावनियमादिति । ज्ञाततद्भावस्यार्थापत्त्याऽनित्यत्वाभावे कृतकत्वं न भवतीति  
भवति । न हि स्वभावस्याभावे भावो भवत्यभेदात् । अन्यथा तद्भावे भवतीत्येव  
न स्यात् । तथा तदभावे न भवतीत्युक्ते तत एव तद्भावतावेदिनः—तथा  
ह्ययमस्य स्वभावो येन तदभावे न भवति, अन्यथायोगादिति तत्तत्स्वभावताप्रतिपत्त्या  
अन्वयस्मृतिर्भवति । तथा यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरित्युक्ते कार्यं धूमो दहनस्य । येन  
धूमेऽवश्यमग्निर्भवति । अन्यथार्थान्तरस्य तदनुबन्धनियमाभावात् स्वातन्त्र्यं भावस्य  
स्यात् । अतस्तदभावेऽपि स्वभाववैकल्यान्नाभावः । कार्ये त्ववश्यं कारणं  
भवति । इदमेव हि कारणस्य कारणत्वम्, यदर्थान्तरभावे स्वभावोपधानम् । कार्यस्यापि  
तद्भाव एव भावः । तच्चास्ति धूमे । तस्मात्कार्यं धूम इत्यन्वयेन विदिततत्कार्यत्वस्य  
दहनाभावे धूमो न भवतीत्यर्थाद्व्यतिरेकप्रतिपत्तिर्भवति । तथाऽसत्यग्नौ धूमो  
नास्तीत्युक्तेऽग्निधूमे भवत्यवश्यमित्यर्थादन्वयप्रतिपत्तिः । अन्यथा हि तदभावे किं न  
भवेदिति ।

ननु च नित्यानित्यार्थकार्यत्वाभावेऽपि श्रावणज्ञानं न भवति तदभावे ।  
न वै न भवति । तयोरेव ततः संशयात् । अन्यथाऽभावेन निश्चितात्कथं तद्भाव-  
परामर्शेन संशयः स्यात् । केवलं तु भावनिश्चयाभावान्नास्तीत्युच्यते । यदा  
पुनर्दृष्टान्तेन नाग्निधूमयोः कार्यकारणभावः प्रदर्श्यते, तदा यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरित्येव न  
स्यात् । प्रतिबन्धाभावात् । कुतोऽग्न्यभावे धूमो नास्तीत्यर्थाद्व्यतिरेकसिद्धिः ?  
तथा वैधर्म्येणाभावासिद्धेरन्वयस्मृतिः ? तस्माद् दृष्टान्तेनायमेव यथोक्तस्वभावप्रतिबन्धः  
प्रदर्श्यते, एकसद्भावेऽन्यस्य प्रसिद्धयर्थम् । तदभावेऽसंभवात् ।

हेतुस्वभावाभावोऽतः प्रतिषेधे च कस्यचित् ।

हेतुर्

तावेव हि निवर्तमानौ स्वप्रतिबद्धं निवर्तयत इति । कस्यचिदर्थस्य प्रतिषेधमपि साधयितुकामेन हेतोर्व्यापकस्य वा स्वभावस्य निवृत्तिर्हेतुत्वेनाख्येया । अप्रतिबन्धे हि कथमेकस्य निवृत्तिरन्यस्य निवृत्तिं साधयेत् ।

युक्तोपलम्भस्य तस्य चानुपलम्भनम् ॥२९॥

प्रतिषेधहेतुः । प्रतिषेधविषयव्यवहारहेतुस्तद्धेतुरित्युक्तः । स्वयं तथाभूतानुपलम्भस्य प्रतिषेधरूपत्वात् । हेतुव्यापकानुपलब्धिरुभयस्यापि हेतुः ।

इतीयं त्रिविधाप्युक्तानुपलब्धिरनेकधा ।

तत्तद्विरुद्धाद्यगतिगतिभेदप्रयोगतः ॥३०॥

त्रिविध एव हि प्रतिषेधहेतुः । उपलभ्यसत्त्वस्य हेतोस्तथाभावनिश्चये व्यापकस्य स्वात्मनश्चानुपलब्धिरिति । स प्रयोगवशेन तत्तद्विरुद्धाद्यगतिगतिभेदप्रयोगतोऽनेकप्रकार उक्तः । तस्यागत्या तद्विरुद्धगत्या विरुद्धकार्यगत्येत्यादिभेदप्रयोगैर्यथोक्तं प्राक् ।

कार्यकारणभावाद्वा स्वभावाद्वा नियामकात् ।

अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनान्न न दर्शनात् ॥३१॥

अवश्यंभावनियमः कः परस्यान्यथा परैः ।

अर्थान्तरनिमित्ते वा धर्मे वाससि रागवत् ॥ ३२ ॥

इत्यन्तरश्लोकौ ।

अपि च

अर्थान्तरनिमित्तो हि धर्मः स्यादन्य एव सः ।

न हि तस्मिन्निष्पन्नेऽनिष्पन्नो भिन्नहेतुको वा तत्स्वभावो युक्तः । अयमेव खलु भेदो भेदहेतुर्वा भावानां विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः कारणभेदश्च । तौ चेन्न भेदकौ तदा न कस्यचित् कुतश्चिद्भेद इत्येकं द्रव्यं विश्वं स्यात् । ततश्च सहोत्पत्तिविनाशौ, सर्वस्य च सर्वत्रोपयोगः स्यात् । अन्यथैकमित्येव न स्यात् । नामान्तरं वा । अर्थभेदमभ्युपगम्य तथाभिधानात् । नन्वनर्थान्तरहेतुत्वेऽपि भावकालेऽनित्यताऽनिष्पत्ते-



स्तुत्याऽतस्वभावता । न वै काचिदन्याऽनित्यता नाम या पश्चान्निष्पद्येत । स एव हि भावः क्षणस्थितिधर्माऽनित्यता । वचनभेदेऽपि धर्मिधर्मतया निमित्तं वक्ष्यामः । तां पुनरस्य क्षणस्थितिधर्मतां स्वभावं स्वहेतोरेव तथोत्पत्तेः पश्यन्नपि मन्दबुद्धिः सत्तोपलम्भेन सर्वदा तथाभावशङ्काविप्रलब्धो न व्यवस्यति सदृशापरोत्पत्तिविप्रलब्धो वा । अन्त्यक्षणदर्शिनां निश्चयात् । पश्चादस्यानुपलब्ध्याऽस्थितिप्रतिपत्तेर्निश्चयकाल इति तदाऽनित्यता व्यवस्थाप्यते । कार्योत्पादनशक्तेः कारणस्वभावत्वेऽप्यदृष्टतत्कार्यस्य कारणदर्शनेऽप्यप्रतिपन्नतद्भावस्य कार्यदर्शनात् तत्प्रतिपत्तिवत् । अन्यथार्थान्तरमेवानित्यता स्यात्, अन्यनिमित्तत्वेऽनिमित्तत्वे वा । तथा च भावस्तद्वान्न स्यात् । तदनुपयोगात् । उपयोगे वा स एवास्य स्वात्मभूतोऽनित्यतेति किमन्यथा । स्वभावेन वाऽचलस्यार्थान्तरयोगेऽपि तद्भावानुपपत्तेः ।

स चार्थान्तराद्भवन्ननित्यताऽन्यो वा धर्मो हेतुः फलं वा स्यात् । अहेतुफलस्यासंबन्धात् । तत्र भावानुमानस्यासंभवात् ।

तत्र

पश्चाद्भावान्न हेतुत्वं फलेऽप्येकान्तता कुतः ॥ ३३ ॥

स हि निष्पन्ने भावेऽर्थान्तरतः पश्चाद्भवन् कथं तस्य हेतुः स्यात् । फलस्यापि नावश्यं हेतौ भावः इति तद्भावहेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वम् । तन्नार्थान्तरनिमित्तो धर्मो भावेऽवश्यं भावीत्यननुमानम् ।

यदि तर्हि दर्शनादर्शने नान्वयव्यतिरेकगतेराश्रयः कथं धूमोऽग्निं न व्यभिचरतीति गम्यते । यस्मात् ।

कार्यं धूमो हुतभुजः कार्यधर्मानुवृत्तितः ।

येषामुपलम्भे तल्लक्षणमनुपलब्धं यदुपलभ्यते । तत्रैकाभावेऽपि नोपलभ्यते । तत्तस्य कार्यं तच्च धूमेऽस्ति ।

स भवंस्तदभावे तु हेतुमत्तां विलङ्घयेत् ॥ ३४ ॥

सकृदपि तथादर्शनात्कार्यः सिद्धः । अकार्यत्वेऽकारणात् सकृदप्यभावात् । कार्यस्य च स्वकारणमन्तरेण भावेऽहेतुमत्तैव स्यात् । न हि यस्य यमन्तरेण भावः स

तस्य हेतुर्भवति । भवति च धूमोऽग्निमन्तरेण तन्न तद्धेतुः स्यात् । अन्यहेतुक-  
त्वान्नाहेतुकत्वमिति चेत् । न । तत्रापि तुल्यत्वात् । तदभावेऽप्यग्नौ भवतीति ।  
कथं वा ततोऽन्यतो वा अतज्जननस्वभावाद्भवेत् । स्वयमतस्वभावस्याजननात्  
तस्याहेतुता स्यात् । न वै स एव भवति तादृशस्य भावात् । अन्यादृशाद्भवत्कथं  
तादृशः स्यात् । तादृशाद्धि भवंस्तादृशः स्यात् । अन्यादृशादपि तादृशो भावे  
तच्छक्तिनियमाभावान्न हेतुभेदो भेदक इत्यकारणं विश्वस्य वैश्वरूप्यं स्यात् । सर्वं  
वा सर्वस्माज्जायेत । तस्मात्कारणभेदाभेदाभ्यां कार्यभेदाभेदौ । तन्न धूमोऽर्थाद् दृष्टा-  
कारविजातीयाद्भवत्यहेतुकत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

तथा च

नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वाऽहेतोरन्यानपेक्षणात् ।

अपेक्षातो हि भावानां कादाचित्कत्वसंभवः ॥३५॥

स हि धूमोऽहेतुर्भवन्निरपेक्षत्वान्न कदाचिन्न भवेत् । तद्भावे वैकल्याभावादिष्ट-  
कालवत् । तदापि वा न भवेत्, अभावकालविशेषात् । अपेक्षया हि भावाः  
कादाचित्का भवन्ति । भावाभावकालयोस्तद्भावयोग्यताऽयोग्यतायोगात्तुल्ययोग्यताऽयोग्यत-  
योर्देशकालयोस्तद्वत्तेतरयोर्नियमायोगात् । सा च योग्यता हेतुभावात्किमन्यत् ।  
तस्मादेकदेशकालपरिहारेणान्यदेशकालयोर्वर्तमानो भावस्तत्सापेक्षो नाम भवति । तथा  
हि । तथा वृत्तिरेवापेक्षा तत्कृतोपकारानपेक्षस्य तन्नियमायोगात् । तन्नियतदेश-  
कालत्वाद्धूमो यत्र दृष्टः सकृद्वैकल्ये च पुनर्न दृष्टः, तज्जन्योऽस्य स्वभावः । अन्यथा  
सकृदप्यभावात् । स तत्प्रतिनियतोऽन्यत्र कथं भवेत् । भवन्वा न धूमः स्यात् ।  
तज्जनितो हि स्वभावविशेषो धूम इति । तथा हेतुरपि तथाभूतकार्यजननस्वभावः ।  
तस्यान्यतोऽपि भावे न स तस्य स्वभाव इति सकृदपि न जनयेत् । न वा स धूमोऽ-  
धूमजननस्वभावाद्भावात् । तत्स्वभावत्वे च स एवाग्निरित्यव्यभिचारः ।

अग्निस्वभावः शक्रस्य मूर्द्धा यद्यग्निरेव सः ।

अथानग्निस्वभावोऽसौ धूमस्तत्र कथं भवेत् ॥३६॥

धूमहेतुस्वभावो हि वह्निस्तच्छक्तिभेदवान् ।

अधूमहेतोर्धूमस्य भावे स स्यादहेतुकः ॥३७॥

इति संग्रहश्लोकौ । कथं तर्हीदानीं भिन्नात् सहकारिणः कार्योत्पत्तिर्यथा चक्षू-  
रूपादेर्विज्ञानस्य । न वै किञ्चिदेकं जनकं तत्स्वभावम् । किं तु सामग्री जनिका

तत्स्वभावा । सैवानुमीयते । सैव च सामग्री स्वभावस्थित्याश्रयः कार्यस्य । अत एव सहकारिणामप्यपर्यायेण जननम् । यदपि किञ्चिद्विजातीयाद्भवद् दृष्टं गोमयादेः शालू-  
कादि, तत्रापि तथाभिधानेऽप्यस्त्येव स्वबीजप्रभवात् स्वभावभेदः । हेतुस्वभावभेदात् ।  
यथा कदली बीजकन्दोद्भवा । स्फुटमेव तादृशं लोको विवेचयत्याकारभेदात् । तस्मान्न  
सुविवेचिताकारं कार्यं कारणं व्यभिचरति ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाद्यो यस्य दृष्टोऽनुवर्तकः ।

स्वभावस्तस्य तद्धेतुरतो भिन्नान्न संभवः ॥३८॥

इति संग्रहश्लोकः । तस्मात्सकृदपि दर्शनादर्शनाभ्यां कार्यकारणभावसिद्धेर्भवति  
ततस्तत्प्रतिपत्तिः । नान्यथा । अन्वयव्यतिरेकयोर्निःशेषदर्शनादर्शनायत्तत्वात् । कचिद-  
मूर्तत्वे नित्यत्वदर्शनेऽप्यन्यत्रान्यथादृष्टेः । कचिन्नित्यत्वाभावेऽप्यदृष्टस्य पुनर्दृष्टेरिति ।

भवतु कार्यस्य कारणेनाविनाभावस्तदुत्पत्तेः । स्वभाव इदानीं कथम्-  
विनाभावः ।

स्वभावेऽप्यविनाभावो भावमात्रानुरोधिनि ।

यो हि भावमात्रानुरोधी स्वभावस्तत्राविनाभावो भावस्येष्यते ।

तदभावे स्वयं भावस्याभावः स्यादभेदतः ॥३९॥

य एव भावो भावमात्रानुरोधी स्वभाव इत्युच्यते । स एव स्वयं वस्तुतो भावः ।  
स चात्मानं परित्यज्य कथं भवेत् । य एव तर्हि कृतकः स एवानित्यो भेदाभावात् ।

प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशो हेतुः स्यात् । नैष दोषः । यस्मात् ।

सर्वे भावाः स्वभावेन स्वस्वभावव्यवस्थितेः ।

स्वभावपरभावाभ्यां यस्माद्व्यावृत्तिभागिनः ॥४०॥

तस्माद्यतो यतोऽर्थानां व्यावृत्तिस्तन्निबन्धनाः ।

जातिभेदाः प्रकल्प्यन्ते तद्विशेषावगाहिनः ॥४१॥

तस्माद्यो येन धर्मेण विशेषः संप्रतीयते ।

न स शक्यस्ततोऽन्येन तेन भिन्ना व्यवस्थितिः ॥४२॥

सर्व एव हि भावाः स्वरूपस्थितयः । ते नात्मानं परेण मिश्रयन्ति । तस्या-  
 परत्वप्रसङ्गात् । यदप्येषामभिन्नमात्मभूतं रूपं न तत्तेषाम् । तदानीं तेषामभावात् ।  
 तदेव हि स्यादभिन्नस्य भावात् । तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य भिन्नस्य चाभावात् । तस्यैव च  
 पुनर्भेदविरोधात् । तच्चात्मनि व्यवस्थितममिश्रमेव । अर्थान्तरमप्यनेकसंबन्धेऽपि न  
 तत्तेषां सामान्यमतद्रूपत्वात् । द्वित्वादिसंयोगकार्यद्रव्येष्वपि प्रसङ्गात् । न हि संबन्धि-  
 नाप्यन्येनान्ये समाना नाम । तद्वन्तो नाम स्युः । भूतवत् कण्ठेगुणेन । नाभिन्न-  
 प्रत्ययविषयाः । भूतवत् । तदात्मानमेव हि बुद्धिः संसृजन्ती सामान्यविषया प्रति-  
 भासते । नैकसंबन्धिनाविति भूतवत् । तदृशिन्याः सा भ्रान्तिरिति चेत् । तदृशिनीति  
 कुतः । निर्बीजभ्रान्त्ययोगादिति चेत् । त एव तदेककार्या बीजम् । संख्यासंयोग-  
 कार्यद्रव्याद्रिमत्सु भूतादिष्वभावाच्च । तन्न तथा सामान्यबुद्धौ निवेशाभावात् सामान्य-  
 मन्यत् । सति वा तस्यापि स्वात्मनि व्यवस्थानादमिश्रणमन्येन । तस्मादिमे भावाः  
 सजातीयाभिमतान्यस्माच्च व्यतिरिक्ताः स्वभावेनैकरूपत्वात् । यतो यतो भिन्नास्तद्भेद-  
 प्रत्यायनाय कृतसन्निवेशैः शब्दैस्ततस्ततो भेदमुपादाय स्वभावाभेदेऽप्यनेकधर्माणः  
 प्रतीयन्ते । तेऽपि शब्दाः सर्वभेदानाक्षेपेऽप्येकभेदचोदनात् तत्स्वलक्षणनिष्ठा एव  
 भवन्ति । तदेकस्मादपि तस्य भेदोऽस्तीति । तस्मादेकस्य भावस्य यावन्ति  
 पररूपाणि तावत्यस्तदपेक्षया व्यावृत्तयः । तदसंभवि कार्यकारणस्य तद्भेदात् । यावत्यश्च  
 व्यावृत्तयस्तावत्यः श्रुतयोऽतत्कार्यकारणपरिहारेण व्यवहारार्थाः । यथा प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकः  
 शब्दः श्रावण इत्यतत्कार्यकारणपरिहारार्थः । तस्मात् स्वभावाभेदेऽपि येन येन धर्मेण  
 नाम्ना यो विशेषो भेदः प्रतीयते न स शक्योऽन्येन प्रत्याययितुमिति नैकार्थाः  
 सर्वशब्दाः । तन्न प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशो हेतुरिति ।

कथं पुनरेतद् गम्यते, व्यवच्छेदः शब्दलिङ्गाभ्यां प्रतिपाद्यते विधिना न  
 वस्तुरूपमेवेति । प्रमाणान्तरस्य शब्दान्तरस्य च प्रवृत्तेः ।

तथा हि ।

एकस्यार्थस्वभावस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य सतः स्वयम् ।

कोऽन्यो न दृष्टो भागः स्याद्यः प्रमाणैः परीक्ष्यते ॥४३॥

एको ह्यर्थात्मा । स प्रत्यक्षः, असिद्धे धर्मिणि साधनासंभवात् । यथानित्यत्वे  
 साध्ये शब्दः । तस्य प्रत्यक्षेणैव सिद्धेः सर्वाकारसिद्धिः । तदन्यस्यासिद्धस्याभावात् ।

भावे वाऽतस्त्वभावत्वम् । न हि यो यदेकयोगक्षेमो न भवति स तत्स्वभावो युक्तः ।  
तन्मात्रनिबन्धनत्वाद्भेदव्यवहारस्य । अन्यथाऽभावप्रसङ्गादित्युक्तम् । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षे  
धर्मिणि तत्स्वभावसाकल्यपरिच्छेदात् तत्रानवकाशा प्रमाणान्तरवृत्तिः स्यात् ।

नो चेद् भ्रान्तिनिमित्तेन संयोज्येत गुणान्तरम् ।

शुक्तौ वा रजताकारो रूपसाधर्म्यदर्शनात् ॥४४॥

यदि दृष्टसर्वतत्त्वस्यापि भावस्य तथा निश्चयप्रतिरोधिना भ्रान्तिनिमित्तेन गुणान्तरं  
न संयोज्यते । यथा शुक्तौ रजताकारः । न हि शुक्तौ द्वे रूपे समानं विशिष्टं च  
तथा प्रतिपत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । अप्रतिपत्तौ वा विवेकेन द्वित्वविकल्पायोगात् । अतिप्रसङ्गाच्च ।  
तस्मात्पश्यन् शुक्तिरूपं विशिष्टमेव पश्यति । निश्चयप्रत्ययवैकल्यात्त्वनिश्चिन्वन्  
तत्सामान्यं पश्यामीति मन्यते । ततोऽस्य रजतसमारोपः । तथा सदृशापरापरोत्पत्त्याऽ-  
लक्षितनानात्वस्य तद्भावसमारोपात् स्थितिभ्रान्तिः । यावन्तोऽस्य परभावास्तावन्त एव  
यथास्वं निमित्तभाविनः समारोपा इति तद्व्यवच्छेदकानि भवन्ति प्रमाणानि सफलानि  
स्युः । तेषां तु व्यवच्छेदफलानां नाप्रतीतवस्त्वंशप्रत्यायने प्रवृत्तिस्तस्य दृष्टत्वात् ।  
अनंशस्य चैकदेशेन दर्शनायोगात् ।

तस्माद् दृष्टस्य भावस्य दृष्ट एवाखिलो गुणः ।

भ्रान्तेर्निश्चीयते नेति साधनं संप्रवर्तते ॥ ४५ ॥

इति संग्रहश्लोकः । तस्मान्नादृष्टग्रहणाय दृष्टे प्रमाणान्तरवृत्तिः ।

वस्तुग्रहेऽनुमानाच्च धर्मस्यैकस्य निश्चये ।

सर्वधर्मग्रहोऽपोहे नायं दोषः प्रसज्यते ॥ ४६ ॥

न केवलं प्रत्यक्षदृष्टे प्रमाणान्तरावृत्तिः क्वचित् । यदानुमानमपि वस्तु विधिना  
प्रत्याययति न व्यवच्छेदकृत् तदैकधर्मनिश्चये तदव्यतिरेकात् सर्वधर्मनिश्चय इति  
प्रमाणान्तरावृत्तिः । न हि तस्मिन्निश्चिते तदात्माऽनिश्चितो युक्तः । यदा  
पुनरनुमानेन समारोपव्यवच्छेदः क्रियते तदा नैकसमारोपव्यवच्छेदादन्यव्यवच्छेदः कृतो  
भवतीति तदर्थमन्यत्प्रवर्तते ।

ननु नावश्यं विपर्यासपूर्वक एवाप्रतीतनिश्चयो भवति । यथाऽकस्माद्धूमादग्नि-  
प्रतिपत्तिः । न हि तत्रानग्निसमारोपः संभाव्यते । तन्न सर्वत्र व्यवच्छेदः क्रियते ।

उक्तमत्र । धर्मिप्रतिपत्तावभेदात् सर्वप्रतिपत्तिः । भेदे वाऽसंबद्धस्य तत्राप्रतिपत्तिरिति । तस्मात्तत्रापि तद्दर्शिनस्तत्स्वभावानिश्चयः, कुतः, विपर्ययात् । स च तं प्रदेशं तद्विविक्तेन रूपेण निश्चिन्वन्नग्निसत्ताभावनाविमुक्त्या बुद्ध्या कथमविपर्यस्तो नाम । तदाकारसमारोपसंशयरहितश्च तत्प्रतिपत्तौ न लिङ्गमनुसरेत् । न च तस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकयोराद्रियेत ।

तस्मादपोहविषयमिति लिङ्गं प्रकीर्तितम् ।

अन्यथा धर्मिणः सिद्धावसिद्धं किमतः परम् ॥ ४७ ॥

इति संग्रहश्लोकः ।

क्वचिद् दृष्टेऽपि यज्ज्ञानं सामान्यार्थं विकल्पकम् ।

असमारोपितान्यांशे तन्मात्रापोहगोचरम् ॥ ४८ ॥

यद्रूपादिदर्शनानन्तरमलिङ्गं निश्चयज्ञानं भवति, तत्कथमसति समारोपे भवद्वयवच्छेदविषयं भवति, समारोपविषये तस्याभावात् । यत्र ह्यस्य समारोपो यथा स्थिरः सात्मक इति वा, न तत्र भेदे निश्चयो भवति ।

निश्चयारोपमनसोर्बाध्यबाधकभावतः ।

न हि सर्वतो भिन्नो दृष्टोऽपि भावस्तथैव प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । क्वचिद्भेदे व्यवधानसंभवात् । यथा शुक्तेः शुक्तित्वे । यत्र तु प्रतिपत्तुर्भ्रान्तिनिमित्तं नास्ति तत्रैवास्य तद्दर्शनाविशेषेऽपि स्मार्तो निश्चयो भवति । समारोपनिश्चययोर्बाध्यबाधकभावात् निश्चयस्य

समारोपविवेकेऽस्य प्रवृत्तिरिति गम्यते ॥ ४९ ॥

तद्विवेक एव चान्यापोहः । तस्मात्तदपि तन्मात्रापोहगोचरम् । न वस्तुस्वभावनिश्चयात्मकम् । तथा हि कस्यचिन्निश्चयेऽप्यन्यस्याप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात् । तत्स्वभावनिश्चये च तस्यायोगात् ।

यावन्तोंऽशसमारोपास्तन्निरासे विनिश्चयाः ।

तावन्त एव शब्दाश्च तेन ते भिन्नगोचराः ॥ ५० ॥

अन्यथैकेन शब्देन व्याप्त एकत्र वस्तुनि ।

बुद्ध्या वा नान्यविषय इति पर्यायता भवेत् ॥ ५१ ॥

इत्यन्तरश्लोकौ ।





